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Introduction
This thesis consists of three studies that examine the feedback effect of capital markets in
general, and capital market participants in particular, on the quality of accounting infor-
mation provided by firms. Specifically, I concentrate on the intersection of conservative
accounting practice and equity price efficiency. I am particularly keen on analyzing the
effect of conservative reporting on the dissemination of information to capital markets
and whether firms benefit from such accounting practice. Additionally, I study how the
accumulation of conservative accounting practices affects the information provided in the
balance sheet and how capital markets react to such information.
In Chapter 1 (co-authored with Beatriz Garcia Osma), we try to tackle the concern
that conservatism might increase information asymmetry. Particularly, lower timeliness
of good news recognition can lead to incorrect inferences regarding a firm’s prospects
from the side of investors. This fact echoed in FASB (2005; 2010), where it was argued
that conservatism may trigger information asymmetry between informed and uninformed
equity investors. To understand whether the timeliness of bad and good news conservative
recognition differently affects information asymmetry, we take the case of insider trading.
In particular, we predict that accounting conservatism influences insiders’ opportunities
to speculate on good and bad news, and thus, insider trading profitability. We find
that greater conditional (unconditional) conservatism is associated with lower (higher)
insiders’ profitability from sales. We find limited evidence that conservatism influences
profitability from purchases. These findings are consistent with our hypotheses on the
different informational roles of conditional and unconditional conservatism, and on the
asymmetric influence of conservatism over the opportunities to speculate on good versus
4
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bad news. Our research design takes into consideration the endogenous nature of insiders’
trading and conservatism. The results are robust to different measures of conservatism
and a number of additional analyses.
In Chapter 2 (co-authored with Beatriz Garcia Osma and Juan Manuel Garćıa
Lara), we take a further step in the analysis of information environment that is generated
through conservative reporting. In particular, we examine the benefits of conditional
conservatism for equity markets. We predict that conservatism helps market participant
to assess firm’s equity underlying value, and mitigates bad news hoarding, thereby im-
proving the information efficiency of stock prices. Consistent with our prediction, we
find that conservatism lowers the probability of sustained duration of equity overvalua-
tion and reduces abnormal short-selling interest. We also document lower penalties for
conditionally conservative firms when they miss earnings forecasts, both in the mid- and
short-run. This is consistent with equity markets applying a lower discount for uncer-
tainty to conservative firms. We corroborate our findings exploiting the passage of SFAS
121 as a plausible exogenous shock to conditional conservatism.
Finally, in Chapter 3 (solo authored), I study how and when the accumulation
of conservative accounting properties in balance sheet numbers might be beneficial for
firms. In particular, I argue that balance sheet conservatism (BSC) was instrumental
in alleviating the adverse consequences of the recent financial crisis. I identify two main
properties of BSC-firms that led to better performance during the crisis: the informational
and cushioning. I document that high BSC-firms raised more capital and obtained lower
cost of debt, due to the former property and reduced earnings volatility and experienced
less assets write-downs, due to the latter. Next, I study whether these translated into a
better performance during the crisis. I find that high BSC-firms outperformed low BSC-
firms both in terms of raw and four-factor model adjusted returns. Further, I document
that firms with higher BSC passed liquidity shocks with lower reductions in investment,
employment and productivity. Overall, BSC benefited both share- and debtholders. Ad-
ditionally, I conduct an out of sample test exploiting the Great Depression setting and
also find that high BSC-firms outperformed low BSC-firms.
This Thesis has benefited from the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of
Education and Science (ECO2016-77579), FEDER (UNC315-EE-3636), CAM (H2015/HUM-
3353), and the International Mobility Program, UC3M. All errors are mine.
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Chapter 1
Accounting Conservatism and the
Profitability of Corporate Insiders
1.1 Introduction
We examine the association between conservatism and insider-trading profitability from
sales and purchases. We argue that firm-level accounting conservatism influences trans-
parency and thus, the opportunities available for insiders to speculate on good and bad
news. Our main focus is on conditional conservatism as it systematically affects the
timeliness of good and bad news recognition. Conditional conservatism refers to the
asymmetric verifiability requirements for the recognition of economic gains versus losses,
which results in earnings that capture unfavourable economic events more quickly and
completely than favourable events (Basu 1997), leading to asymmetric persistence of good
and bad news.1
Prior literature usually regards conditional conservatism as a desirable property of
accounting numbers, which results in high quality information useful to monitor man-
agement (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007, 2011; Louis et al. 2012; Mora
1Conservatism can be classified as conditional or unconditional (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Beaver
and Ryan 2005). Unconditional conservatism refers to the persistent understatement of net assets which
results in unrecognised goodwill (of unknown magnitude). It is the result of news independent conser-
vative accounting at the inception of assets and liabilities (Basu 2005a; Ryan 2006). In addition, and
somewhat orthogonally to these notions, the most recent conceptual frameworks refer to “cautious pru-
dence,” and prior work also identifies balance sheet conservatism (Basu 1997, 2001; Sunder et al. 2018).
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and Walker 2015). We build on this literature and argue that conditional conservatism
reduces insiders’ trading profitability. Two key assumptions underpin our prediction.
First, that insiders can earn abnormal returns by exploiting private information (Seyhun
1986; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). Second, that conditional conservatism is positively associ-
ated with decreases in information asymmetry (LaFond and R. Watts 2008; Francis et al.
2013) and that it acts as a corporate governance mechanism that disciplines opportunistic
decision-making, offsetting managerial tendency to hide bad news and accelerate good
news recognition (Watts 2003).
In particular, given that conditional conservatism leads to timely and complete bad
news recognition, when conservatism is high, we expect a reduction in insiders’ opportuni-
ties to speculate on negative news. This should result in lower insiders’ profitability from
sales. In contrast, the prediction on the effect over the profitability from purchases is not
as straightforward. On the one hand, conditional conservatism imposes higher verifica-
tion standards for the recognition of economic gains (Basu 1997). This means that gains
are recognized as the associated cash flows are realized (thus, often with a lag), and could
lead investors to make incorrect inferences regarding firm’s prospects. Then, conservatism
would create opportunities for insiders to speculate on positive news, increasing profitabil-
ity from purchases. On the other hand, prior work shows that conditional conservatism
ameliorates the firm information environment, improving transparency. Conditional con-
servatism is associated with improvements to corporate governance, lowering the incen-
tives for opportunistic managerial behaviour (Watts 2003; Gao 2013), and enhancing
the confirmatory role of accounting, disciplining good news disclosure and increasing its
credibility (Ball 2001; Garcia Osma et al. 2018). Then, conditional conservatism would
act as a disciplining mechanism that leads to truthful disclosure of good news (Guay and
Verrecchia 2007; LaFond and R. Watts 2008), reducing the opportunities to speculate on
good news.
We test our predictions on a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 2003 to 2014.
To measure insiders’ profitability, we focus on opportunistic insiders’ sale and purchase
transactions aggregated at a firm-day level, following Jagolinzer et al. (2011). We classify
9
firms as having high (low) profitability if they earn (do not earn) abnormal returns from
their transactions. To ensure the robustness of our results, we measure conservatism
using two different proxies. The first one is market-based in cross-section (Basu 1997),
and the second is firm-specific (Khan and Watts 2009). Both of the measures are modified
following Banker et al. (2016). In addition, to address potential endogeneity issues, we
run changes analyses and study the effect of an exogenous shock to conservatism: the
mandatory adoption of SFAS-142. For robustness, we examine whether our results are
robust to different categories of insiders (CEO and CFO, Top-5 insiders, and all other
officers and directors). Finally, we study the impact of unconditional conservatism on
insiders’ profitability.
We report the following key findings. First, our results indicate timelier recogni-
tion of bad news in firms where insiders have lower profitability from sales. We find no
systematic evidence of an effect over the profitability from purchases. This reduces the
concerns that conditional conservatism delays the recognition of good news resulting in
higher information asymmetry. In contrast, we find unconditional conservatism is asso-
ciated with greater profitability from insiders’ sales. Unconditional conservatism results
in an understatement of net assets that is news independent (Beaver and Ryan 2005),
and may prevent the recognition of future negative news in a timely manner (Basu 2001).
Our finding is consistent with the view in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Basu (2005a)
that unconditional conservatism is uninformative and largely exists to circumvent taxes
and regulation. Finally, we show that the relation between conditional conservatism and
insiders’ profitability is sensitive to the constraining effect of unconditional conservatism
(Sunder et al. 2018). Because unconditional conservatism pre-empts the recognition of
future bad news, it lowers the negative effect of conditional conservatism on insiders’
profitability. Our results are robust to the use of different measures for insider trading
and conditional and unconditional conservatism, to the inclusion of additional control
variables and to a battery of robustness tests.
Put together, our results contribute to several streams of the literature. We con-
tribute to the literature on insider trading by showing that conditional conservatism
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reduces the ability of insiders to speculate on private information. This adds to the work
that evidences negative effects associated with insider trading (e.g., Ausubel 1990; Easley
et al. 1996; Bernardo 2001; Cheng and Lo 2006; Ellul and Panayides 2018) and suggests
conservatism may act as a mechanism against insiders’ opportunistic behaviour, limiting
speculation on negative news. In contrast, we show that unconditional conservatism trig-
gers greater insiders’ profitability from sales, consistent with the view that it increases
information asymmetry. Our evidence has policy implications, as it suggests that greater
conditional conservatism may increase price informativeness and lower information asym-
metry. Ultimately, more efficient prices benefit society as they lead to a more efficient
allocation of resources. Therefore, we also add to the literature on the positive economic
consequences of conditional conservatism (e.g., A. S. Ahmed et al. 2002; Ahmed and
Duellman 2007, 2011; Zhang 2008; Francis and Martin 2010; Louis et al. 2012; Francis et
al. 2013; Garcia Lara et al. 2014; Kim and Zhang 2016).
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Insiders often earn abnormal returns when trading on their own firms by exploiting private
information (Seyhun 1986; Rozeff and Zaman 1988; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Marin and
Olivier 2008; Jagolinzer et al. 2011). While insider trading may accelerate the resolution
of uncertainty, increasing stock price informativeness (Manne 1966; Leland 1992), and
spurning the generation, processing, and communication of private information (Ronen
1977), recent work generally highlights its negative effects. This research suggests that
insider trading may not be Pareto optimal (Ausubel 1990), that it increases cost of
capital (Easley and O’ Hara 2004), and lowers liquidity and firm value (Masson and
Madhavan 1991; Easley et al. 1996). We add to this literature by examining the role of
conservatism in influencing insiders’ opportunities to speculate on good and bad news and
by proposing conditional conservatism as a plausible mechanism that limits the negative
effects of insider trading.
Conservatism is partly non-discretionary and determined by accounting regulation
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(Lawrence et al. 2013), taxation, litigation risk, and innate firm characteristics, such
as firm size, capital structure or growth opportunities (Watts 2003;Roychowdhury and
Watts 2007; Qiang 2007b; Khan and Watts 2009), making it fairly exogenous to the
current generation of managers.2 Concerns exist that conservatism may lead to ineffi-
cient decision-making because of the bias it introduces in financial reporting (Guay and
Verrecchia 2006; Gigler et al. 2009).3 However, most of the existing work concludes that
conditional conservatism is an efficient mechanism associated with a number of positive
economic consequences (Watts 2003; Mora and Walker 2015; Ruch and Taylor 2015). In
line with this latter literature, we present a bright side of conditional conservatism, acting
as a tool against opportunistic behavior of insiders in exploiting private information to
trade on negative economic news. Particularly, we argue that conditional conservatism
mitigates information asymmetries between outsiders and insiders through timelier recog-
nition of losses and increasing price informativeness that lowers information asymmetry.
Timely loss recognition also enhances the confirmatory role of accounting, disciplining
good news disclosure. In contrast, we expect that unconditional conservatism introduces
a bias into financial statements that results in higher information asymmetry and higher
insiders’ profitability. We develop our arguments next.
1.2.1 Conditional conservatism and the opportunities of insid-
ers to speculate on good and bad news
Managers are reluctant to disclose negative firm information (Kothari et al. 2009), and
are likely to strategically accelerate the release of good news and to withhold or delay bad
news disclosure.4 Bad news hoarding engenders crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009), and allows
firms to continue investing in poor projects, leading to greater losses on abandonment
(Francis and Martin 2010; Ahmed and Duellman 2011). However, absent any mechanism
2Discretion also exists in conservatism. An ample literature provides evidence of cross-sectional
variation in conservatism, driven by changes in regulation and firm determinants, as well as by firm-level
choices linked both to managerial decision-making and to pressures from boards of directors, auditors,
creditors and other stakeholders (see, e.g. Watts 2003; Mora and Walker 2015; Ruch and Taylor 2015).
3These criticisms are usually focused on unconditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).
4As noted in Kim and Zhang (2016), this behaviour can be explained by the existence of a variety
of incentives linked to earnings- and equity-based compensation, reputation, career concerns, etc.
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that counters the incentives for strategic disclosure, insiders may knowingly hide bad
performance and disclose unverifiable information about potential future growth, to retain
their informational advantage and maximize their profits from insider trading. We predict
that conditional conservatism reduces insiders’ opportunities to trade on bad news for
the following reasons.
First, by imposing lower verification requirements for the recognition of negative
news (possible economic losses) relative to positive news, conditional conservatism leads
to timely and complete dissemination of negative information that managers would oth-
erwise withhold (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Kothari et al. 2010). This disciplines insiders’
opportunistic behaviour by offsetting managerial tendency to disclose information strate-
gically. As a result, bad news flow into the market more quickly than unverifiable good
news, reducing the risk that bad news will be hidden and accumulate (LaFond and R.
Watts 2008; Kim and Zhang 2016), thereby reducing insiders’ opportunities to profitably
trade on bad news information. A growing body of research provides evidence consistent
with this view that conservatism reduces the information asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders (LaFond and R. Watts 2008; Garcia Lara et al. 2014). For example, Francis et
al. (2013), and Kim and Zhang (2016) find that through a decrease in information asym-
metry, conservatism mitigates negative market reactions to bad news (economic losses)
and reduces crash risk. Further evidence consistent with conditional conservatism lead-
ing to improvements in information quality that ameliorate the information environment
and allow investors to better assess firm performance is provided in papers that show
its association with lower cost of equity (Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Li 2015), lower cost
of debt, and better assessment of default risk for lenders (Wittenberg-Moerman 2008;
Zhang 2008; Franke and Muller 2019). Thus, we expect that conditional conservatism
limits the informational advantage of insiders. Reduction in information asymmetry is
an important mechanism to reduce insiders’ profitability (e.g., Aboody and Lev 2000).
Second, beyond this direct effect, a number of scholars have linked conditional con-
servatism to different firm attributes that, in turn, can have an impact on insiders’ trading
practices and profitability. For instance, prior work shows that conditional conservatism
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lowers agency conflicts and is associated with improvements in firm corporate governance
and greater institutional ownership (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Ra-
malingegowda and Yu 2012; Chen et al. 2018). This evidence links with prior work
on the profitability of insider trading, which indicates that, on average, better-governed
firms have lower profitability of insider sales (Dai et al. 2016), and that greater institu-
tional ownership is negatively related with the profitability of insider trading (Bricker
and Markarian 2015).
Further channels through which conservatism may affect insider trading include re-
ductions in earnings management (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia 2006;
Chen et al. 2007; Gao 2013), which should decrease insider-trading profitability since
more profitable trades are possible in firms with greater levels of earnings management
(Summers and Sweeney 1998; Sawicki and Shrestha 2008; Kraft et al. 2014). Finally, con-
servatism improves investment efficiency (Francis and Martin 2010; Bushman et al. 2011;
Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Louis et al. 2012; Garcia Lara et al. 2016). Under condi-
tional conservatism, managers cannot defer the recognition of losses. This disciplines
managers ex ante and reduces the likelihood of investment in poorly performing projects.
Conditional conservatism also improves investment efficiency ex post, by imposing timely
disclosure of poor realizations of ongoing investments, and triggering the early aban-
donment of poor projects. Overall, this results in lower investment in negative NPV
projects, which also alleviates possible information asymmetry coming from managers
who try to withhold negative information about their investments. Lower investment in
poor projects should lead to a reduction of opportunistic speculation on negative infor-
mation from insiders.
Given the previously reviewed evidence, we expect that conditional conservatism
limits insiders’ opportunities to speculate on bad news. Therefore, our first hypothesis
is:
H1: Conditional conservatism reduces insiders’ opportunities to earn abnor-
mal returns on negative news, which leads to a lower profitability from sales.
Regarding good news, conditional conservatism imposes higher verification thresh-
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olds for the recognition of economic gains (Basu 1997; Watts 2003). This means that
the prediction on the effects of conditional conservatism on insiders’ opportunities to
speculate on positive news is not as straightforward. On the one hand, conditional con-
servatism may also reduce insiders’ opportunities to exploit their informational advantage
with regards to good news for at least two reasons. First, conditional conservatism en-
hances the confirmatory role of accounting information, acting as a ‘hard’ benchmark to
evaluate the credibility of alternative sources of information (LaFond and R. Watts 2008),
such as unverifiable good news disclosures and management forecasts. This confirmatory
role disciplines good news disclosure through ex post accountability (Ball 2001; Ball et
al. 2012). Then, conditional conservatism allows other ‘softer’ sources of information to
flourish (LaFond and Watts 2008), lending credibility to good news disclosure and per-
mitting attaining full disclosure (Guay and Verrecchia 2007). Consistent with this view,
Garcia Osma et al. (2018) show that conditional conservatism is associated with greater
frequency and credibility of good news management forecasts. Second, all the previously
documented mechanisms that are linked to greater conditional conservatism (i.e., better
quality corporate governance, greater institutional investor ownership, or lower earnings
management) would also hold for the recognition of good news, also reducing information
asymmetry with respect to positive economic outcomes.
However, on the other hand, the lower timeliness of good news recognition can lead
to incorrect inferences regarding a firm’s prospects from the side of investors. In par-
ticular, the FASB (2005; 2010) has argued that conservatism may trigger information
asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors.5 In this regard, higher
verification standards for the recognition of positive news could lead to delays in reveal-
ing unverifiable economic gains, and thus, to information asymmetry that would grant
opportunities for insiders to speculate on positive news. A number of studies provide
evidence that even sophisticated users of financial statements, such as analysts, do not
fully understand conservatism (Helbok and Walker 2004; Pae and Thornton 2010), giving
5Admittedly, this concern applies mostly to unconditional conservatism, but extends to conditional
conservatism. In contrast to this position, the IASB, in recent years, has began walking back their
objections to conditional conservatism (IASB 2015 Exposure Draft).
15
credence to this view.6
Thus, ultimately, the link between conservatism and the opportunities to speculate
on a firm’s good news is an empirical question. Following the aforementioned discussion,
we propose to test the following second hypothesis:
H2: Conditional conservatism reduces insiders’ opportunities to earn abnor-
mal returns on positive news, which leads to a lower profitability from pur-
chases.
1.2.2 Unconditional conservatism and insider trading profitabil-
ity
Unconditional conservatism refers to the persistent understatement of the book value of
net assets (Beaver and Ryan 2005), and is often viewed as introducing a bias of unknown
magnitude into financial statements (Ball and Shivakumar 2005) and thus, as garbling
the earnings signal and increasing information asymmetry. A classical example would
be the immediate expensing of R&D costs. Under SFAS 2 Accounting for Research and
Development Costs, all R&D outlays are considered expenses, independent of whether
they represent successful innovations or not. Insiders could be better informed about the
future profitability associated with such investments, whilst investors would only observe
the annual R&D expense in the financial statements.7
Given this, we argue that conditional and unconditional conservatism have different
effects on financial statements transparency, and particularly, over the timing of account-
ing recognition. While the principal mechanism of conditional conservatism is its timely
reaction to negative news, unconditional conservatism is news independent and prevents
timely loss recognition (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Pope and Walker 2002; Pae et al. 2005;
Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). Also, it leads to potential over-reporting of losses which
may never be realized. Indeed, unconditional conservatism may provide opportunities for
6In addition, prior evidence would suggest markets do not always understand the links between
accounting choices and earnings persistence (Sloan 1996; Lev and Nissim 2006).
7Alternative sources of information, such as analysts recommendations or management forecasts,
would of course be available both in the described expensing scenario, as well as in a capitalizing scenario,
to complement financial statements.
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earnings management, as it can result in the creation of ‘cookie jar’ reserves, that can be
used to artificially increase earnings when past understatements reverse (Ball et al. 2000;
Jackson and Liu 2010). In addition, prior understatement of asset values (as a result of
unconditional conservatism), restrains the firm future ability to record losses in a timely
manner (Basu 2001, 2005a, Giner and Rees 2001, Beaver and Ryan 2005, Pae et al. 2005).8
This means that more unconditionally conservative firms have a constraint in signaling
future negative economic events (Sunder et al. 2018). Given this, it is likely that insiders
can profitably trade on negative information in more unconditionally conservative firms.
Formally stated:
H3: Unconditional conservatism increases insiders’ opportunities to earn ab-
normal returns on negative news, which leads to a greater profitability from
sales.
Regarding positive news, under unconditional conservatism, asset values are ex-
pected to present their lower bound estimates. This restrains the signalling of potential
good news, increasing information asymmetry (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). If negative
news are not realized, unconditional conservatism could benefit insiders: knowing that
the assets are undervalued in financial statements, insiders can purchase the stock and
sell it in the future. However, the problem with this strategy is that even for insiders it
would be difficult to time the unravelling of prior conservatism. It is not trivial to track
when the company is going to realize gains as conservatism is a ‘sticky’ policy and par-
tially embedded into accounting frameworks. Firms may smooth realizations of earnings
through time (lowering volatility in share prices). Contrary, they may realize earnings
all at once. This would increase stock price. Thus, potentially, firm-insiders with per-
fect foresight and decision-rights on the timing of earnings realizations might profit from
unconditional conservatism. This leads us to our final hypothesis:
8Unconditional conservatism can help managers hide bad news. Consider a simple case: a firm
uses accelerated depreciation for an asset. This is independent of news. Suppose that in year 2, after
accounting depreciation, the asset is valued at 30% of its initial value on the balance sheet (while its
economic value is 75%), and there is an exogenous shock to the asset that lowers its economic value
to 45%. If the firm is unconditionally conservative, there is no need to recognize an impairment, as
its current book value (30%) is lower than its economic value (45%). In contrast, if the accounting
depreciation had matched economic depreciation, the firm would need to recognize an impairment.
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H4: Unconditional conservatism increases insiders’ opportunities to earn ab-
normal returns on positive news, which leads to a greater profitability from
purchases.
1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Computation of insider trading
Following Cohen et al. (2012), we separate insiders into two categories: routine and
opportunistic, and consider only “opportunistic” insiders in our analyses. Routine insiders
are those who trade based on liquidity or other needs, and are identified as those who
trade in the same month for at least three consecutive years. All other insiders are
classified as opportunistic. Thus, at the beginning of each year, insiders are classified
into one of these two categories based on their trading history.9 We hypothesize that if
insiders’ consistently earn profits on their trades, this should signal that those trades are
based on private (non-public) information. To compute insider trading profitability we
follow Jagolinzer et al. (2011). More specifically, we estimate the following four-factor
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model over 180 days after each transaction
(sale and purchase).10
Ri −Rf = α + β1(Rmrt −Rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML+ β4UMD + εt, (1.1)
where Ri is firm’s i daily return, Rf is the daily risk-free interest rate, Rmrt is market
return, and SMB, HML and UMD are the Size, Book-to-Market and Momentum fac-
tors. Finally, α is the average daily risk-adjusted positive return for insider purchases.
Conversely, -α represents profitability for insider sales.11 Internet Appendix, Table 1
9We extend our sample back to 1992 to segregate insiders into these two groups. This is done to
preserve the sample size.
10Following prior literature, we compute abnormal returns over a six-month horizon (Jagolinzer et
al. 2011; Skaife et al. 2013). This is because there is a penalty for profits earned on trades made fewer than
180 days subsequent to prior trades (“short-swing” rule: Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934). In robustness tests, we calculate insider’s profitability over a one-year period (instead of
180 days). Our main inferences are retained.
11Due to data restrictions, we have information on actual sales (not short-selling positions). Thus, in
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provides a replication of Jagolinzer et al. (2011) that validates our method to calculate
insiders’ profitability from sales and purchases. To come to firm-wide net transactions,
we separately account for daily net transactions of all officers and directors.
1.3.2 Measurement of accounting conservatism
Conditional conservatism using Basu (1997)
In our first set of tests, to examine the links between conditional conservatism and in-
siders’ profitability from sales and purchases, we use Basu’s (1997) model as modified
by Banker et al. (2016). These authors argue that the timelier recognition of bad news
relative to good news as measured by Basu (1997) can arise from a fundamentally differ-
ent source - cost stickiness.12 Banker et al. (2016) show that controlling for sticky costs
reveals that conservatism estimates (as used in the extant prior research, such as in Basu
(1997), Ball et al. (2013), or Collins et al. (2014)) are biased more than 25%. Thus, we
follow their method in our first set of tests, modifying Basu’s (1997) model to account
for cost stickiness. The full model is as follows:
Ei,t/Pi,t−1 = β0 + β1DRi,t + β2RETi,t + β3DRi,t ×RETi,t + β4DSi,t
+ β5∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β6DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + εi,t,
(1.2)
where Ei,t/Pi,t−1 is earnings in year t scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning
of the fiscal year. RET is the compounded market-adjusted CRSP stock return over the
fiscal year t. DR is a dummy variable that equals one if RET is negative (i.e., in the case
of bad news) and zero otherwise (i.e., good news). DS is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if there is a decrease in sales from year t− 1 to t and zero otherwise. ∆Si,t/Pi,t−1
is the change in sales from year t−1 to year t that is scaled by the market value of equity
line with the previous literature, we estimate the profitability of sales in the sense of ‘opportunity cost.’
For instance, selling one share when the price goes up by 10% would signal that the insider makes a
loss in a cost of opportunity sense (i.e. without the sale, she would have gained 10% over the estimated
period). In contrast, if the sale of a stock is followed by a 10% decline in price, the insider makes a profit.
12In particular, to avoid adjustment and disposal costs that are associated with the alteration of firms’
operations, managers retain some unused resources when sales fall. Correspondingly, when sales rise,
managers are in need to add additional resources to meet the demand. Given these features, there is an
asymmetric behaviour of costs that can distort inferences about the level of conservative reporting.
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at the beginning of the fiscal year, and ε is an error term. Appendix 1.7 contains further
details on the calculations and definitions of all variables.
In Eq.(2) the β2 coefficient captures the timeliness of good news recognition, while
β3 measures the asymmetric timeliness of bad news recognition relative to good news,
and captures the incremental timeliness of bad news. The sum of β2 and β3 measures the
total timeliness of bad news recognition. In the presence of conservatism, β3 is expected
to be positive and significant.
To assess whether there is an impact of accounting conservatism on corporate insid-
ers’ profitability, we follow extant prior research in conservatism and modify Eq.(1.2) to
include interaction terms with yearly average profitability of corporate insiders (Profit)
and control variables associated with insider trading. Moreover, in line with the literature,
we add a number of controls (Controls) that are likely to affect profitability of insiders.
In particular, we control for firm size, book-to-market ratio and institutional ownership
(Seyhun 1986; Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Piotroski and Roul-
stone 2005; Skaife et al. 2013; Bricker and Markarian 2015; Massa et al. 2015). To control
for the firm information environment we use the number of analysts following the firm
and to control for momentum factor we control for buy-and-hold returns estimated over
the three year period. The main regression under consideration is as follows:
Ei,t/Pi,t−1 = β0 + β1DRi,t + β2Profiti,t+1 + β3DRi,tProfiti,t+1 + β4RETi,t
+ β5RETi,tProfiti,t+1 + β6DRi,tRETi,t + β7DRi,tRETi,tProfiti,t+1
+ β8DSi,t + β9DSi,tProfiti,t+1 + β10∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β11∆Si,t/Pi,t−1Profiti,t+1
+ β12DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β13DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1Profiti,t+1 + β14Xi,t
+ β15DRi,tXi,t + β16RETi,tXi,t + β17DRi,tRETi,tXi,t + β18DSi,tXi,t
+ β19∆Si,t/Pi,t−1Xi,t + β20DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1Xi,t + ψ + ω + εi,t,
(1.3)
where Xi,t is a set of control variables as described above. Profit is our measure of the
profitability from sales or purchases. We expect to observe a difference in conditional
conservatism between firms with high and low insiders’ profitability. Under H1 and H2
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we expect that β7, which captures the incremental timeliness of loss recognition relative
to gains, will be negative and significant. We also expect that the sum of β5 and β7,
capturing the total timeliness of loss recognition will be different from zero. Eq.(3)
includes firm- fixed effects (ψ) to control for the cross-sectional correlation between the
expected components of earnings and returns (Ball et al. 2013), and year- fixed effects
(ω) to control for economy-wide temporal shocks. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and year (Petersen 2009).
Conditional conservatism using Khan and Watts (2009)
Our second measure of conditional conservatism is based on the approach in Khan and
Watts (2009) that permits calculating a firm-year measure. Augmenting the Basu (1997)
model, Khan and Watts (2009) relate timeliness of good news (referred to as G Score) and
incremental timeliness of bad news (referred to as C Score ) to firm-specific characteristics
(size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage). As before, we follow Banker et al. (2016) and
modify Khan and Watts (2009) model to incorporate sticky costs as follows:
Ei,t/Pi,t−1 = α0 + α1DRi,t + α2RETi,t + α3DRi,tRETi,t
+BMi,t−1 × (α4DRi,t + α5RETi,t + α6DRi,tRETi,t)
+ LEVi,t−1 × (α7DRi,t + α8RETi,t + α9DRi,tRETi,t)
+ SIZEi,t−1 × (α10DRi,t + α11RETi,t + α12DRi,tRETi,t)
+ γ1BMi,t−1 + γ2LEVi,t−1 + γ3SIZEi,t−1
+ β1DSi,t + β2∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β3DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1
+BMi,t−1 × (β4DSi,t + β5∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β6DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1)
+ LEVi,t−1 × (β7DSi,t + β8∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β9DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1)
+ SIZEi,t−1 × (β10DSi,t + β11∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 + β12DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1) + εi,t,
(1.4)
where BMi,t−1, LEVi,t−1, and SIZEi,t−1 are the book-to-market ratio, leverage, and size
(see Appendix 1.7 for definitions), respectively, at the beginning of the fiscal year.13 Ta-
13C Score (firm-year conditional conservatism) is defined as α3 +α6BMi,t +α9LEVi,t +α12SIZEi,t.
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ble 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for C Score and G Score. In Panel A, C Score
(G Score) has a mean of 0.210 (0.014) and median of 0.174 (0.068). Conservatism
is present, as expected, throughout the sample (Q1 of C Score is positive). In unre-
ported results, Spearman (-0.253) and Pearson (-0.3316) correlations between C score
and G Score suggest a negative and significant correlation. Our results replicate the
findings of higher asymmetric timeliness as a result of lower good news timeliness (nega-
tive correlation). Overall, the results are in line with the ones of Khan and Watts (2009)
Table 4. This validates our calculations.
Our firm-year measure of conditional conservatism (CSCORE) is the three-year
average of C Score (e.g., for year t, CSCORE is the average over years t, t−1, and t−2).14
A greater value of CSCORE represents a higher degree of conditional conservatism.15
In our tests, we control for determinants affecting insiders’ profitability as defined in the
literature. Our main regression under consideration is as follows:
Profiti,t = β0 + β1CSCOREi,t + β2Controlsi,t + ψi,t + ωi,t + εi,t, (1.5)
where all variables are as previously defined. We include industry- (ψ) and year- (ω) fixed
effects to control for the industry-specific contracting environment and economy-wide
temporal shocks, and cluster standard errors by firm and year (Petersen 2009). Given that
conservatism is a sticky policy, we set industry fixed effects as our benchmark to arrive
at economic significance. However, all tables include the results of main coefficients, once
we control for firm-fixed effects. The dependent variable is alternatively profitability from
sales or from purchases. The coefficient of interest is β1 that is expected to be significant
and negative under H1 and H2.
G Score, is defined as α2 + α5BMi,t + α8LEVi,t + α11SIZEi,t.
14Given lagged values we estimate Eq.(1.4) over the sample from 2001 until 2014 to preserve sample
size.
15Our inferences are retained if we calculate CSCORE as total timeliness of bad news recognition by
summing C Score and G Score.
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1.3.3 Unconditional conservatism
We measure unconditional conservatism as the persistent downward bias in book value
of equity.16 Book-to-market (BTM) is a noisy measure of unconditional conservatism
since there are factors other than conservatism that affect both book and market value
of equity. Following Sunder et al. (2018) we extract these other sources of variation
in BTM . In particular, we control for growth and economic rents, distress, market
sentiment, unrealized mark-to-market gains, and inflation. The residual from Eq.(1.6)
below is our measure of unconditional conservative reporting (UCONS):
BTMi,t = α + β2LTGForecasti,t + β2SalesGrowthi,t + β3IndConcentrationi,t
+ β41/CSIi,t + β51/S&PIndexi,t + β6Profitabilityi,t + β7CreditRatingi,t
+ β8ReturnV olatilityi,t + β9HighInflationi,t + β10AOCIi,t + εi,t,
(1.6)
where BTM is the book value of assets divided by the market value of equity plus
the book value of debt. Long-term growth forecast (LTGForecast) and sales growth
(SalesGrowth) proxy for firm expected growth. Industry concentration (IndConcentration)
controls for the effect of a high rent that results in a lower BTM . 1/CSI is a proxy for
consumer sentiment and 1/S&P accounts for general level of prices that is expected to
affect investors’ sentiments. Profitability, CreditRating and ReturnV olatility control
for distress. HighInflation is an indicator variable that controls for inflation, because
even without conservatism inflation can decrease BTM (Basu 1997). AOCI is accumu-
lated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets and is a proxy for the extent of
fair value accounting.17 Eq.(1.6) includes year- and industry- (ICODE50 in the Fixed
Industry Classification data) fixed effects. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1.7.
UCONS are the residuals from Eq.(1.6). For ease of interpretation, we multiply
16We thank the reviewer for suggesting this measure. We are aware that proxy of Sunder et al. (2018)
captures not only unconditional conservatism, but balance sheet conservatism on average. However, given
that balance sheet conservatism mostly arises from unconditional conservatism (correlation between
Sunder et al. (2018) and Beaver and Ryan (2000, 2005) is 71%) we set this as our main proxy. The
results do hold if we use the measure of Beaver and Ryan (2000, 2005) instead. Please, refer to Internet
Appendix, Table 3.
17See Sunder et al. (2018) for detailed explanations of variables construction and estimation procedure.
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then by -1, so that the higher UCONS, the more unconditionally conservative the firm
is. To control for possible measurement error, we use the three-year average of UCONS
(e.g., for year t, UCONS is the average over years t, t−1, and t−2).18 Internet Appendix,
Table 2 provides a replication of Sunder et al. (2018) that validates our calculation. To
test H3 and H4, we run Eq.(1.5) above, substituting CONS for UCONS. The coefficient
of interest is again β1 which now is expected to be positive and statistically significant.
As before, the dependent variable is either profitability from sales or from purchases.
1.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We study U.S. firms for the period 2003 to 2014. Following Banker et al. (2016) we
exclude financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) between 6000 and 6999)
and those firms with stock price below 1$. Additionally, we exclude observations for
which the annual change in sales exceeds 50% to eliminate large acquisitions that distort
performance measure like earnings and operating accruals. We start our sample in 2003
to avoid the confounding effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 that imposed
stricter regulations for insider trading, particularly in terms of disclosure requirements.19
Insider trading data comes from Thomson Financial Insider Fillings (Form 4 filings),
and covers all transactions made by insiders and their relation to the firm. As noted,
we focus on “opportunistic” insiders since their trades are more likely to be based on
the use of private information. We perform our analysis within sub-groups as different
insiders occupy positions that provide different levels of access to firm-specific information
(Seyhun 1986; Lin and Howe 1990; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Ravina and Sapienza
2010). Particularly, the CEO and CFO are responsible for accounting estimates and the
preparation of financial statements (Skaife et al. 2013). Also, overall, Top-5 insiders have
18Given lagged values we estimate Eq.(1.6) over the sample from 2001 until 2014 to preserve sample
size.
19Brochet (2010) shows an increase in the information content of Form 4 after SOX, and lower insiders’
sales around SOX. Before August 2002, insiders needed to file their trades within ten days after the end
of the calender month in which the transaction occurred, which could result in a delay of up to 40 days
since the trade. SOX requires insiders to file their trades within two business days. In robustness tests,
we increase our sample to cover the period from 1996 to 2014. Our results stay in line with the main
conclusions.
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better access to firm-specific information compared to other insiders (Core et al. 2006).20
Given this, we classify insiders into three categories: (1) CEO-CFO; (2) Top-5; and (3)
Officers and directors other than Top-5 insiders (No Top-5). We focus on open market
sales and purchases and follow the steps detailed in Jagolinzer et al. (2011) in terms of
our data-cleaning process. Accounting information comes from Compustat annual, and is
merged with the insider trading data using six digits CUSIP. Data on daily share prices
and returns comes from CRSP. The data on Institutional ownership is from Thomson
Reuters 13F Holdings database. Finally, analyst coverage data is from I/B/E/S. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels.
[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of our main variables. Panel B contains
variables used in the Banker et al. (2016) and modified Khan and Watts (2009) models.
Panel C contains the controls for insider trading profitability. Panel D presents descrip-
tive evidence on the profitability from sales and purchases of different groups of insiders.
Overall, the evidence reported in Table 1.1 is consistent with prior research, although it
suggests that sample firms are slightly under performing, with over half of them (50.5%)
experiencing bad news (DR=1). It can also be seen that, consistent with previous liter-
ature, on average, insider purchases appear to be more profitable than sales. Moreover,
Panel D presents that trades conducted by the CEO, CFO and Top-5 insiders, on aver-
age, have higher returns compared to other officers and directors. This is consistent with
different insiders having different access to firm-specific information on which to trade
on.
20The Top-5 includes the Chairman of the Board, CEO, CFO, COO and President (Core et al. 2006).
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1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Insiders’ profitability and conditional conservatism
Conditional conservatism as measured by modified Basu (1997)
Table 1.2 presents the results of testing H1 using the modified Basu (1997) model follow-
ing Banker et al. (2016). The baseline regression under consideration is as in Eq.(1.3).
For completeness, we show results segregated into the 3 groups of insiders as previously
described.
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
The first column presents results of Banker et al. (2016) raw model estimation,
Eq.(1.2). The incremental coefficient on negative news, DR × RET , is both positive
and statistically significant (0.273; t-stat = 12.155). This is as expected and indicates
that, on average, firms in the sample are conditionally conservative. The main results
are presented in columns (2) to (7).21 The coefficient of interest is the interaction of
incremental timeliness and insiders’ profitability (β10). As represented in columns (2),
(4) and (6), conservative reporting, on average, decreases insiders’ profit from sales. This
effect is statistically significant for all officer and directors (excluding Top-5 insiders,
column (6)) (-0.395, t-stat=-2.637). Additionally, we report coefficient estimates of β10
with firm-fixed effects. As before, the results are negative for all officer and directors
(excluding Top-5 insiders, column (6)) (-0.354, t-stat=-2.713). Overall, this is consistent
with lower insiders’ profitability from sales in more conditionally conservative firms, and
thus, suggests conditional conservatism is associated with less opportunities to profitably
trade on negative news.
Columns (3), (5) and (7) present the results for insiders’ profitability from pur-
chases. The results support the negative association as predicted in H2. There is some
21We do not report the estimation results of control variables for brevity. Internet Appendix, Table
4 provides the benchmark regression for this specification, where we include all the control variables.
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evidence that conservative reporting has negative effect on CEO-CFO profits from pur-
chases (-0.620, t-stat=-2.007). However, due to limited number of observations, this result
lacks statistical power. For the other groups of insiders, the effect of conditional conser-
vatism on insiders profitability from purchases is statistically insignificant at conventional
levels (-0.365, t-stat=-1.491; -0.054, t-stat=-0.433). Once we control for firm-fixed effects
the results are statistically insignificant for all the groups of insiders. Overall, our re-
sults accept H1 and fail to accept H2, suggesting that conditional conservatism reduces
insiders’ opportunities to profitably trade on bad news.
Conditional conservatism as measured by modified Khan and Watts (2009)
Table 1.3 presents the estimation results of Eq.(1.5), where we use a firm-year measure
of conditional conservatism (CSCORE) based on the modified Khan and Watts (2009)
model.22 As predicted, there is a negative association between conditional conservatism
and insiders’ profitability from sales. The coefficient of CSCORE is negative and signif-
icant for all types of insiders, columns (1), (2) and (3) (-0.254, t-stat = -7.226; -0.209,
t-stat = -5.528; -0.212, t-stat = -3.835). In terms of economic significance, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in CSCORE (0.144) decreases insiders’ profitability by 3.7%, 3%
and 3.1% for CEO-CFO, Top-5 and non-Top-5 groups of insiders, subsequently. Adding
firm-fixed effects does not alter the conclusions, there is still negative and statistically
significant effect of conservative reporting on insiders’ profitability (-0.191, t-stat = -
2.644; -0.178, t-stat = -2.387; -0.221, t-stat = -4.537). Columns (2), (4) and (6) present
the results on the association between conditional conservatism and profitability from
purchases. As in Table 1.2 the effect is statistically insignificant, but not for officers and
directors excluding Top-5 insiders. However, adding firm-fixed effects results in statisti-
cally insignificant effect of conservative reporting on insiders’ profitability for all group
of insiders (-0.047, t-stat = -0.268; -0.011, t-stat = -0.071; 0.145, t-stat = 1.484).
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
22Internet Appendix, Table 5 provides the benchmark regressions for this specification.
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Overall, our results thus far support H1, as we provide evidence of a negative associ-
ation between conditional conservatism and insiders’ profitability from sales. On average,
we fail to accept H2 consistent with the idea of no effect of conditional conservatism over
the opportunities of insiders to profitably trade on good news. Additionally, our results
systematically reveal lower insider trading profitability for officers and directors excluding
Top-5 insiders. The results for the group of CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders have lower
negative statistical significance. This may indicate that top insiders have superior access
to firm-specific information that would allow them to overcome the alleviation of informa-
tion asymmetry by means of conservative reporting (Seyhun 1986; Lin and Howe 1990;
Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). Results are robust to the
inclusion of control variables, firm-, industry- and year-fixed effects and robust standard
errors clustered at the firm and year level.
1.5.2 Additional analyses to account for endogeneity
A concern with our results thus far is endogeneity, and in particular, reverse causality.
One may argue that more insider trading-prone firms are more likely to use conserva-
tive reporting. We try to control for this issue in a number of ways. First, as noted
before, conservatism is a stable property of accounting numbers, which is the result of
accounting choices, regulations, macro-economic factors and innate firm determinants
(Watts 2003;Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Qiang 2007b; Khan and Watts 2009) that
are fairly exogenous to the existing generation of managers. In our analyses, we construct
our conservatism proxy as a three-year average so that it measures prior committent to
conditional conservatism. Second, we include in our models time- and firm-fixed effects to
account for economy-wide temporal shocks and the firm-specific contracting environment
and corporate governance. Third, we study the effect of conservative reporting on in-
siders’ profitability within different groups of insiders that are expected to have different
quality of private information. However, despite these steps, we cannot entirely rule out
endogeneity concerns. A perfect experimental setting would be an exogenous shock to
conservative reporting. However, due to the absence of such a shock, in this section, we
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propose additional analyses to mitigate this concern.
First, we repeat our main analyses using a changes specification. In particular,
we study the association between current changes in conservatism and future changes in
insiders’ profitability. Additionally, to mitigate the issue of reverse causality we introduce
a current change in insiders’ profitability (Profiti,t) as follows:
∆Profiti,t+1 = β0 +β1∆CSCOREi,t+β2∆Profiti,t+β3∆Controlsi,t+ψi,t+ωi,t+ εi,t+1,
(1.7)
Table 1.4 presents the estimation results of Eq.(1.7). Columns (1), (3) and (5) indicate
a negative association between conditional conservatism and insiders’ profitability from
sales. The results are only significant at conventional levels for all officers and directors
excluding Top-5 insiders (-0.115, t-stat=-2.321). Interestingly, columns (2) indicates a
positive association between conditional conservatism and CEO-CFOs’ profitability from
purchases. Main conclusions remain the same if we include firm-fixed effects.
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
Overall, the results suggest that current changes in conservatism are associated
with lower profitability from sales. Additionally, we find evidence that some insiders may
profit from the asymmetric timeliness of positive news recognition. However, a concern
with this test is the small sample sizes, particularly for the profitability from purchases
analyses (except for the No Top-5 group), and thus, results should be interpreted with
caution.
Conditional conservatism and insider trading, evidence from SFAS 142
As a further robustness test, we use the adoption of SFAS 142 as a plausible external
shock to conservatism. In particular, we follow Cedergren et al. (2017) who study the
period before and after the introduction of SFAS 142. After the effective date of SFAS
142 (June 30, 2001) firms are required to replace periodic amortization of goodwill for
impairments based on a fair value test with write-offs if necessary.23 Moreover, it required
23Before SFAS 142 provision, firms amortized goodwill over a period not exceeding 40 years.
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that a firm’s goodwill is allocated to its reporting value. This resulted in an increase in
goodwill impairments (Li and Sloan 2017). Thus, this regulatory change led to an increase
in conditional conservatism as it increased the timeliness of loss recognition, that before
SFAS 142 could be deferred as periodic expenses (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).24
Goodwill appears as a result of mergers and acquisitions, representing intangible
assets that are acquired in the transaction, but are not separately identifiable (e.g., cus-
tomer loyalty, intellectual capital). The sample of acquisitions is obtained from Thomson
Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. To avoid the confounding
effects of SOX (August 2002) that imposed stricter disclosure requirements for insider
trades, we perform the analysis within a one-year window. In particular, we require that
deals are completed between 2000-Q2 through 2002-Q2, a one-year window around SFAS
142. Following Cedergren et al. (2017) we exclude observations with missing transaction
value, those where the percentage of target’s firm acquired shares is less than 90 percent,
and transactions where the value of the transaction is less than the bottom 1 percent or
more than 100 percent of the firm’s market value at the beginning of the fiscal year.
To test whether the passage of SFAS 142 has an impact on a firm-insiders’ prof-
itability within our sample we consider the following regression:
Profiti,t = β0 + β1T + β2SFAS + β3SFAS × T + β4Controlsi,t + ψi,t + ωi,t + εi,t,
(1.8)
as before, we include calendar quarter fixed-effects (ψ) setting 2000Q2 as a benchmark,
industry (4-digit SIC) -fixed effects (ω) and clustered standard errors by firm and time
(ε). SFAS is a dummy variable equal to one for all observations after 2001-Q2, when
SFAS 142 became effective, and zero otherwise. T is a dummy variable equal to one if
the firm had at least one M&A deal before SFAS 142, and zero otherwise. SFAS × T
captures the effect of SFAS 142 (increase in conditional conservatism) on the treated
24Basu (2001, pp. 1336-7) points out that SFAS 142 reduced unconditional (income) conservatism
by stopping goodwill amortization while simultaneously increasing conditional (income) conservatism by
mandating annual goodwill impairment reviews. To the extent that SFAS 142 reduced unconditional
conservatism, and that unconditional conservatism constrains conditional conservatism, we expect that
the overall effect of this regulation will be an increase in conditional conservatism.
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group, and is expected to be negative and statistically significant.
Table 1.5 presents the results on our causal analysis on the links between conditional
conservatism and insiders’ profitability. The coefficient of SFAS×T , β3, is negative and
statistically significant for all groups. Additionally, there is a positive effect for the No
Top-5 insiders group (0.151; t-stat = 2.400). Interestingly, the coefficient on SFAS is
positive and statistically significant for some of insiders’ transactions. Possibly, we might
capture the effect of corporate scandals of early 2000s or the dot.com bubble, where
insiders could possibly profit on firm-specific information. However, this conclusion is
suggestive and requires further analysis.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
Overall, given the restrictions imposed on our sample in these tests, we still fail to
fully assure causality of our results. However, this section provides additional support
for H1 on the negative association between conditional conservatism and insiders’ prof-
itability from sales. The results on H2 are more mixed, but suggest that there may be a
positive association between conservatism and profitability from purchases, particularly,
for those insiders with more direct access to private information. We have argued that
conditional conservatism disciplines good news disclosure, but its confirmatory role only
exists when insiders opt to disclose. While accounting rules mandate timely recognition
of bad news information, disclosure of good news remains voluntary. Also, financial state-
ments are provided on a quarterly basis. This means insiders may still time their actions
and profit from their private information in between reporting periods.
1.5.3 Insiders’ profitability and unconditional conservatism
We now turn to examine whether unconditional conservatism is associated with the prof-
itability of sales (H3) and purchases (H4). To the extent that unconditional conservatism
introduces a bias of unknown magnitude into financial statements, it may create oppor-
tunities for insiders to trade profitably.
[Insert Tables 1.6 and 1.7 about here]
31
Table 1.6 presents estimation results of Eq.(1.5), where we now focus on UCONS.25
It can be readily seen that β1 is positive and statistically significant for insiders’ prof-
itability from sales, but not for purchases (except for non-Top-5 insiders’ group: -0.067;
t-stat = -.2.640) (0.198, t-stat=7.461; 0.185, t-stat=7.773; 0.146, t-stat=6.956). In terms
of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in UCONS (0.21) increases
insiders’ profitability by 4.2%, 3.7% and 0.029% for CEO-CFO, Top-5 and non-Top-5
groups of insiders, subsequently. Adding firm-fixed effects does not alter the conclusions,
there is still positive and statistically significant effect (0.443, t-stat = 9.277; 0.395, t-stat
= 7.335; 0.343, t-stat = 9.037).
Table 1.7 presents the results for the association between current changes in uncon-
ditional conservatism and future changes in insiders’ profitability. As before, β1 is posi-
tive and statistically significant for CEO-CFO and Top-5 insiders’ profitability from sales
(0.176, t-stat=2.755; 0.102, t-stat=2.028). We find no statistically significant evidence
for purchases. Overall, our findings support H3 and our arguments that unconditional
conservatism is a news independent form of conservatism that constrains firm’s signal-
ing of future negative economic events, leading to increased asymmetry of information
and opportunities for insiders to speculate on negative information. Results are robust
to the inclusion of control variables affecting insiders’ profitability, firm-, industry- and
year-fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level.
1.6 Additional Analyses
1.6.1 Cross-sectional analyses
To shed light on the underlying mechanism and ensure the robustness of the conclusions
drawn so far, we conduct a number of split sample analyses to better understand the
effects of conservative reporting. For these analyses, we classify firms into high (low)
portfolios of firm-specific features if the observation is above (below) of the sample median.
25Internet Appendix, Tables 5 and 6 provides benchmark regressions for the specifications in Tables 1.6
and 1.7.
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First, an ample literature suggest that litigation risk is an important determinant
of conditional conservatism (see, e.g., Basu 1997; Ball et al. 2000; Holthausen and Watts
2001; Lang et al. 2003; Huijen and Lubberink 2005; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Lang
et al. 2006; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Qiang 2007b; Chung and Wynn 2008). There is also
evidence for the link between litigation risk and insider trading in Cheng et al. (2016),
which suggests that increases in litigation risk due to lawsuits lead to a decrease in the
volume of insider sales. Given this evidence, we expect the effect of conservatism to vary
with litigation risk, where conservative reporting should play a more significant role in
the reduction of opportunistic behavior in settings with low litigation risk. To check this
assumption, we split our sample into firms with high (above median) and low (below
median) level of litigation risk following Kim and Skinner (2012).
Table 1.8 Panels A presents the results.26 As before, we use our benchmark regres-
sion following Eq.(1.5). The effect of conditional conservatism on insiders’ profitability is
more pronounced in the sample of firms with lower litigation risk. The difference between
firms with high and low litigation risk is statistically significant for all insiders (p-value
< 0.1).27
Second, we separate firms in high and low corporate governance. Garcia Lara
et al. (2009) document that firms with strong corporate governance show significantly
higher levels of conditional conservatism. Thus, we expect that the effect of conservative
reporting to also vary with corporate governance. We measure corporate governance as
a sum of percentage of independent directors on the board, percentage of independent
directors on the compensation committee and institutional ownership. Table 1.8, Panel
B presents the results. The effect of conservative reporting on insiders’ profitability from
sales is more pronounced for the sample with high corporate governance. Although the
difference between firms with high and low corporate governance is only statistically sig-
nificant for CEO-CFO group (p-value < 0.05). Interestingly, we document that the effect
26Similar results are found if we split the sample into firms operating in industries with high and low
litigation risk
27To make sure that our results are not biased by omitting controls for litigation risk, Internet Ap-
pendix, Table 7 and Table 8 additionally control for idiosyncratic risk, stock return volatility turnover
ratio and probability of a litigation (Kim and Skinner 2012) that are associated with firm’s litigation risk
(Jones and Weingram 1996; Gande and Lewis 2009). All the results stay in line with previous findings.
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of conservative reporting on CEO-CFO insiders’ profitability is negative and statistically
significant in low corporate governance firms (p-value = 0.04). However, this result should
be taken with caution given low statistical power (186 observations).
[Insert Table 1.8 about here]
Third, we study firms with high (low) information asymmetry. Again, we use two
separate proxies: the overall informational opaqueness of the firm proxied by the bid-ask
spread, and the quality of their textual disclosure. In particular, we consider a proxy for
“readability” of financial disclosures - the Bog index (Bonsall et al. 2017). It captures
linguistic attributes (e.g. length of sentences, complex words, jargon, etc.) that are
associated with the costs of the language used in financial disclosure. The higher is the
Bog index, the lower is the level of financial disclosure readability. While insiders have
higher profitability from their trades under higher information asymmetry (Aboody and
Lev 2000), in settings with higher informational asymmetry, debt-holders are expected
to require higher level of conservatism to reduce their concerns.
Table 1.8 Panel C evidences more pronounced negative effect of conditional con-
servatism on insiders’ profitability from sales when information asymmetry is high. The
difference between firms with high and low information asymmetry is statistically signif-
icant (p-value < 0.1). We do not find statistically significant difference when we split
sample by ”readability” of financial disclosures in Panel D.
Overall, this section sheds additional light on all our previous findings. First, we
find that the effect of conservative reporting on insiders’ profitability from sales is higher
when firms are expected to be under lower scrutiny from market participants (i.e. lower
litigation risk). Second, consistent with the findings that link conservative reporting with
the decrease in information asymmetry, we find that conditional conservatism reduces
insiders’ profitability from sales in a setting with high information asymmetry. Third, the
demand side for conservatism (i.e. better governed firms) results in a more pronounced
negative effect on insiders’ profitability from sales. Finally, the results on the effect
of conditional conservatism on insiders’ profitability from purchases remain mixed and
weakly positive, suggesting that there might be a positive association in certain settings.
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1.6.2 Additional control variables and alternative proxies
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we consider additional control variables that
are likely to affect insiders’ profitability. In particular, to the extent that CEOs drive
corporate culture (Bushman et al. 2017) and carry out firm policies (Dyreng et al. 2008)
it may be important to control for CEO characteristics. In particular, we control age,
tenure, shareholdings and gender. Additionally, given that an increase in firm size might
be due to inflation rather than growth, we introduce inflation-adjusted size measure.
Finally, Dai et al. (2016) find that corporate governance reduces profitability of insider
sales. We use a composite proxy of corporate governance to examine whether our previous
results are driven by underlying governance structures. See Appendix 1.7 for variables
definitions.
Internet Appendix, Table 9 and Table 10 present the results. Including additional
control variables reduces sample sizes. Of the variables included, share holdings and
corporate governance appear to have a significant negative effect. Additionally, once
we include firm-fixed effect the evidence suggests lower profitability from insider sales
when the CEO is female (not reported). The results obtained confirm the previously
documented effects of conservatism on insiders profitability, both with industry- and
with firm-fixed effects.
[Insert Tables 1.9 and 1.10 about here]
In Table 1.9, Panels A and B we introduce an alternative proxy for insiders’ prof-
itability. In particular, we estimate the Sharpe Ratio as the firm-year insiders’ prof-
itability minus interest rate of one-year Treasure bill scaled by the annualized standard
deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year. The results stay in line with all the pre-
vious findings. Finally, instead of aggregating insiders’ profitability over a year, we let
the dependent variable change on a daily basis (given insiders’ transactions), while all
the control variables we update on a yearly basis. This significantly increases the sample
size. We report the results in Table 1.10, Panels A and B. As before, the results stay in
line with all the previous findings.
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1.6.3 Moderating effect of unconditional conservatism
In our final test, we analyses the constraint hypothesis discussed by Sunder et al. (2018).
Past high levels of unconditional conservatism might prevent the recognition of future
bad news. For example, in the case of accelerated depreciation, write-offs lead to more
conservative values early on, but also, limit future write-offs in case of negative expecta-
tions regarding a firm’s prospects: i.e., assets can only be written-off once. Overall, we
would expect a higher effect of conditional conservatism on insiders’ profitability when
there is a low level of past unconditional conservatism (i.e. higher scope for timely bad
news recognition). We set firms with high level of past unconditional conservatism equal
to one if the level of unconditional conservatism over the past five years (min. three
years) is higher than the median level during the sample period, and zero otherwise.
[Insert Table 1.11 about here]
Table 1.11 presents the results. Following Sunder et al. (2018), we split a sample
into firms with high (low) levels of unconditional conservatism. The results are consistent
with our expectations. In firms with low unconditional conservatism (Panel A) CSCORE
is larger and has higher statistical significance. However, the difference between low and
high levels of unconditional conservatism is only statistically significant for non-Top-5
group of insiders (p-value = 0.04).
1.7 Summary and Conclusion
We predict that accounting conservatism influences insiders’ opportunities to speculate
on good and bad news, and thus, insider trading profitability. We find that greater
conditional (unconditional) conservatism is associated with lower (greater) insiders’ prof-
itability from sales. We also find limited evidence of a positive association between
conservatism and insiders’ profitability from purchases, although this result is sensitive
to model specification. We measure conservatism using a number of different proxies,
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and our research design takes into consideration the endogenous nature of insiders’ prof-
itability.
Our results are consistent with our hypotheses on the different informational roles
of conditional and unconditional conservatism, and on the asymmetric influence of con-
servatism over the opportunities to speculate on good versus bad news. In particular, our
evidence suggests that conditional conservatism ameliorates the firm information envi-
ronment, and that timely and complete recognition of losses reduces the opportunities of
insiders to speculate on negative news. In contrast, greater unconditional conservatism
leads to greater information asymmetry and further opportunities for insiders to prof-
itably trade on their private negative information. These findings may be of particular
interest for regulators, given the ongoing debate on the desirable properties of accounting
information.
Also, for decades, there has existed a debate on whether insider trading should be
allowed (see, e.g., Fishman and Hagerty 1992). Proponents argue that insider trading
increases the informativeness of stock prices, accelerating uncertainty resolution. In con-
trast, those in favor of restricting it argue that insider trading may deter other traders
from acquiring information, following the firm, or trading, leading to lower liquidity and
greater information asymmetry. In this paper, we argue and show that conditional con-
servatism, by imposing a quicker and more complete recognition of bad news, limits the
opportunities for insiders to exploit their information advantage. This has policy implica-
tions, because through conditional conservatism, bad news that insiders would otherwise
not disclose are timely communicated to capital markets, and thus, the potential posi-
tive consequences of insider trading (lower uncertainty) is achieved in a timely manner
(without waiting for trades), while avoiding its negative consequences. This should mean
greater price informativeness and lower information asymmetry. Ultimately, more effi-
cient prices benefit society as they lead to more efficient allocation of resources.
Our study is not without limitations. Private information is produced throughout
the year, while financial statements are only available on a quarterly basis and other
disclosure are also not that frequent, even in firms that provide management forecasts
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and that are followed by many analysts. This provides opportunities for insider trading.
We have argued that conditional conservatism has a disciplining role on disclosure (La-
Fond and R. Watts 2008; Garcia Osma et al. 2018), and also, is associated with good
corporate governance, appeasing concerns that insiders would use private information for
personal profit in the interim between financial statements. However, a pending, relevant
issue linked with conservatism and information flows within the firm refers to further
researching the role of other corporate disclosures.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition of main variables
Variables used in construction of BSC following Sunder et al. (2018)
BTM The book-to-market ration, computed as the ratio of the book value of total
assets to the market value of equity plus the book value of debt
LT Growth Forecast The median of long-term growth estimates by analysts (I/B/E/S data). Missing
values of firms that have at least one non-missing observation within the sample
period are replaced by the closest non-missing value to preserve the sample size.
Sales Ratio of sales to lagged sales
IndustryConcentration Herfindahl index (FIC300HHI) constructed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010,




Published by the University of Michigan, available at
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/tables.html
S&P Level of the S&P’s Composite Index from CRSP
Profitability The ratio of cash flow from operations lagged total assets
Credit Rating The numerical equivalent of S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating from
COMPUSTAT. For firms not rated by S&P, I first regress debt rating on a set
of financial variables, including log of assets, ROA, leverage, dividend indicator,
subordinated debt indicator and a loss indicator, with industry and year fixed
effects for rated firms. Then, I use the estimated coefficients from the first
regression and the firm’s financial information to compute a credit rating for
each firm in each year. The computed rating values are winsorized at 2 and
27 to be consistent with the range of ratings reported in COMPUSTAT. The
value of Credit Rating decreases in credit quality
High Inflation An indicator variable equal to one if the inflation over the past five years is
higher than the median level during the sample period, and zero otherwise.
Inflation is from Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
AOCI Accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets
Variables associated with accounting conservatism
X Net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity
RET Twelve-month market-adjusted stock return ending the last day of fiscal year t
DR Takes the value of one in case of negative or zero market adjusted stock returns
(case of bad news) and zero otherwise (case of good news)
∆S/P Sales change scaled by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year
DS Takes the value of one if sales decreased from the prior to the current fiscal
year and zero otherwise
C Score (G Score) Timeliness of bad (good) news obtained from the modified Khan and Watts
(2009) following Banker et al. (2016)
CSCORE Firm-year measure of conditional conservatism calculated as the three year
average of C Score (e.g. for year t the average consists of t, t-1, t-2).
UCONS Firm-year measure of unconditional conservatism using Sunder et al. (2018)
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Table 1.7 continued
Control variables for insider trading and additional analyses
Log(Size) Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity
Leverage Long-term debt issue plus current liabilities scaled by total assets
B/M Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (total shares outstanding times
price)
Log(1+analyst) Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm
Inst.Ownership Institutional ownership measured as the percentage of common shares outstanding
owned by institutional shareholders
Momentum Buy-and-hold return over three year period
Additional Analysis
CG Corporate governance is defined as a sum of percentage of independent directors on
the board, percentage of independent directors on the compensation committee and
institutional ownership.
Litigation Following Kim and Skinner 2012) we construct a proxy for litigation risk based on
prior year return, return skewness, return volatility, and sales turnover as proxies that
make firms more vulnerable to litigation.
Spread Average monthly relative bid-ask-spread estimated over a period of 60 months (min
24 months). Relative Bid-ask spread = 100 × (Ask - Bid)/(0.5× (Ask + Bid)).
Readability Bog Index (readability measure) created by Bonsall et al. (2017) and obtained from
https://kelley.iu.edu/bpm/activities/bogindex.html
Age CEO age (from Execucomp)
Tenure CEO tenure (from Execucomp)
ShareHoldings CEO share holdings (from Execucomp)
Gender Takes the value of one if the CEO is a female; and zero otherwise (from Execucomp)
SharpeRatio Estimated as firm-year insiders’ profitability minus interest rate of one-year Treasure
bill (from Federal Reserve Bank) scaled by annualized standard deviation of daily
returns over the fiscal year.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of Main Variables
N Mean Std.dev Q1 Median Q3
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of C score and G score
C score 22345 0.210 0.174 0.114 0.193 0.280
G score 22345 0.014 0.068 -0.022 0.013 0.049
Panel B: Variables related to conservatism
X 23962 0.014 0.185 0.009 0.048 0.072
DR 23988 0.505 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
RET 23988 0.066 0.445 -0.188 -0.004 0.219
RET ×DR 23988 -0.114 0.168 -0.188 -0.004 0.000
DS 23966 0.272 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000
∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 23961 0.045 0.407 -0.005 0.042 0.121
∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 23961 -0.068 0.305 -0.005 0.000 0.000
CSCORE 19255 0.222 0.144 0.142 0.199 0.287
UCONS 19016 0.020 0.210 -0.114 0.027 0.168
Panel C: Control variables for insider trading
Log(Size) 23988 7.023 1.855 5.666 6.921 8.263
Leverage 23988 0.209 0.205 0.016 0.180 0.325
B/M 23988 0.533 0.434 0.272 0.451 0.695
Analyst 23988 8.057 7.157 3.000 6.000 11.000
Inst. Ownership 23988 0.645 0.288 0.453 0.713 0.873
Momentum 23988 0.528 1.124 -0.177 0.276 0.860
Panel D: Profitability of insiders
Sales:
CEO-CFO 3788 0.016 0.190 -0.092 0.005 0.111
Top-5 4608 0.016 0.189 -0.091 0.004 0.110
Insiders excluding Top-5 11869 0.008 0.169 -0.079 0.004 0.094
Purchases:
CEO-CFO 1760 0.093 0.275 -0.065 0.073 0.222
Top-5 2001 0.090 0.273 -0.063 0.071 0.218
Insiders excluding Top-5 4561 0.068 0.234 -0.058 0.048 0.172
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of C score and G score as in Khan and Watts
(2009). Panel B contains variables used in the Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009)
models. Panel C contains the variables that are used as controls for insider trading
profitability. Panel D presents descriptive evidence on the profitability of different
groups of insiders. All of the variables are defined in Appendix 1.7. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels.
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Table 1.2: Estimation of the association between corporate insiders’ profitability and
conditional conservatism based on Banker et al. (2016)
Sample CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Mod.Basu Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
DR 0.009* -0.048 -0.211 -0.052 -0.175 0.015 0.023
(2.094) (-0.682) (-1.383) (-0.798) (-1.326) (0.432) (0.386)
RET -0.018 -0.158 -0.073 -0.183* -0.106 -0.059 -0.084
(-1.557) (-1.576) (-0.660) (-1.878) (-1.223) (-0.807) (-0.815)
DR×RET 0.273*** 0.292 -0.431 0.486* -0.111 0.352* 0.174
(12.155) (1.020) (-1.717) (1.948) (-0.402) (1.884) (1.147)
DS -0.028*** 0.103* -0.148 0.069 -0.165** -0.050 -0.096*
(-4.526) (2.166) (-1.594) (1.394) (-2.361) (-1.046) (-1.819)
∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 -0.021* 0.101 -0.368 0.111 -0.383 -0.006 -0.225**
(-1.858) (0.597) (-1.550) (0.644) (-1.795) (-0.042) (-2.826)
∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 0.180*** 0.657* 0.038 0.290 0.058 0.262 0.545***
(6.344) (1.978) (0.089) (1.196) (0.143) (1.391) (4.492)
Profitt+1 -0.105*** -0.122 -0.068* -0.099 -0.072** 0.041
(-3.601) (-1.791) (-2.165) (-1.630) (-2.438) (1.491)
DR× Profitt+1 0.022 -0.087 -0.017 -0.059 -0.015 -0.042
(0.278) (-0.999) (-0.233) (-0.724) (-0.318) (-0.921)
RET × Profitt+1 0.139 0.064 0.082 -0.010 0.064 0.006
(1.548) (0.676) (1.048) (-0.157) (1.121) (0.091)
DR×RET × Profitt+ 1 -0.418 -0.620* -0.346 -0.365 -0.395** -0.054
(-1.647) (-2.007) (-1.613) (-1.491) (-2.637) (-0.433)
DS × Profitt+1 -0.095 0.045 -0.041 0.040 0.009 -0.041
(-1.396) (0.840) (-0.876) (0.687) (0.230) (-1.531)
∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 × Profitt+1 0.140 0.721** 0.199 0.730** 0.216 -0.220**
(0.774) (2.473) (1.051) (2.459) (1.014) (-2.281)
DSi,t ×∆Si,t/Pi,t−1 × Profitt+1 -0.435 -0.707* -0.214 -0.738* -0.243 0.127
(-1.699) (-2.122) (-0.899) (-2.131) (-1.154) (0.876)
Controls FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,961 2,344 883 2,992 1,039 9,584 2,991
Adjusted R-squared 0.157 0.583 0.414 0.513 0.391 0.399 0.434
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β10 with F irm FE -0.326 -0.427 -0.297 -0.296 -0.354** -0.027
(-1.414) (-1.474) (-1.480) (-1.262) (-2.713) (-0.275)
This table presents the OLS regression results of augmented Banker et al. (2016) model, Eq.(1.3). The main coefficient
of interest is DR × RET × Profitt+1 that is expected to be negative and statistically significant. All the variables
are as described in Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the
firm and year level.
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Table 1.3: Estimation of the association between corporate insiders’ profitability and
conditional conservatism based on Khan and Watts (2009)
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
CSCORE -0.254*** -0.004 -0.209*** -0.019 -0.212*** 0.136*
(-7.226) (-0.028) (-5.528) (-0.148) (-3.835) (2.036)
Log(Size) -0.028*** 0.007 -0.027*** 0.003 -0.020*** -0.001
(-4.248) (0.769) (-4.350) (0.311) (-6.184) (-0.174)
Leverage 0.096** -0.045 0.078** -0.036 0.088** -0.031
(2.930) (-0.897) (2.517) (-0.635) (2.802) (-1.054)
B/M 0.105*** -0.049* 0.088*** -0.052* 0.084*** -0.043**
(7.082) (-1.873) (5.451) (-2.119) (5.170) (-2.726)
Log(1+analyst) 0.033*** -0.047*** 0.033*** -0.041*** 0.026*** -0.019**
(4.133) (-3.745) (3.559) (-3.839) (5.651) (-2.417)
Ins. Ownership 0.027 -0.026 0.036 -0.030 0.023 -0.046
(1.173) (-0.429) (1.633) (-0.594) (1.537) (-1.396)
Momentum -0.017*** 0.015** -0.018*** 0.015** -0.024*** 0.030***
(-7.567) (2.418) (-7.776) (2.334) (-11.750) (8.351)
Observations 2,920 1,287 3,581 1,466 9,674 3,567
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.044 0.073 0.046 0.078 0.072
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE -0.191** -0.047 -0.178** -0.011 -0.221*** 0.145
(-2.644) (-0.268) (-2.387) (-0.071) (-4.537) (1.484)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5). The dependent variable is either insiders’
profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase). The main coefficient of interest is CSCORE
that is expected to be negative and statistically significant. All the variables are as described in
Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard
errors clustered at the firm and year level.
43
Table 1.4: Estimation of the association between current changes in conditional
conservatism and future changes in insiders’ profitability.
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
∆CSCORE -0.192 0.374** -0.114 0.569*** -0.115** 0.026
(-1.307) (2.376) (-0.901) (3.185) (-2.321) (0.143)
∆Log(Size) 0.197*** -0.136*** 0.183*** -0.181*** 0.196*** -0.129***
(7.234) (-3.219) (6.516) (-3.900) (10.249) (-3.633)
∆Leverage 0.222 -0.171 0.141 -0.399* 0.036 -0.020
(1.205) (-0.824) (0.987) (-1.964) (1.183) (-0.147)
∆B/M 0.044 0.089** -0.020 -0.031 0.048* 0.030
(0.756) (2.370) (-0.325) (-0.536) (1.900) (0.864)
∆Log(1 + analyst) -0.067* 0.043 -0.056* 0.050 -0.012 0.067
(-2.126) (0.616) (-2.153) (1.259) (-1.085) (1.622)
∆Inst.Ownership 0.017 0.142 0.068 -0.102 -0.086 0.084
(0.126) (0.636) (0.620) (-0.388) (-1.710) (1.025)
∆Momentum 0.011* -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.019**
(1.863) (-0.328) (0.217) (0.035) (1.053) (-2.281)
Observations 880 274 1,176 317 5,166 1,024
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 -0.080 0.076 -0.059 0.093 0.036
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE -0.113 1.357* -0.272 1.335* -0.181** 0.264
(-0.458) (2.101) (-1.507) (2.034) (-2.358) (1.084)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.7). In particular, we study the asso-
ciation between current changes in conservatism and future changes in insiders’ profitability.
The dependent variable is either insiders’ profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase),
Profiti,t+1. The main coefficient of interest is ∆CSCORE that is expected to be negative
and statistically significant. All the variables are as described in Appendix 1.7. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the
firm and year level.
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Table 1.5: Estimation of the effect of asymmetric timeliness on insiders’ profitability
from sales and purchases after the SFAS-142 Provision of 2001
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
SFAS 0.173 0.541*** 0.091 0.248** 0.093* -0.064
(1.787) (5.568) (1.148) (2.557) (1.955) (-1.256)
Treated 0.055 0.007 0.006 -0.084 0.020 0.008
(0.597) (0.066) (0.082) (-0.865) (0.686) (0.137)
SFAS×Treated -0.230* -0.153 -0.193* -0.040 -0.092* 0.151**
(-2.274) (-1.072) (-2.153) (-0.284) (-1.931) (2.400)
Log(Size) -0.024 -0.019 -0.008 0.048 -0.015 0.014
(-0.583) (-0.217) (-0.257) (0.659) (-1.229) (0.535)
Leverage -0.151 0.825** -0.065 0.531** -0.076 0.164
(-0.723) (2.655) (-0.357) (2.651) (-0.794) (1.270)
B/M -0.061 -0.025 0.003 -0.023 -0.051 -0.007
(-0.838) (-0.230) (0.039) (-0.202) (-1.297) (-0.122)
Log(1+analyst) -0.018 0.113 -0.035 0.123 0.014 -0.026
(-0.412) (1.029) (-0.822) (1.341) (0.814) (-0.516)
Inst.Ownership 0.037 -0.243 0.049 -0.613 0.109* -0.209
(0.383) (-0.459) (0.466) (-1.163) (1.962) (-1.720)
Momentum -0.043 0.104 -0.067** 0.016 -0.054** -0.007
(-1.581) (0.495) (-2.668) (0.159) (-2.431) (-0.207)
Observations 460 117 618 160 1,380 416
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.011 0.119 0.035 0.106 0.105
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.8). In particular, we study the
effect of an exogenous change in conservatism (i.e. introduction of SFAS 142) on insiders’
profitability from their trades. The dependent variable is either insiders’ profitability from
sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase). The main coefficient of interest is SFAS×Treated that
is expected to be negative and statistically significant. All the variables are as described
in Appendix 1.7 (except for Momentum that is estimated as buy-and-hold return over 12
months, min. 6 months) and are updated on a quarterly basis. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm
and year level.
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Table 1.6: Estimation of the association between corporate insiders’ profitability and
unconditional conservatism based on Sunder et al. (2018)
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
UCONS 0.198*** -0.060 0.185*** -0.057 0.146*** -0.067**
(7.461) (-1.588) (7.773) (-1.477) (6.956) (-2.640)
Log(Size) -0.019*** 0.015* -0.021*** 0.013 -0.014*** -0.004
(-5.924) (1.903) (-6.187) (1.704) (-7.701) (-1.310)
Leverage 0.028 0.007 0.030 0.003 0.036 0.012
(0.915) (0.246) (1.106) (0.110) (1.696) (0.510)
B/M 0.166*** -0.065** 0.153*** -0.072*** 0.123*** -0.058***
(8.562) (-2.841) (7.947) (-3.545) (8.213) (-5.803)
Log(1+analyst) 0.027*** -0.061*** 0.027*** -0.060*** 0.028*** -0.021*
(5.059) (-6.064) (4.416) (-5.038) (9.333) (-1.953)
Ins. Ownership 0.002 -0.056 0.010 -0.054 0.025 -0.070*
(0.102) (-1.263) (0.484) (-1.394) (1.485) (-1.909)
Momentum -0.017*** 0.021*** -0.018*** 0.020*** -0.023*** 0.030***
(-7.740) (3.975) (-8.367) (5.405) (-13.075) (9.439)
Observations 3,494 1,556 4,245 1,761 10,874 4,043
Adjusted R-squared 0.077 0.065 0.081 0.065 0.078 0.073
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE 0.443*** -0.141 0.395*** -0.130 0.343*** -0.199**
(9.277) (-1.155) (7.335) (-1.257) (9.037) (-3.048)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5) substituting CSCORE for UCONS.
The dependent variable is either insiders’ profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase).
The main coefficient of interest is UCONS that is expected to be positive and statistically signif-
icant. All the variables are as described in Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level.
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Table 1.7: Estimation of the association between current changes in unconditional
conservatism and future changes in insiders’ profitability.
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
∆UCONS 0.176** -0.418 0.102* -0.283 0.113 -0.069
(2.755) (-1.290) (2.028) (-1.022) (1.498) (-0.569)
∆Log(Size) 0.209*** -0.103** 0.183*** -0.158*** 0.196*** -0.161***
(7.140) (-2.487) (7.257) (-3.184) (11.043) (-6.110)
∆Leverage 0.016 -0.171 -0.008 -0.303 0.044 0.138
(0.124) (-0.858) (-0.091) (-1.752) (1.171) (1.096)
∆B/M 0.044 0.138 -0.041 -0.003 0.032 0.027
(0.737) (1.595) (-0.807) (-0.025) (1.015) (0.872)
∆Log(1 + analyst) -0.068* -0.013 -0.059** 0.037 -0.012 0.041
(-2.145) (-0.187) (-2.348) (0.815) (-1.028) (0.911)
∆Inst.Ownership 0.039 -0.153 0.090 -0.336 -0.031 0.020
(0.301) (-0.852) (0.889) (-1.303) (-1.171) (0.212)
∆Momentum 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.002 -0.008
(1.204) (0.046) (0.317) (0.476) (1.365) (-0.956)
Observations 1,040 318 1,364 368 5,677 1,120
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 -0.028 0.093 -0.041 0.106 0.056
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE 0.467** -0.268 0.224 -0.374 0.163* -0.131
(2.584) (-0.487) (1.338) (-0.814) (2.025) (-0.743)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.7) substituting CSORE for UCONS.
In particular, we study the association between current changes in unconditional conservatism
and future changes in insiders’ profitability. The dependent variable is either insiders’ prof-
itability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase), Profiti,t+1. The main coefficient of interest
is ∆UCONS that is expected to be positive and statistically significant. All the variables are
as described in Appendix, Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99%
and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values
are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level.
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Table 1.8: Split sample analysis
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
Panel A: Low Litigation Risk - Industry
CSCORE -0.409*** 0.197 -0.336*** 0.110 -0.331*** 0.214***
(-9.005) (1.528) (-9.986) (0.809) (-4.762) (3.463)
Observations 1,567 742 1,922 849 5,208 1,988
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 0.059 0.112 0.052 0.109 0.076
High Litigation Risk
CSCORE -0.125** -0.200 -0.112 -0.148 -0.134** 0.029
(-2.222) (-1.025) (-1.547) (-0.909) (-2.308) (0.358)
Observations 1,342 524 1,648 598 4,436 1,561
Adjusted R-squared 0.055 0.061 0.072 0.075 0.062 0.082
p− value (Low −High) 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.01
Panel B: Low Corporate Governance
CSCORE -0.033 -0.292*** -0.076 -0.210*** -0.181*** 0.084
(-0.417) (-6.394) (-0.766) (-4.585) (-3.263) (0.979)
Observations 683 186 866 226 2,749 931
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.107 0.082 0.042 0.079 0.029
High Corporate Governance
CSCORE -0.309*** 0.093 -0.230* 0.010 -0.228*** 0.065
(-4.360) (0.664) (-2.095) (0.056) (-5.476) (0.733)
Observations 645 210 781 235 2,752 733
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.047 0.042 0.035 0.094 0.087
p− value (Low −High) 0.05 0.04 0.42 0.32 0.25 0.82
Panel C: Low information asymmetry
CSCORE -0.121* 0.220* -0.087 0.154 -0.185*** 0.053
(-2.140) (2.122) (-1.639) (1.728) (-5.091) (0.645)
Observations 1,405 446 1,755 515 5,597 1,612
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.118 0.074 0.100 0.088 0.053
High information asymmetry
CSCORE -0.357*** 0.088 -0.311*** 0.084 -0.323*** 0.278***
(-9.101) (0.501) (-10.108) (0.536) (-3.826) (4.222)
Observations 1,512 836 1,824 947 4,076 1,952
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 0.061 0.080 0.051 0.081 0.106
p− value (Low −High) 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.68 0.09 0.05
Panel D: Good Readability
CSCORE -0.221*** -0.018 -0.155** -0.035 -0.234*** 0.210**
(-3.613) (-0.101) (-2.903) (-0.229) (-3.584) (2.417)
Observations 1,572 641 1,933 744 5,025 1,945
Adjusted R-squared 0.045 0.037 0.056 0.033 0.079 0.071
Bad Readability
CSCORE -0.343*** -0.007 -0.309*** -0.064 -0.190*** 0.027
(-4.222) (-0.041) (-4.055) (-0.377) (-3.675) (0.258)
Observations 1,247 606 1,523 680 4,264 1,493
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.093 0.102 0.083 0.076 0.078
p− value (Low −High) 0.30 0.95 0.11 0.90 0.39 0.19
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5) on a sample of firms with high and low
levels of firm-specific characteristics. Firms are classified into two samples if the observation falls
above sample mean (high) and below sample mean (low). Panel A splits sample into high and low
litigation risk firms based on a proxy of Kim and Skinner (2012). Panel B splits sample into high
and low corporate governance (CG) firms, where CG is estimated as a sum of percentage change
of independent directors on the board, percentage of independent directors on the compensation
committee and institutional ownership. All the variables are as described in Appendix 1.7. The
dependent variable is either insiders’ profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase). The
main coefficient of interest is CSCORE that is expected to be negative and statistically significant.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered
at the firm and year level.
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Table 1.9: Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism and Sharpe Ratio
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
Panel A: Conditional Conservatism and Sharpe Ratio
CSCORE -0.510*** 0.120 -0.209*** -0.019 -0.212*** 0.136*
(-4.213) (0.518) (-5.528) (-0.148) (-3.835) (2.036)
Observations 2,918 1,287 3,581 1,466 9,674 3,567
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.053 0.073 0.046 0.078 0.072
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE -0.483** -0.018 -0.178** -0.011 -0.221*** 0.145
(-2.644) (-0.059) (-2.387) (-0.071) (-4.537) (1.484)
Panel B: Unconditional Conservatism and Sharpe Ratio
UCONS 0.374*** -0.113 0.185*** -0.057 0.146*** -0.067**
(5.727) (-1.480) (7.773) (-1.477) (6.956) (-2.640)
Observations 3,494 1,556 4,245 1,761 10,874 4,043
Adjusted R-squared 0.080 0.062 0.081 0.065 0.078 0.073
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE 0.919*** -0.144 0.397*** -0.135 0.342*** -0.198**
(8.444) (-0.862) (7.374) (-1.360) (8.914) (-3.079)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5). In Panel A and B, the dependent variable
is either insiders’ Sharpe ratio of profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase). Sharpe
ratio is estimated as firm and year insiders’ profitability minus interest rate of one-year Treasure bill
scaled by annualized standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year. All the variables are as
described in Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***,
**, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust
standard errors clustered at the firm and year level.
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Table 1.10: Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism and Daily Returns
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
Panel A: Conditional Conservatism and Daily Returns
CSCORE -0.352*** -0.200 -0.291*** -0.112 -0.231*** 0.125
(-6.053) (-1.096) (-4.975) (-0.783) (-3.482) (1.423)
Observations 12,133 2,462 16,028 2,942 50,139 7,968
Adjusted R-squared 0.080 0.135 0.072 0.135 0.074 0.080
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE -0.290*** -0.182 -0.237** -0.108 -0.237*** 0.070
(-3.289) (-0.990) (-2.629) (-0.841) (-4.075) (0.686)
Panel B: Unconditional Conservatism and Daily Returns
UCONS 0.206*** 0.015 0.213*** 0.024 0.165*** -0.077**
(5.812) (0.306) (6.912) (0.400) (5.968) (-2.876)
Observations 15,394 3,160 20,137 3,778 59,513 9,112
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.135 0.081 0.132 0.075 0.081
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1 with F irm FE 0.503*** -0.121 0.464*** -0.092 0.352*** -0.096
(6.839) (-0.920) (7.700) (-0.924) (6.806) (-1.179)
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5). In Panel A and B, the dependent
variable is either insiders’ profitability from sales (Sale) or purchases (Purchase) that are at daily
frequency, while all the control variables are updated yearly. All the variables are as described in
Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard
errors clustered at the firm and year level.
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Table 1.11: Moderating effect of unconditional conservatism on the relation between
of corporate insiders’ profitability and conditional conservatism
CEO-CFO Top-5 No Top-5
VARIABLES Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase
Low Unconditional Conservatism
CSCORE -0.310*** -0.014 -0.268*** -0.016 -0.285*** 0.156*
(-4.949) (-0.090) (-3.697) (-0.111) (-4.624) (1.978)
Observations 1,148 659 1,416 750 3,831 1,558
Adjusted R-squared 0.090 0.072 0.070 0.064 0.086 0.071
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
High Unconditional Conservatism
CSCORE -0.207** 0.092 -0.177* -0.000 -0.162** 0.131
(-2.223) (0.396) (-2.172) (-0.001) (-2.534) (1.304)
Observations 1,769 623 2,163 711 5,842 2,007
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.014 0.075 0.022 0.076 0.084
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p− vlaue(Low −High) 0.44 0.67 0.43 0.94 0.04 0.83
This table presents the OLS regression results of Eq.(1.5) on a sample of firms with high and
low levels of past unconditional conservatism. We set firms with high level of past unconditional
conservatism equal to one if the level of unconditional conservatism over the past five years (min.
three years) is higher than the median level during the sample period, and zero otherwise. All the
variables are as described in Appendix 1.7. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and
1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm and year level.
Chapter 2
Accounting Conservatism and the
information efficiency of stock prices
2.1 Introduction
Prior work provides overwhelming evidence on the benefits of conditional conservatism
for debt holders (e.g., Beatty et al. 2008; Zhang 2008; Li2013; Haw et al. 2014; Franke
and Muller 2019). However, there is limited evidence on the effects of conservatism for
shareholders (e.g., Francis and Martin 2010; Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Biddle et al. 2016).
We contribute to this work on the equity market benefits of conservatism. In particular,
we study whether conditional conservatism ameliorates the information efficiency of stock
prices.
Conditional conservatism imposes more stringent verification requirements for
the recognition of economic gains than losses, which results in earnings that capture
unfavourable economic events more quickly and completely than favourable ones (Basu
1997). We argue that this results in two key positive outcomes that lead to more infor-
mationally efficient prices. First, conditional conservatism offsets managerial tendency to
strategically reveal good news while hiding or delaying bad news disclosure (Basu 1997;
Watts 2003). As a result, bad news flows into the market more quickly than unverifiable
good news, reducing the risk that bad news will be hidden (LaFond and Watts 2008;
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Kim and Zhang 2016). Second, conditional conservatism enhances the confirmatory role
of accounting. It sets a ‘hard’ benchmark against which ‘softer,’ unverifiable, disclosures
can be compared ex post. This disciplines managerial voluntary disclosure of good news,
increasing its credibility (Ball 2001; Garcia Osma et al. 2018). Jointly, these effects lead
to full disclosure of information (Guay and Verrecchia 2007), where no information about
firm value is withheld.
We build on this prior literature and argue that conditional conservatism im-
proves overall market efficiency and has a positive impact on the functioning of equity
markets. In particular, we study three capital market outcomes. First, we posit that
conservatism helps to assess the company’s equity underlying value, reducing the prob-
ability of equity overvaluation that arises when stock price is higher than underlying
value (Jensen 2005). Importantly, we expect that conditional conservatism accelerates
the reversal of overvalued equity back to underlying value, limiting the duration of sus-
tained overvaluation. Given that unsophisticated investors are more likely to value firms
over-optimistically and take accounting numbers at face value, conditional conservatism,
by disciplining good news disclosure and recognition, is expected to result in rational
equity prices reflecting intrinsic value. Conditional conservatism is also expected to re-
duce equity overvaluation through better earnings quality (e.g., Chen et al. 2007; Gao
2013) and lower information asymmetry (e.g., Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara et al. 2014).1
Second, if conservatism decreases equity overvaluation, it should reduce short sellers in-
terest. In particular, through timelier recognition of losses relative to gains, conservatism
should promptly signal unprofitable projects and decrease bad news hoarding (Kim and
Zhang 2016), decreasing the probability that firms have hidden, unrealized losses that
short-sellers could uncover and benefit from. Third, taking into consideration the ben-
efits associated with conservative reporting, we expect that equity market participants
will apply a lower discount for uncertainty when valuing more conditionally conservative
firms (Guay and Verrecchia 2007), leading to higher prices and lower discounts for missing
1The extant prior literature provides mounting evidence confirming that greater conditional conser-
vatism leads to high quality information useful to monitor management (Beekes et al. 2004; Ahmed and
Duellman 2007, 2011; GarciaLara et al. 2009; Louis et al. 2012).
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earnings targets.
We test our predictions on a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1991
to 2015. We use a modified firm-year version of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Equity
overvaluation is measured using the residual income valuation model (Peasnell 1982;
Ohlson 1995) after filtering out scale and growth opportunities. Specifically, we identify
firms in the highest quartile of our overvaluation proxy, and estimate sustained duration of
equity overvaluation. Next, we estimate abnormal short selling interest following Karpoff
and Lou (2010). Specifically, we assign firms into different portfolios based on firm-specific
characteristics and use these regressors in the second-step estimation procedure. Further,
we study whether firms that just beat (miss) analyst forecasts with low versus high levels
of conservatism have differences in stock performance over mid- and short-term periods.
To overcome endogeneity concerns, we use the introduction of SFAS 121 as a plausible
regulatory shock that increased conditional conservatism. Finally, to corroborate our
findings, we study two regulatory shocks to firms’ information environment (SFAS 131)
and short selling activity (Regulation SHO). We analyze whether firms pre-shock level of
conservatism altered the net effect of the regulatory shocks on short selling activity and
equity overvaluation.
We report the following key findings. First, we find that conservatism reduces
overall and sustained duration of equity overvaluation. High conservatism results in lower
likelihood of being a firm with overvalued equity. The effect is more pronounced with the
increase in the number of consecutive years of equity overvaluation. This suggests that
reversals of overvaluation back to underlying value accrue faster to more conditionally
conservative firms, which is supported by the survival analysis. Second, we document that
conservatism reduces abnormal short interest. These results are robust to an exogenous
change in conditional conservatism as a result of a regulatory change induced by SFAS
121. Finally, we provide evidence of different valuation consequences of missing earnings
forecasts both in the short- and mid-run for high versus low conservative firms that miss
earnings forecasts. In particular, over the 30-day (60-day) horizon equal-weighted and
value-weighted BHARs of missers with high conservatism outperform missers with low
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conservatism by 2.31% and 1.56% (1.70% and 2.42%). Additionally, we show that in the
short-run (from 1 to 30 days after earnings announcement date) and in the mid-run (1
to 60 days) the portfolio of long missers with high conservatism and short missers with
low conservatism, on equal-weighted basis results in 12 (7) basis points per day.
To corroborate our findings, we perform a number of additional tests. First, we
employ two regulatory shocks affecting 1) firms’ information environment, 2) short selling
activity. We predict that firms that maintained higher level of pre-shock conservatism
are expected to have ex-ante better information environment (Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara
et al. 2016) and avoid bad news hoarding that is expected to mitigate the pressure from
short sellers after the SHO regulation effect on pilot firms. Our findings indicate that
both regulatory shocks have a less pronounced effect on firms with higher pre-shock
levels of conservatism. Second, we test whether more conservative high-tech firms had
lower equity overvaluation during the Dot-Com bubble and whether they experienced
lower stock price drops after the burst of the bubble. Our findings stay in line with our
expectations. Finally, we ensure that our main conclusions remain for alternative proxy
of conservatism and when we perform Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions instead of
clustering standard errors by firm as suggested by Conley et al. (2018).
We contribute to the prior literature by providing evidence that conditional
conservatism leads to more efficient equity markets. In particular, we contribute to
the literature analyzing the positive effects of conditional conservatism for shareholders
(Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2013; Biddle et al.2016; Kim and Zhang
2016). Additionally, we contribute to the literature analyzing the information content of
conditionally conservative reporting (LaFond and Watts 2008; Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara
et al. 2014) by presenting additional evidence of efficiency-increasing information that is
diffused through conservative reporting.
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 Conservatism and equity overvaluation
When investors (both naive and sophisticated) hold heterogeneous beliefs about firm
value (Miller 1977), securities held by well-informed investors are expected to avoid un-
dervaluation. However, if those informed investors are unwilling to short-sell there might
be a case of overvaluation (Malkiel 1985). Divergence of opinions regarding the security’s
return is expected to worsen overvaluation (Miller 1977; Boehme et al. 2006). Jensen
(2005) notes that in the presence of substantial equity overvaluation, there is a threat
of organizational forces deterioration that might destroy core value of the firm. To sat-
isfy growth expectations that are far above “true” firm value, managers may engage in
short-run value-increasing activities at the expense of long-run performance.
We argue that conditional conservatism decreases the probability of equity over-
valuation and importantly, that it leads to a faster reversal of overvalued stock back to
underlying equity values. These benefits of conservatism accrue to equity investors at
least through two channels. First, bidding up by uninformed investors who take firm
disclosed information at face value may explain overvaluation. Under aggressive account-
ing (reporting and disclosure), unsophisticated investors are more likely to value the firm
over-optimistically. In line with this view, Badertscher (2011) documents a positive as-
sociation between total earnings management and the duration of firm overvaluation. In
contrast, under conservative accounting, timely and complete recognition of poor realiza-
tions offsets managerial tendency to strategically disclose good news and withhold bad
news,2 and thus, the firm’s market value is unlikely to be overstated, resulting in equity
prices that are closer to fundamentals. Prior work supports this view that conservatism
reduces information asymmetry (Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara et al. 2014), improving the firm’s
information environment and allowing investors to better assess firms’ performance. This
should result in more informed capital markets.
Second, conditional conservatism directly reduces the incentives for earnings
2See, for example, the work of Kothari et al. (2009) on managerial disclosure of good and bad news.
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management (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Chen et al. 2007;
Gao 2013). This limits managerial attempts to artificially inflate earnings, improving
accounting quality and therefore, the ability of outsiders to assess underlying trends in
revenues and earnings growth, making over-optimism less likely. Importantly, in the pres-
ence of temporary overvaluation, which as noted in Jensen (2005) may happen for various
reasons in both inefficient and semi-efficient markets, we expect that conditional conser-
vatism leads to faster reversal to efficient prices. This is because it prevents the activation
of the organizational forces that sustain overvaluation, and reduces the likelihood that
managers get caught in a game of meeting expectations (see, Stein 1989). Mechanisms
such as using overvalued equity to make acquisitions (Moeller et al. 2005; Shleifer and
Vishny 2003) are constrained by conditional conservatism, as shown by recent research
that suggests conditional conservatism reduces inefficient investment and accelerates the
abandonment of poor projects (Francis and Martin 2010; Ahmed and Duellman 2011;
Bushman et al. 2011; Garcia Lara et al. 2016).
Our argumentation is in line with the work of Mashruwala and Mashruwala
(2018a) who find that accounting conservatism (they are using proxies for unconditional
conservatism) under high shorting constraints and investors’ disagreement reduces equity
overvaluation. We add to their work by predicting that conditional conservatism not
only reduces the likelihood of over-valuation but also, that it leads to a quicker reversal
of overvaluation by imposing timely disclosure of negative realizations and disciplining
good news disclosure, thereby reducing the likelihood of sustained duration of equity
overvaluation. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Conditional conservatism is associated with lower sustained duration of
equity overvaluation
2.2.2 Conservatism and abnormal short interest
Building on the above argumentation that more conditionally conservative firms are less
likely to be overvalued, it follows that short sellers are less likely to target them. Short
sellers are informed investors (Boehmer et al. 2008) who trade based on information rather
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than liquidity needs (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). Prior research shows that they
are able to identify analyst downgrades, (Christophe et al. 2010) earnings restatements
(Desai et al. 2006) and financial misconduct significantly before it is publicly revealed
(Karpoff and Lou 2010). Overall, this literature indicates that short sellers target firms
that are suspect of having hidden bad news, tracking their accounting accruals to uncover
misreporting (Fang et al. 2016). In this manner, they can take positions in anticipation
of stock price decreases (i.e., bad news realizations). Short sellers scrutiny is therefore
associated with instances where managers withhold or delay the disclosure of negative
firm information.
As noted, managers have incentives to strategically disclose good news and
to delay or withhold the release of bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). This behaviour
intensifies with the firms’ opaqueness and complex tax planning (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim
et al. 2011). Conditional conservatism offsets this behaviour, by imposing timely and
complete loss recognition (Basu 1997; Watts 2003), via the lower verification requirements
for the recognition of negative news (unrealized economic losses) relative to positive news.
This serves as a signal that no negative information is withheld. Consistent with this
view, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conditional conservatism mitigates concerns of
managerial tendencies to delay recognition of bad news in hope of an economic condition
reversal. Additionally, through timelier recognition of economic losses relative to gains,
conditional conservatism ensures prompt identification and termination of unprofitable
projects. Prior work relates conservatism to higher investment efficiency ex ante and
to quicker ex post termination of poorly performing projects (Francis and Martin 2010;
Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Bushman et al. 2011; Garcia Lara et al. 2016). This prevents
bad news hoarding and lowers the probability of stock price crash risk (Kim and Zhang
2016).
Given the above discussion, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Conditional conservatism is associated with lower abnormal short inter-
est
Jin et al. (2018) study the related question of whether changes in short selling
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restrictions affect conservatism. We view conservatism as an ex-ante managerial decision
that determines the information environment of the firm, making more conservative firms
less attractive to short sellers.
2.2.3 Conservatism and the valuation of earnings surprises
Prior research provides growing evidence that conditional conservatism benefits equity
holders: it lowers the volatility of future stock price and results in efficient risk sharing
(Suijs 2008); decreases cost of equity capital (Garcia Lara et al. 2011); results in smaller
price drops at SEO announcements (Kim et al. 2013); lowers the probability of stock
price crashes (Kim and Zhang 2016); and reduces bankruptcy risk (Biddle et al.2016).
Additionally, Francis et al. (2013) document that more conservative firms have less
negative stock returns during the recent financial crisis. Overall, this literature suggests
that conservative reporting is a mechanism that protects shareholders’ value. This effect is
magnified for firms with poorer corporate governance and higher information asymmetry.
Given the above, we expect market participants to reward conditionally con-
servative firms, and apply a lower penalty in the presence of earnings disappointments.
More generally, as argued in Guay and Verrecchia (2007) market participants may apply
conservative firms a lower discount for uncertainty. This is because by imposing timely
and complete recognition of losses, bad news are recognized in the financial statements.
This coupled with managerial strategic disclosure of good news (Kothari et al. 2009) im-
plies that all value relevant information is communicated in a timely manner. In addition,
conservatism enhances the confirmatory role of accounting, acting as a ‘hard’ benchmark
to evaluate the credibility of alternative sources of information (LaFond and Watts2008),
such as unverifiable good news disclosures and management forecasts. Conservatism dis-
ciplines good news disclosure through ex post accountability (Ball 2001), allowing ‘softer’
sources of information to flourish (LaFond and Watts 2008), and lending credibility to
good news disclosure, permitting attaining full disclosure, where no information about
firm value is withheld (Guay and Verrecchia 2007).
It is amply accepted that capital markets punish (reward) firms for missing
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(beating) analyst forecasts even by a single penny (Bhojraj et al. 2009). Unsurprisingly,
managers are reluctant to miss earnings forecasts (Graham et al. 2005), and may engage
in sub-optimal decision-making in an attempt to beat simple earnings targets. The earn-
ings management literature suggests there is a greater penalty associated with earnings
disappointments relative to the reward for positive earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan
2002). A possible explanation for this imbalance is that earnings management is an equi-
librium outcome (Dye 1988; Stein 1989), where markets apply a discount for earnings
management, which, in turn, induces earnings management. If markets apply this dis-
count, in the expectation that earnings will be managed and targets met, it may act as a
buffer in the presence of earnings surprises, and thus, the observed rewards and penalties
would differ in the absence of this discount.
Given the aforementioned benefits of conservative reporting and the fact that
conservatism improves earnings quality (e.g., Chen et al. 2007; Gao 2013), decreases the
deadwight losses of information asymmetry (e.g. LaFond and Watts 2008) and serves
as a corporate governance mechanism (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman 2007), we expect that
shareholders will apply a lower penalty to conditionally conservative firms for missing
earnings forecasts. Our third hypothesis is:
H3: Conditional conservatism is associated with lower penalties for missing
earnings forecasts
2.3 Research Design
2.3.1 Measurement of accounting conservatism
Our measure of conditional conservatism follows Ball and Shivakumar (2005).3 This mea-
sure is accounting-based and does not rely on market measures, which reduces concerns
associated with market inefficiency and circularity in our proxies. In particular, given
that we study how conditional conservatism affects market inefficiency, we avoid using
3In Section 2.5.4 we replicate main results estimating firm-year conservatism proxy by augmenting
Eq.(2.1) with measures of cost stickiness following Banker et al. (2016)
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market-based proxies since they assume market efficiency.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) note that asymmetric treatment of economic gains
relative to losses results in an asymmetry of accruals. The recognition of economic losses
is reflected in earnings on a timely basis through accruals. In contrast, the recognition of
economic gains occurs when the associated cash flows are realized as it is accounted for on
a cash basis. To calculate our proxy, we augment Ball and Shivakumar (2005) following
the logic of Khan and Watts (2009) to arrive at a firm-year measure of conditional con-
servatism. We allow for C Score and G Score to vary across firm-years through different
firm characteristics (size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage). We estimate the following
annual cross-section model:
Accrualsi,t = β0 + β1DCFOi,t + CFOi,t(µ0 + µ1Sizei,t−1 + µ2B/Mi,t−1 + µ3Levi,t−1)
+DCFOi,tCFOi,t(λ1Sizei,t−1 + λ2B/Mi,t−1 + λ3Levi,t−1) + (σ1Sizei,t−1
+ σ2B/Mi,t−1 + σ3Levi,t−1 + σ4DCFOi,tSizei,t−1 + σ5DCFOi,tB/Mi,t−1
+ σ6DCFOi,tLevi,t−1) + εi,t,
(2.1)
where Accruals is operating accruals (calculated using a balance sheet approach fol-
lowing Collins et al. (2014) as the change in current non-cash assets minus the change in
current non-debt liability minus depreciation). CFO is operating cash flow (defined as
the difference between earnings income before extraordinary items and accruals), Both
Accruals and CFO are scaled by average total assets. DCFO is a dummy variable equal
to one in the case of negative CFO and zero otherwise. We calculate the timeliness of
good news (G Score) and our main coefficient of interest: the incremental timeliness of
bad news (C Score) as follows:
G Scorei,t = B3 = µ0 + µ1Sizei,t + µ2B/Mi,t + µ3Levi,t (2.2)
C Scorei,t = B4 = λ0 + λ1Sizei,t + λ2B/Mi,t + λ3Levi,t (2.3)
Our firm-year measure of conditional conservatism is derived from Ball and Shivaku-
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mar (2005) (CSCORE) is the three-year average of the sum of C Score (e.g., for year t,
CSCORE is the average over years t, t−1, and t−2). A greater value of CSCORE rep-
resents a higher degree of conditional conservatism. To mitigate measurement error and
to reduce concerns associated with non-linearity, we take the annual decile of CSCORE
and denote this measure as ACT . Internet Appendix Table 3.1 validates the measure of
conditional conservatism by presenting the means of selected characteristics and ACT .
2.3.2 Measurement of overvaluation
A stock is overvalued when its price is higher than its underlying value (Jensen 2005). To
measure overvaluation, we follow the residual income approach (Edwards and Bell 1965;











where B is the book value of equity and FROE is the future return on equity from
I/B/E/S consensus earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates. To account for the dependence
of year-end book value from current-year return on equity (ROE), we follow Frankel and
Lee (1998) using a sequential estimation process of future ROE.4 re is annualized cost
of capital derived from the CAPM. V is a forward-looking measure of fundamental (i.e.,
“intrinsic”) value derived from the residual income model of Ohlson (1995). P/V is an
indicator of mispricing and better return predictor than M/B (Frankel and Lee 1998;
Lee et al. 1999).5 V filters earnings growth prospects from market price, except when
such prospects are associated with misvaluation rather than just growth. The predictive
4For detailed explanation of the estimation procedure, please see Appendix 2.6
5Tobin’s Q or M/B rely on a backward-looking value measure, book value, as a fundamental bench-
mark. Thus, such ratios reflect the ability of a firm to generate returns over its book assets that are
affected by differences in industry and accounting methods. Additionally, these raios are strongly as-
sociated with other firm characteristics not related to overvaluation such as investment opportunities,
managerial effectiveness, etc. The P/V measure is expected to reflect misvaluation in a more neat way
by filtering out other sources of variation that are present in M/B or Tobin’s Q ratio (Dong et al. 2012).
Table 2.2 shows that the correlation between P/V measure and B/M is -40% presenting evidence that
P/V measure captures other information that is not captured by B/M ratio.
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ability of P/V is robust to the capital model used (Lee et al. 1999) and to whether the
discount factor is allowed to vary across firms (D’mello and Shroff 2000). We use firms
with different fiscal year-ends. Thus, to arrange firms in calendar time, we use June as
the cut-off. We set a four-month gap for the accounting data to be publicly available
from the fiscal year end date. In particular, calendar year t includes firms with fiscal year
ends no later than February of year t, and no earlier than March of year t− 1.
First, we analyze association between the level of conditional conservatism and
the level of equity overvaluation. We estimate the following model:
P/Vi,t+1 = β1ACTi,t +
n∑
a=1
γa,tXa,t + εi,t, (2.5)
where P/V is an indicator of mispricing as discussed above. ACT is annual decile of
firm-year proxy of conditional conservatism following Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Un-
der H1 β1 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. Xa,t is a set of control
variables. In particular, we control for the size (Log(Size)), leverage (Leverage) and
book-to-market (BTM) to isolate the effect of mechanical correlation between ACT and
P/V as these variable are used in construction of firm-year proxy of conditional conser-
vatism. Additionally, we control for overall information asymmetry of a firm proxied by
analyst coverage (Log(1 +analyst)). To control for overall audit quality that is expected
to reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Francis and Wilson 1988; DeFond
1992) we include Big-5 auditors (Big − 5). To measure the extent of past earnings man-
agement that ultimately inflates value of the stock price (Adams et al. 2009; Badertscher
2011), we control for the overall bloat in the balance sheet (Barton and Simko 2002)
(NOA). Additionally, as a measure of overall firm-performance, we control for fiscal
year buy-and-hold returns. Finally, we control for short-sale constraints (SSC) and in-
vestment disagreement that lead to stock overvaluation (Miller 1977) following Boehme
et al. (2006). SSC is estimated as follows. Every month, firms are sorted independently
into terciles on short interest (demand side of shares to loan) and institutional ownership
(supply side of shares to lend). We then form three SSC portfolios: SSC = 2 (highest)
for firms with the highest short interest and the lowest institutional ownership, SSC = 0
63
(lowest) for firms with the lowest short interest and the highest institutional ownership,
and SSC = 1 for all other firms. To control for investment disagreement we estimate share
Turnover, IV OL and inverse of AGE. All variables are as described in Appendix 2.6.
Additionally, we include firm- and year-fixed effects to control for the firm-specific con-
tracting environment and economy-wide temporal shocks.
Second, to estimate the association between conditional conservatism and the
probability of stock overvaluation for a certain consecutive duration we follow Badertscher
(2011). In particular, we form annual portfolios on June 1 by ranking firms based on the
P/V ratio, where firms in the highest quartile rank of P/V are considered to be overvalued.
Sustained duration of overvaluation is captured by identifying the number of consecutive
years that a firm has been in the top quartile of P/V from one to a maximum of three
years, where our last portfolio contains firms that have had a sustained overvaluation
of three years or longer. The dependent variable in Eq.(2.5) is (Overvaluationi,t,∈ Φ)
that is a benchmark (equals to 1) if a firm is in the top quartile of P/V for 1, 2 or
more consecutive years and zero otherwise. Φ is one of the 3 consecutive overvaluation
benchmarks discussed above. A positive (negative) coefficient on CSCORE (β1) implies
that this factor increases (decreases) the probability of stock overvaluation for a certain
consecutive duration. Finally, we perform a survival analysis to estimate the hazard (i.e.,
the rate) of exiting consecutive overvaluation period.
2.3.3 Measurement of abnormal short-selling interest
To estimate abnormal short interest we follow Karpoff and Lou (2010). Specifically, for
each firm i in period t, abnormal short interest in defined as follows:
ABSI(j)i,t = SIi,t − E(SI(j)i,t), j = 1, 2, 3 (2.6)
where SIi,t is raw short interest and E(SI(j)i,t) is the expected short interest based
on j firm-specific characteristics. The first benchmark, E(SI(1)i,t), controls for the firm’s
market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, past stock returns, and industry (Dechow
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et al. 2001; Asquith et al. 2005; Duarte et al. 2006). The second benchmark, E(SI(2)i,t),
additionally controls for share turnover and institutional ownership (D’avolio 2002). Fi-
nally, the third benchmark, E(SI(3)i,t), adds accruals and insiders’ selling (Healy 1985;
Dechow et al. 2011).
At the beginning of each period, each stock is assigned to 27 portfolios con-
structed by independently sorting stocks by size, book-to-market, and momentum (for
E(SI(1)i,t)), all measured at the end of the prior period. Additionally, these 27 portfolios















where the first three sets of variables are dummy variables that define 27 size-, book-
to-market-, and momentum- based portfolios. The portfolio with the highest market
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and momentum for each industry are the base port-
folios. The coefficients from Eq.(2.7) should be interpreted as the difference between the
short interest of the given portfolio in relation to the base one.
The measure of abnormal short-selling (the dependent variable) is estimated as
the residual from the first-step regression of Eq.(2.7). W. Chen et al. (2018) documents
that when residuals from the first-step are used as dependent variable in the second-step
regressions, they can generate biased coefficients and unreliable t-statistics that can lead
to incorrect inferences. To avoid these biases Chen et al. (2018) suggests to include
a set of interactions between industry (two-digit SIC) and a set of control variables as
discussed above. All our inferences remain the same if we do not use this procedure.
To study whether there is a negative effect of conditional conservatism on
abnormal short selling, our main regression under consideration is as follows:
SIi,t+1 = β1ACTi,t +
n∑
a=1
γa,tXa,t + εi,t+1, (2.8)
where SI is raw short interest rate. ACT is annual decile of firm-year proxy of
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conditional conservatism following Ball and Shivakumar (2005). A positive (negative)
regression coefficient of ACT implies that this factor increases (decreases) the abnormal
short interest. Xa,t is the set of control variables. In particular, we control for firm size,
share turnover and dividend yield (Jain et al. 2013); buy-and-hold returns (C. Jain et
al. 2012); institutional ownership (Asquith et al. 2005); stock return volatility (Diether
et al. 2009a); leverage and analysts’ coverage. Audit quality is proxied by the presence
of Big-5 auditors (Big-5) and the level of accounting bloat in the balance is estimated
following Barton and Simko (2002). Additionally, we include a set of interactions be-
tween industry (two-digit SIC) and a set of control variables that are expected to define
expected-short interest as state above. As before, we include firm- and year-fixed ef-
fects to control for the firm-specific contracting environment and economy-wide temporal
shocks.
2.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We study U.S. firms for the period 1991 to 2015. We exclude financial firms (Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC between 4800
and 5000) because their accrual calculation procedures are not comparable to other firms.
We follow Frankel and Lee (1998) and Badertscher (2011) and require that firms have
both one- and two-year-ahead EPS forecasts from I/B/E/S. We use yearly earnings fore-
cast issued in May to guarantee that those forecasts belong to the correct fiscal year.
We restrict the sample to firms with positive book-to-market ratio and eliminate obser-
vations where return on equity and dividend payout ratio are greater than 100 percent.
Additionally, we drop observations with stock price lower than $1. Overall, we insure
that the sample contains non-missing variables.
Accounting information and the data on short interest come from Compustat
annual and Compustat Supplemental Short Interest File. Data on daily share prices and
returns comes from CRSP. The data on Institutional ownership is from Thomson Reuters
13F Holdings database. Analyst coverage and earnings forecast data is from the I/B/E/S
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database. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. We guarantee
that there are non-missing observations for the main variables under consideration.
[Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2 about here]
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the tests studying
the effect of conditional conservatism on equity market. Overall, the evidence reported
in Table 2.1 is consistent with prior research. On average, sample firms are overvalued
(mean of P/Vt+1 is 1.682), consistent with Badertscher (2011). There are around 4%
of stock being shorted (SI = 0.037). The average firm in the sample is followed by 10
analysts and 90% of firms are audited by Big-5. Importantly, on average firms in the
sample are conditionally conservative (ACT = 5.496).
Table 2.2 present correlations between main variables under interest. As seen
from the table, conservatism (ACT ) is negative correlated with equity overvaluation
(P/Vt+1) and short selling activity (SIt+1).
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Conditional conservatism and the duration of overvalua-
tion
[Insert Tables 2.3 and 2.4 about here]
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the results of testing H1. Under H1, we predict that condi-
tional conservatism is associated with lower equity overvaluation in general, and reduced
duration of equity overvaluation in particular. The evidence supports the hypothesis.
Table 2.3 presents the association of conditional conservatism with equity overvaluation.
In all the model specification the coefficient of ACT is negative and statistically signif-
icant. Last Model (4) includes both firm- and industry-year-fixed effects. In terms of
economic significance, the findings in Model (4) indicate that holding everything else
constant, increasing ACT by one standard deviation (2.873) decreases P/V at t+1 by
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0.092 (-0.032×2.873) from its mean of 1.682 to 1.59, or 5.5%. In terms of control vari-
ables, firms with higher amount of analyst following, with Big-5 auditors, higher size and
book-to-market ratio have lower levels of equity overvaluation.
Table 2.4 present the results of the association between conditional conser-
vatism and consecutive equity duration. As seen from the table there is negative and
statistically significant association. In terms of economic significance, holding everything
else constant, increasing ACT by one standard deviation (2.873) decreases consecutive
equity overvaluation of one, two and more than two periods by 1% (-0.003×2.873), by
1.4% (-0.005×2.872) and by 2.3% (-0.008×2.873).
To corroborate our findings, we use survival analysis to study the occurrence
and timing of the so called “event”. The event of interest in our study is defined as a
firm’s year of exiting consecutive overvaluation period. Time to event or survival time
(dependent variable) in this study is the number of years from the start year to year of
last consecutive period of overvaluation. The start year is defined as the first year when
the company is identified as overvalued. We estimate Cox proportional hazards model to
evaluate simultaneously the effect of several time dependent factors on survival. Table
2.4, Column (4) presents the results. The coefficient of ACT is positive and statistically
significant, meaning that an increase in conservatism increases the hazard (i.e., the rate)
of exiting consecutive overvaluation period. The hazard ratio is equal to 1.077.6 In
other word, a one standard deviation increase in ACT (2.873) increases the hazard by 22
percent.
2.5.2 Conditional conservatism and abnormal short interest
Table 2.5 presents the results of testing H2 that conditional conservatism is associated
with a reduction in abnormal short interest. The results consistently present a negative
association between short interest and conservatism. Column (1) presents estimation of
Eq.(2.8) without inclusion of first-stage regressors interacted with industry as control
variables. Column (2) - (4) adds first-stage regressors interacted with industry, but this
6exp(0.074)
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does not change statistically significant and negative association between conservatism
and abnormal short selling. In terms of economic significance, the findings indicate
that holding everything else constant, increasing ACT by one standard deviation (2.873)
decreases abnormal short-selling at t+1 by 0.003 (-0.001×2.873) from its mean of 0.037
to 0.034, or 8%.
[Insert Table 2.5]
We document that certain firm characteristics affect abnormal short interest.
In particular, in line with D’avolio (2002) and Asquith et al. (2005) we find that higher
institutional ownership (that serves as a supplier of shares to be loaned reducing the short-
sale constraints) positively affects abnormal short interest. Additionally, we document
that shares turnover (stock return) increases abnormal short interest in line with Jain et
al. (2012, 2013). Additionally, we find that greater leverage, analysts’ coverage, dividend
yield and bloat in the balance sheet are associated with greater abnormal short interest.
2.5.3 Conditional conservatism, earnings surprises and future
stock performance
Under H3, we predict that the penalties associated with earnings disappointments vary
with conditional conservatism. We follow Bhojraj et al. (2009) in designing tests for H3
estimation. Table 2.6 reports 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding
the earnings announcement (from 2 days before to 2 days after), for firms with high
(low) conditional conservatism. To ensure that we capture persistence in conservative
reporting we rank firms according to CSCORE proxy. Firms are ranked as “high”
(“low”) in conditional conservatism if firm-year CSCORE is in the third (first) tercile
among all firms.
[Insert Table 2.6]
Table 2.6 reports CARs separately for firms that narrowly meet the target by
not more than one cent (+1), that just meet the target (0), or that narrowly miss the
69
target by not more than one cent (-1). As expected, we find significantly higher CARs
when firms just beat analyst forecasts compared to firms that just miss (t-stat = 8.53).
We observe a higher earnings response to firms with high conservatism at the earnings
announcement date within the full sample (t-stat = 2.85). We do not find any statistical
significance of 5-day CARs for firms with low versus high conservatism that beat earnings
targets. In the superscripted diagonal cells (”a” and ”b”), we see a statistically significant
difference between firms that beat consensus forecast, but have low level of conservatism,
and firms that miss consensus forecast, but have high level of conservatism . Firms that
miss the consensus forecast despite having high level of conservatism underperform firms
that beat the forecast, but have low levels of conservatism (t-stat = 3.5).
Next, we examine the future performance of firms with high (low) conditional
conservatism that miss annual consensus forecast. First, we calculate portfolio-matched
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for
15, 30, 45, and 60 days after the earnings announcement date. We calculate BHAR and












where Rbenchmarkt is the return to the corresponding value-weighted size/book-to-
market (BM) portfolio constructed by Fama and French (1993). We match each firm
to one of the 25 corresponding size/BM portfolios at the beginning of the announcement
year using the size/BM breakpoints from Ken French’s website. We include the delisting
return and re-invest the proceeds in the matching size/BM portfolio in case a stock stops
trading prior to the end of the cumulation window. We report both equal-weighted and
value-weighted average BHARs for firms with high (low) quality of conservatism that
miss the forecast. We obtain weights scaling firm’s value of equity at the beginning of




Table 2.7, Panel A summarizes the BHAR results. There is evidence that high conser-
vatism missers outperform low conservatism missers throughout the whole time intervals.
We follow Fama and French (1993) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) (as in
Bhojraj et al. (2009)) and use CARs (involving summing abnormal returns) instead of
BHARs as the latter can magnify a single period abnormal performance due to compound-
ing. Additionally, there is better statistical behavior of sums compared to compounded
returns, that leads to fewer inference problems. Table 2.7, Panel B summarizes the CAR
results. As before, we document that missers with high level of conservatism outperform
those with low level of conservatism throughout all windows under consideration, except
within 15 days window on the equal-weighted basis (BHAR difference = -2.59, p-value =
0.26; CAR difference = -1.81; p-value = 0.26).
We report that there is a statistically significant difference between firms with
high and low conservatism that miss earnings forecasts both in the short-run (15 to 30
days) and in the mid-run (30 to 60 days). Overall, there is a significant reward from
equity markets for firms with higher conservatism.
Calendar-time regressions
Both BHARs and CARs suffer from lack of independence that might lead to biased tests
as a result of any cross-correlation in event-time returns that are not accounted for by
the model (Fama and French 1993; Brav 2000). We overcome this by forming portfolios
in calendar time (Fama 1998) following the intuition of Bhojraj et al. (2009). The effect
of cross-correlations on the variance of abnormal returns is accurately captured by the
time-series variation in portfolio returns. We form portfolios every calendar day over the
sample period of missers with low and high conservatism. Additionally, we construct a
zero-investment hedge portfolio that goes long in missers with low conservatism and short
in missers with high conservatism. The short-term (mid-term) performance differences
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between beaters and missers are captured within 1 to 30 (1 to 60) days following earnings
announcement.
We form both value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios, where weights are
based on market value of equity of the firm at the beginning of the announcement year.
To obtain average abnormal daily returns we estimate a 3-factor Fama and French (1993)
model. We require that there are at least 10 observations per day to form portfolios.
[Insert Table 2.8]
Table 2.8, Panel A presents short-term results. On an equal-weighted basis,
missers with high conservatism outperform missers with low conservatism by 12 basis
points per day (p-value = 0.08). On a value-weighted basis, the difference is positive, but
statistically insignificant (i.e., 8 basis point per day; p-value = 0.31). In addition, Panel B
presents mid-term results. As before, missers with high conservatism outperform missers
with low conservatism by 7 basis points per day (p-value = 0.06). On a value-weighted
basis, the difference is positive, but statistically insignificant (i.e., 2 basis point per day;
p-value = 0.65).
In summary, the results present evidence that missing analysts’ expectation
with high level of conservatism outperforms missing analysts’ expectation with low level
of conservatism over a short-term window after the earnings announcement date.
2.5.4 Additional analyses
Tests to account for endogeneity
A particular concern with the findings thus far is endogeneity issue, in particular reverse
causality and omitted variables. It can be argued that given some managerial discretion
in setting the level of accounting conservatism (Lawrence et al. 2013), managers might
respond to short sellers’ pressure or equity overvaluation by changing the level of conser-
vatism. We tackle this issue in a number of ways. In particular, we use a battery of control
variables and a set of fixed-effects to account for economy-wide temporal shocks and the
firm-specific contracting environment and corporate governance. However, despite these
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steps, we cannot entirely rule out endogeneity concerns. A perfect experimental setting
would be an exogenous shock to conservative reporting or random assignment of conser-
vative accounting practice to some of the firms. However, due to the absence of such
condition, in this section, we propose to use a regulatory change that is expected to alter
the level of conservatism (Garcia Lara et al. 2019).
As an exogenous setting we take into consideration the passage of SFAS 121,
which became effective for fiscal years starting from December 15, 1995. SFAS 121 led
to more stringent impairment tests for long-lived assets. We expect that it led to an
increase in conditional conservatism without a direct effect on short-selling and equity
overvaluation. We expect that firms with lower pre-SFAS 121 level of conditional con-
servatism (Treated firms) should be affected more by the regulation as they are expected
to be forced to increase their level of conservatism. We examine the period of 1992-1999
(four years before and after the regulation). The main regressions under consideration
are as follows:
Yi,t = β1Treated× SFAS121 +
n∑
a=1
γa,tXa,t + εi,t, (2.11)
where Yi,t is either equity overvaluation (P/V) or raw short interest rate (SI). SFAS121
equals one after the passage of SFAS 121 (for fiscal years starting after December 15,
1995), zero otherwise. Treated is a decile-ranked variable for average conservatism over
seven years ending in 1993 to exclude potential endogenous anticipation effect of the
regulation. To accommodate with the interpretation, high values of Treated are set to
indicate low conservatism. The main coefficient of interest is β1 that is expected to be
negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with a decrease in short interest
rate and equity overvaluation for treated firms after the passage of SFAS 121. To control
for firm-specific contracting environment we include firm-fixed effects (that subsumes the
effect of Treated control) and year fixed-effects to control for economy-wide temporal
shocks (that subsumes the effect of SFAS121 control).
First, we start with the graphical representation of the difference in conditional
conservatism for treated versus control groups, before and after the SFAS 121. Figure 2.1
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present evidence after the passage of SFAS 121 there is a significant decrease in the dif-
ference between High and Low groups. This decrease is in line with our expectation that
firms with lower pre-SFAS 121 level of conditional conservatism (Treated firms) were af-
fected more by the regulation to increase the level of conservatism. Overall, this evidence
sheds support on the parallel trends assumption. This is in line with the findings in
Garcia Lara et al. (2019). Second, we directly test whether SFAS 121 led to an increase
in conditional conservatism. Table 2.9 presents the results. In the second column, we
regress firm-year proxy of conservatism, C score, on a dummy variable SFAS121 (equal
to one for fiscal years starting after December 15, 1995 and zero otherwise) and a set of
control variables. The coefficient of SFAS121 is positive and statistically significant. In
the fourth column, we estimate a standard Basu (1997) model interacted with SFAS121
and lagged market-to-book ratio (to control for the accumulation of conservatism in the
previous periods). The coefficient of D × RET × SFAS121 is positive and statistically
significant. These results indicate that SFAS 121 led to an increase in conditional con-
servatism justifying the setting of exogenous variation in conditional conservatism.
[Insert Table 2.9 and Table 2.10]
Table 2.10 reports the results of the estimation of Eq.(2.11). As we can see,
the coefficient of Treated × SFAS121 (the effect of SFAS 121 on treated firms) is nega-
tive and statistically significant for the proxy of equity overvaluation (short interest) in
Column 1 (2) (-0.025, t-stat = -2.441; -0.001, t-stat = -2.656). Next, we examine trends
in the equity overvaluation and short selling activity surrounding the year of the effective
year of SFAS-121 (1995). We interact Treated with every year from 1993 to 1999 using
year 1992 as a benchmark. The results of the regression coefficients are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.2. The figure shows the differences in equity overvaluation and short selling activity
between treated and control groups after SFAS-121 became effective. Importantly, there
is appear to be no significant difference in equity overvaluation and short selling between
the treatment and control groups in the period before the effective date of SFAS-121,
consistent with the parallel trends assumption.
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Regulatory shocks on short selling activity and information environment
To corroborate our findings, in this section we study two regulatory shocks to firms’
information environment and short selling activity. In vein with Garcia Lara et al. (2019),
we examine 1) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Regulation SHO, which
exempted pilot firms (Rule 202T pilot program) from short-sale price tests and 2) the
passage of SFAS 131 Disclosures about segments of an enterprise and related information
that became effective in 1998.
Regulation SHO (Rule 202T)
In July 2004, the SEC initiated a pilot program (Rule 202T of Regulation SHO),
where every third stock in the Russell 3000 index ranked by trading volume within each
exchange was set as a pilot stock. These pilot firms were exempted from short-sale
price tests over May 2, 2005 to August 6, 2007. As a result, firms in the pilot sample
experienced an increase in short-selling activity (Diether et al. 2009b). Additionally,
provided that firms with higher short-sale constraints have lower price efficiency (Saffi
and Sigurdsson 2011), Fang et al. (2016) document that pilot firms exhibited improvement
in price efficiency. As before, we expect SHO Regulation to have more pronounced effect
on firms that entered the regulation period with less conservatism. This is based on
less timely recognition of economic losses that is expected to deter the incorporation of
unfavorable information into prices. Thus, our main prediction is that pilot firms that
entered SHO Regulation with higher pre-regulation conservatism exhibited lower pressure
from short sellers during the pilot program as their prices were closer to underlying value
of equity through timelier recognition of unfavorable information. Additionally, we expect
lower effect on price efficiency of these firms and thus, lower effect on equity overvaluation.
To test these hypotheses we estimate the following models:
SIi,t = β1CONS Pi + β2During CONS Pi,t + β3During Pt + γ1CONS NPi






P/Vi,t = β1CONS Pi + β2During CONS Pi,t + β3During Pt + γ1CONS NPi





where CONS is a decile-ranked variable of average conservatism over seven years
ending in 2003 that excludes potential endogenous anticipation effect of the SEC’s short
selling regulation conducted during 2005-2007. Pilot firms are the ones that are listed in
the SEC’s randomized experiment.7 During is an indicator variable that equals one if the
year is within 2005 to 2007 and zero otherwise. X and X′ are a set of control variables.
CONS P (CONS NP ) is equal to CONS if the firm is (is not) in the pilot program
and zero otherwise. During P (During NP ) equals During if a firm is (is not) in the
pilot program and zero otherwise. First, if conservatism negatively affects both short
selling activity and equity overvaluation, we expect a negative β1 and γ1 in Eq.(2.12) and
Eq.(2.13). Second, we expect a positive (negative) β3 in Eq.(2.12) (Eq.(2.13)) in line
with the idea that Regulation SHO resulted in higher short selling activity (resulted in
short selling pressure on overvalued stocks driving equities to underlying value). Third,
the main coefficient of interest is β2. Given our prediction, we expect that the effects of
Regulation SHO is less pronounced for firms that entered the shock with higher level of
conservatism. This implies a negative (positive) β2 in Eq.(2.12) (Eq.(2.13)). Finally, we
expect the effect on the non-pilot firms (γ3) to be insignificant.
[Insert Table 2.11 about here]
Table 2.11 presents the results. Column (1) (Column (2)) documents the results
of the SHO pilot program on equity overvaluation (short selling activity). As expected
the coefficient on β1 and γ1 is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient on β3
presents evidence that during the pilot program short selling activity increased (0.013,
t-stat = 2.930), but no effect on equity overvaluation. Importantly, we document that β2
7The full list contains 986 stocks that traded without being subject to price tests is available on the
SEC website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-50104.htm). It was published on July 28, 2004 (SEC
Act Release No. 50104).
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is negative and statistically significant for short selling activity that signifies that stocks
with higher pre-SHO pilot program experienced lower short-sellers’ pressure during the
program period. The net effect of SHO regulation and the level of pre-SHO conservatism
is (is not) statistically different from zero for the short selling (equity overvaluation)
(p−value = 0.00). Surprisingly, we document that non-pilot stocks experienced a decline
in equity overvaluation during the pilot program (γ3). Overall, we present corroborating
evidence that higher levels of conservatism are negatively associated with short sellers
activity. Next, we study the passage of SFAS 131.
SFAS 131
SFAS 131 Statement establishes standards on the disclosure of operating seg-
ments and about products and services, geographic areas, and major customers. Addi-
tionally, the statement requires provision of segment profit or loss, certain specific revenue
and expense items, and segment assets. Berger and Hann (2003) documents that SFAS
131 induced firms to reveal “hidden” information about their diversification strategies.
This affected market valuation and changed firms’ behavior in line with the improved
monitoring imposed by the new regulatory standard. Thus, we hypothesize that the
implementation of SFAS 131 is expected to improve firms information environment that
should lead to the improvement of equity valuation. We do not make any assumptions
on short selling activity as short sellers are treated as sophisticated investors that posses
superior information to beat the market (Dechow et al. 2001; Asquith et al. 2005; Drake
et al. 2011; Engelberg et al. 2012). On the one hand, SFAS 131 is expected to improve
information environment of a firm (Berger and Hann 2003), on the other hand, to what
extent SFAS 131 led to the release of a “hidden” information that short-sellers were trad-
ing on is ex-ante unclear. As before, we hypothesize that SFAS 131 should affect firms
differently based on pre-SFAS 131 level of conservatism. In particular, firms with higher
pre-SFAS 131 levels of conservatism are expected to have lower information asymmetry
(Suijs 2008; Garcia Lara et al. 2014). Thus, after the regulation became effective ex-
ante conservative firms are expected to have lower effect on information environment.
The pre-SFAS 131 level of conservatism is estimated as the average level of conservatism
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over seven years measured two years before the regulation became effective (to avoid
endogenous anticipation effect of the regulation). The models that we use are as follows:












where SFAS 131 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years equal or greater than
1998 and zero otherwise. CONS 96 is a decile-ranked variable of average conservatism
over seven years ending in 1996. X and X′ are a set of control variables. If SFAS 131
led to improvement in information environment and monitoring (Berger and Hann 2003;
Botosan and Stanford 2005), we expect β1 to be negative. Additionally, we expect β2
to negative. The main coefficient under interest is β3. We hypothesize that firms with
higher pre-SFAS 131 level of conditional conservatism had better information environment
reducing both short selling activity and equity overvaluation. Given this prediction, the
effect of SFAS 131 should be less pronounced for firms with higher pre-SFAS 131 level of
conservatism. Thus, β3 is expected to be positive.
Table 2.11, Column (3) and (4) present the results. The coefficient on SFAS 131
is negative and statistically significant in Column (3), but not in Column (4). This
signifies that SFAS 131 had a negative impact on equity overvaluation, but not on short
sellers activity (as is hypothesized). The coefficient on pre-SFAS 131 level of conservatism
is negative for equity overvaluation and (surprisingly) positive for short selling activity.
Importantly, we document that firms with higher levels of pre-SFAS 131 conservatism had
lower effect on equity overvaluation (but not on short selling activity) after the passage
of SFAS 131 (SFAS 131 × CONS 96 = 0.075, t-stat = 4.762). The net effect of SFAS
131 and the level of pre-SFAS 131 conservatism is (is not) statistically different from zero
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for the equity overvaluation (short selling) (p− value = 0.00).
Dot-Com bubble and conditional conservatism
In this section we analyze the setting of Dot-Com bubble and whether firms with higher
conditional conservatism experienced better stock performance after the burst of the
bubble. In particular, the stock market run-up that occurred during the mid to late
1990s showed unprecedented boom in the last 140 years of U.S. history (Shiller 2000).
Prices of stocks were at record multiples of earnings. There were some companies that
during the latter half of the 1990s experienced an increase in the stock prices with no
earnings at all (Morris and Alam 2012). Given that we hypothesize that conditional
conservatism should alleviate the problem of equity overvaluation, we expect that firms
with higher Dot-com bubble period (1995-1999) level of conservatism should enter the
burst of the bubble with less overvalued stocks and thus, experience lower stock return
drops during the crisis (March 2000 to October 2002). Overall, the burst of the bubble
resulted in a loss of $428 billion of U.S. publicly traded Internet firms during the March-
December 2000 period (Bharath and Viswanathan 2006). We define internet companies
following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004).8
[Insert Table 2.12 about here]
Table 2.12, Panel A presents average values of overvaluation measure (P/V)
for firms within different levels of conservatism over the Dot-Com bubble period (1995
to 1999).9 The results indicate that stock overvaluation proxy (P/V) declines with the
quintile of conservatism. Additionally, the difference in mean values of P/V between
corresponding quintiles of conservatism is statistically significant (except the difference
between the 3rd and 4th quintiles). Overall, univariate results in Table 2.12, Panel A
indicate that firms with higher levels of conservatism during the Dot-Com bubble had
lower levels of stock overvaluation.
8High-tech companies are active in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware),
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3674 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823,
3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 4899 (communication services), and 7370,
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379
9We sort firms into quintiles each year based on CSCORE measure.
79
Table 2.12, Panel B presents main results with different model specifications.
The results are consistent with our expectations. Firms with higher level of conser-
vatism during the Dot-Com bubble (average of C score over 1995-1999) experienced
better stock performance after the burst of the crisis (March 2000 to October 2002)
(ACT ×DOT COM = 0.007). On average, tech-firms experienced stock price declines
during the burst of the bubble (DOT COM = -0.115 and -0.116).10 Overall, we docu-
ment that tech-firms with higher pre-bubble burst level of conservatism experienced lower
decline in stock prices.
Additional robustness tests
In this section, we perform additional analysis to corroborate our findings. First, we study
whether the results above do hold for alternative proxy of conservatism. We follow Banker
et al. (2016) and augment Eq.(2.1) with the measures controlling for cost stickiness as in
Eq. (7) in Banker et al. (2016).
[Insert Table 2.13 about here]
Table 2.13 presents the results. As shown in Columns (1) and (2) the coefficient
on ACT Banker (which is annual decile of conservatism estimated following Banker et
al. (2016)) is negative and statistically significant both for equity overvaluation (Column
(1)) and short selling activity (Column (2)).
Next, we perform Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. In our main regression
specifications, we cluster standard errors by firm. However, in clustering standard errors
the homogeneity assumption comes into the first place, which might be difficult to achieve
given small number of clusters (Conley et al. 2018). We follow the suggestions of Conley et
al. (2018) and draw inferences using Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure as a robustness
10We include a set of control variables that might drive high-conservatism firms’ overperformance
during the Dot-Com burst period. Specifically, we control for firm’s financial health before the crisis
by controlling for cash holdings (Cash), both short (ST)- and long-term (LT) debt and profitability.
Additionally, we control for momentum (the firm’s raw buy-and-hold return measured over one year
prior to the onset of the crisis), size, book-to-market ratio, idiosyncratic risk and a dummy variable
indicating whether book-to-market ratio is negative. Factor loadings are estimated each month over the
previous 60 months (min 24) data using Fama-French three-factor model plus the momentum factor.
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check. Table 2.13, Columns (3) and (4) present the results. As before, the coefficient on
ACT is negative and statistically significant.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
We predict that accounting conservatism improves market efficiency. We test whether
high conditional conservatism is associated with lower equity overvaluation and whether
it reduces sustained duration of equity overvaluation. Next, we examine whether bet-
ter information quality and corporate governance mechanisms that are associated with
conservatism reduce abnormal short interest. Finally, we check whether equity market
participants value conditionally conservative firms.
We find strong statistical support to our hypotheses. In particular, we doc-
ument that firms with high conditional conservatism are negatively associated with eq-
uity overvaluation. Additionally, we document that conditional conservatism reduces the
probability of consecutive duration of equity overvaluation. Moreover, we find that condi-
tionally conservative firms are less likely to be targets of abnormal short sellers. Finally,
we find that equity markets reward firms for being conservative. Overall, our results
shed additional light on a positive effect of conditional conservatism to equity market.
To overcome endogeneity concern, we exploit regulatory change set by SFAS 121 that
increased the level of conditional conservatism.
Our findings provide additional evidence on the positive effect of conditional
conservatism for shareholders. Additionally, we shed corroborating evidence on the
efficiency-increasing informational channel of conservative reporting. Overall, these find-
ings may be of particular interest for regulators, given the ongoing debate on the desirable
properties of accounting information.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition of main variables
Panel A: Main Dependent and Independent Variables
CSCORE A firm-year measure of conditional conservatism following Ball and Shivakumar
(2005). To mitigate the measurement error a three year average of C Score is
considered (e.g. for year t the average consists of t, t-1, t-2)
ACT Annual decile of CSCORE
P/V Price (P) to fundamental value (V) ratio, where V is a proxy for fundamental
value estimated from the residual income approach (Edwards and Bell 1965;
Ohlson 1995) as implemented in Frankel and Lee (1998)
SI Raw short interest defined as the number of shares hold short over the total
shares outstanding. Missing values are set equal to zero
Panel B: Main Control Variables
Log(Size) A firm size measured as natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage Long-term debt issue plus current liabilities scaled by total assets
B/M Book-to-market ratio estimated as the ratio of shareholders’ equity over the
market value of equity
IO Institutional ownership represented as the percentage of common shares out-
standing owned by institutional shareholders
NOA Net Operating Assets. Net operating assets is the sum of two cumulative dif-
ferences between accounting and cash value added: (Operating Income Before
Depreciation - Operating Cash Flow), and (Investment - Depreciation)
Big − 5 Is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is audited by one of the Big-5
auditors
Log(1 + analyst) Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following a firm
Return 24-month cumulative returns
IV OL The residual variance of the market model estimated over five-year period with
the minimum of two-years of data
Turnover Average number of shares traded over the 100 trading days ending one month
prior to the portfolio formation month, divided by shares outstanding on the
last day. Following Gao and Ritter (2010), we adjust turnover for NASDAQ
firms as follows: Prior to February 1, 2001, we divide NASDAQ volume by
2. For February 1, 2001, to December 31, 2001, we divide NASDAQ volume
by 1.8. For 2002 and 2003, we divide NASDAQ volume by 1.6. For 2004 and
beyond, we do not adjust NASDAQ volume
SSC Short sales constraints proxy. Every month, firms are sorted independently
into terciles on short interest (SI) and institutional ownership (IO). We then
form three SSC portfolios: SSC = 2 (highest) for firms with the highest short
interest and the lowest institutional ownership, SSC = 0 (lowest) for firms with
the lowest short interest and the highest institutional ownership, and SSC = 1
for all other firms
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Table 1: Table 2.6 - Continued
Variable Definition of main variables
Dividend yield Dividend per share divided by price per share
Return volatility Annual return volatility of a stock
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by book value of assets
Bid−Ask Spread Average daily bid-ask spread over the fiscal year
∆Sale Percentage change in sales
Oper.Cycle Log of days of receivables plus the days of inventories less the days of payable
M/B Market-to-book ratio estimated as the ratio of market value of equity to share-
holders’ equity
Altman− Z Altman-Z Score of firms’ distress level
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Appendix 2: Using I/B/E/S forecasts to derive future
ROE estimates
We follow Frankel and Lee (1998) and estimate three future ROE forecast (FROEt,
FROEt+1, FROEt+2) and Bt using sequential process.
To estimate FROEt and Bt, we require a one-year-ahead I/B/E/S consensus
EPS forecast [FY1] and dividend payout ratio (k):
FROEt = FY 1/[(Bt−1 +Bt−2)/2],
Bt = Bt−1[1 + FROEt(1− k)]
To estimate FROEt+1 and Bt+1, we require a one-year-ahead I/B/E/S consen-
sus EPS forecast [FY2] and dividend payout ratio (k):
FROEt+1 = FY 2/[(Bt +Bt−1)/2],
Bt+1 = Bt[1 + FROEt+2(1− k)]
To estimate FROEt+2 and Bt+2 we require a long-term I/B/E/S growth esti-
mate [Ltg] and dividend payout ratio (k):
FROEt+2 = [FY 2(1 + Ltg)]/[(Bt+1 +Bt)/2],
Bt+2 = Bt+1[1 + FROEt+1(1− k)]
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fiscal Year
CI5/CI95 Difference
Difference between High and Low conservatism groups
This figure presents the difference between High and Low groups of conservatism before and
after the passage of SFAS 121 (for firms with fiscal year start after December 15, 1995). High
(Low) groups are the Treated (Control) firms. The groups are identified as the reverse decile
ranking of average conservatism (C score) over the seven years ending in 1993. High (Low)
groups means being in top (bottom) two deciles of the reverse ranking.
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This figure plots trends in the equity overvaluation (A) P/V and short-selling activity (B) SI
around SFAS-121. Specifically, this figure presents the difference-in-differences estimation of
Eq.(2.11), where the coefficient in the figure are related to dummy variables of every fiscal year
relative 1992 (the benchmark). The bars represent 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals. p
is the p-value of the betas. All variables are defined in Table 2.6.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
N Mean Std.dev Q1 Median Q3
P/Vt+1 19013 1.682 1.193 0.969 1.363 1.980
ACT 19013 5.496 2.873 3.000 5.000 8.000
CSCORE 19013 0.154 0.150 0.048 0.125 0.220
SIt+1 19013 0.037 0.047 0.002 0.020 0.050
Leverage 19013 0.186 0.166 0.018 0.168 0.300
Size 19013 5947.154 15738.293 294.481 952.971 3473.617
B/M 19013 0.522 0.383 0.272 0.426 0.654
Analyst 19013 9.564 7.418 4.000 7.000 13.000
Return 19013 0.370 0.867 -0.174 0.196 0.658
SSC 19013 0.462 0.244 0.250 0.500 0.500
IVOL 19013 0.016 0.015 0.006 0.011 0.020
NOA 19013 0.104 0.267 -0.075 0.126 0.296
Big-5 19013 0.898 0.302 1.000 1.000 1.000
IO 19013 0.635 0.260 0.458 0.679 0.849
Turnover 19013 0.178 0.157 0.063 0.136 0.241
Dividend yield 19013 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.012
Return volatility 19013 0.405 0.198 0.258 0.361 0.508
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the main analysis. The
sample comprises 19013 firm-year observations with 3480 unique firms within the
period of 1991-2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1%














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: The role of conditional conservatism in the reduction of equity overvaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
ACT -0.117*** -0.055*** -0.030*** -0.032***
(-17.737) (-9.178) (-6.297) (-6.282)
Leverage 0.059 0.170 0.153
(0.340) (0.943) (0.824)
Log(Size) 0.100*** -0.240*** -0.253***
(7.042) (-6.545) (-6.219)
B/M -0.663*** -0.488*** -0.472***
(-16.282) (-10.016) (-9.038)
Log(1+analyst) 0.050* -0.032 -0.019
(1.652) (-0.938) (-0.532)
Return 0.156 0.226*** 0.229***
(8.44) (13.026) (12.309)
SSC 0.143** -0.106* -0.124**
(2.393) (-1.763) (-2.057)
IVOL -5.351*** -2.308* -3.923**
(-4.977) (-1.702) (-2.531)
NOA -0.062 -0.225* -0.210
(-0.532) (-1.783) (-1.637)
Big-5 0.005 -0.152** -0.193***
(0.131) (-2.485) (-3.008)
Observations 19,012 19,012 18,246 18,083
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.256 0.575 0.582
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
Industry x Year FE No No No Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(2.5). The dependent
variable is a proxy of equity overvaluation (P/V). All the other variables are
as described in Table 2.6. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99%
and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level.
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Table 2.4: The role of conditional conservatism in the reduction of sustained duration
of equity overvaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Overvaluation (1) Overvaluation (2) Overvaluation (>2) Hazard Model
ACT -0.003** -0.005*** -0.008*** 0.074***
(-2.428) (-5.735) (-5.081) (5.878)
Leverage 0.076* 0.074** 0.001 0.375
(1.749) (2.497) (0.013) (1.265)
Log(Size) -0.020*** -0.017*** 0.032*** -0.092***
(-3.145) (-3.777) (3.385) (-3.368)
B/M -0.043*** -0.022*** 0.012 0.706***
(-4.068) (-3.644) (1.006) (5.975)
Log(1+analyst) -0.040*** -0.006 0.020** -0.197***
(-4.926) (-1.137) (2.139) (-3.285)
Return 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.006
(6.414) (3.054) (1.188) (0.214)
SSC -0.003 -0.019* 0.007 0.158
(-0.195) (-1.837) (0.389) (1.350)
IVOL 0.910*** 0.205 -0.574* 13.176***
(2.790) (1.070) (-1.774) (6.548)
NOA -0.031 -0.057*** 0.032 -0.319*
(-1.040) (-2.961) (0.880) (-1.787)
Big-5 -0.026* -0.014 -0.011 -0.019
(-1.752) (-1.603) (-0.713) (-0.179)
Observations 18,246 18,246 18,246 4,604
Adjusted R-squared 0.018 -0.008 0.406
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE No No No Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(2.5). The dependent variables are dummy
variables representing the number of consecutive years that a firm has been in the top quartile of P/V
from one to a maximum of three years (or more). All the other variables are as described in Table 2.6. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level.
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Table 2.5: The role of conditional conservatism in the reduction of abnormal short
interest
VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4
ACT -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-4.990) (-4.368) (-4.499) (-3.741)
Leverage 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.029***
(4.291) (4.291) (5.717) (4.276)
Dividend yield 0.234*** 0.227*** 0.216*** 0.271***
(4.165) (4.164) (3.834) (3.698)
Return volatility -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.003
(-3.361) (-3.578) (-0.966) (-1.139)
Log(1+analyst) 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004***
(3.579) (2.529) (3.234) (3.057)
NOA 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005 0.006
(2.654) (2.890) (1.144) (1.102)
Big-5 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003











Observations 18,246 18,246 18,246 11,835
Adjusted R-squared 0.677 0.689 0.685 0.692
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-step regressors No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(2.8). The dependent
variable is raw short interest. Column (1) does not include first-step regressors
Eq.(2.6). Column (2) includes first-step regressors (i.e., size, book-to-market
and momentum) interacted with two-digit SIC industry. Column (3) includes
first-step regressors (i.e., size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover and in-
stitutional ownership) interacted with two-digit SIC industry. Column (4)
includes first-step regressors (i.e., size, book-to-market, momentum, turnover
and institutional ownership, accruals and insiders selling) interacted with two-
digit SIC industry. All the variables are as described in Table 2.6. All con-
tinuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.6: Five-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding earnings announcement
Earnings Surprise
VARIABLES -1 0 1 t-Stat 1 minus (-1) All firms
Low Conservatism -0.012 -0.008 0.009a 6.89*** 0.005
High Conservatism −0.004b 0.006 0.005 2.40** 0.008
Total -0.009 -0.003 0.008 8.53***
t-stat High - low 2.05** -1.17 2.85***
t-stat a - b 3.5***
Table values are cumulative abnormal returns for firms with high or low conditional
conservatism. Firms are ranked as “high” (“low”) in conditional conservatism if firm-
year CSCORE is in the third (first) tercile among all firms. Earnings surprises are
defined as those that narrowly miss the target by not more than one cent (-1); that just
meet the target (0) or narrowly meet the target by not more than one cent (1). CARs
are 5-day cumulative returns surrounding the earnings announcement date estimated
using market-adjusted model. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
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Table 2.7: Future Stock performance for missers with high and low conditional
conservatism








15 Low -1.60 0.46 -5.06 0.00
High 0.99 0.20 -0.48 0.46
Difference -2.59 0.26 -4.58 0.00
30 Low -1.95 0.08 -2.63 0.00
High 0.36 0.53 -1.07 0.02
Difference -2.31 0.07 -1.56 0.06
45 Low -5.01 0.00 -3.68 0.00
High -1.21 0.08 -1.77 0.00
Difference -3.81 0.00 -1.91 0.03
60 Low -5.88 0.00 -4.25 0.00
High -1.93 0.01 0.62 0.32
Difference -3.96 0.00 -4.86 0.00








15 Low -1.21 0.42 -3.70 0.00
High 0.60 0.32 0.55 0.38
Difference -1.81 0.26 -4.25 0.00
30 Low -1.71 0.03 -3.28 0.00
High -0.01 0.98 -0.86 0.07
Difference -1.70 0.07 -2.42 0.00
45 Low -4.11 0.00 -4.12 0.00
High -1.53 0.01 -1.68 0.00
Difference -2.58 0.01 -2.44 0.00
60 Low -4.48 0.00 -4.52 0.00
High -2.44 0.00 -0.39 0.48
Difference -2.04 0.04 -4.14 0.00
This table reports buy-and-hold (BHAR) and cumulative ab-
normal returns (CAR) (both in percentage points) for firms
with high and low levels of conditional conservatism that miss
consensus forecast by as much as one penny. Firms are
ranked as “high” (“low”) in conditional conservatism if firm-
year CSCORE is in the third (first) tercile among all firms.
Missers are defined as those that narrowly miss the target by
not more than one cent (-1). Returns are compounded 15, 30,
45 and 60 days after the announcement of earnings. ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.8: Calendar-Time Regressions of Portfolios Formed on firms with high and low
conservatism that miss analysts’ consensus forecast
Low Cons. High Cons. Hedge
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Panel A: Calender-Time Regressions - Days 1 through 30
Equal-Weighted
Alpha -0.03 0.43 0.09 0.09 -0.12 0.08
Mktret 0.94 0.00 1.05 0.00 -0.11 0.14
Smb 0.55 0.00 0.65 0.00 -0.10 0.46
Hml -0.07 0.49 0.25 0.18 -0.33 0.13
Adj.R2 0.52 0.53 0.01
Value-Weighted
Alpha 0.02 0.67 0.10 0.06 -0.08 0.31
Mktret 0.97 0.00 0.98 0.00 -0.01 0.92
Smb 0.29 0.02 0.31 0.02 -0.01 0.94
Hml -0.24 0.19 0.25 0.18 -0.49 0.04
Adj.R2 0.67 0.59 0.01
Panel B: Calender-Time Regressions - Days 1 through 60
Equal-Weighted
Alpha 0.01 0.55 0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.06
Mktret 1.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.07
Smb 0.44 0.00 0.62 0.00 -0.18 0.03
Hml 0.03 0.57 0.42 0.00 -0.39 0.00
Adj.R2 0.59 0.53 0.07
Value-Weighted
Alpha 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.65
Mktret 0.97 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.09 0.10
Smb 0.02 0.73 0.44 0.00 -0.42 0.00
Hml -0.25 0.00 0.29 0.00 -0.54 0.00
Adj.R2 0.76 0.63 0.05
This table reports calendar-time regressions of portfolios formed on firms
with high and low levels of conditional conservatism that miss analysts’
consensus forecasts. Firms are ranked as “high” (“low”) in conditional
conservatism if firm-year CSCORE is in the third (first) tercile among all
firms. Missers are defined as those that narrowly miss the target by not
more than one cent (-1). The performance differences are between missers
that is captured within 1 to 30 an 1 to 60 days following earnings an-
nouncement. p-values are reported using White (1980)-adjusted standard
errors.
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Table 2.9: Conditional conservatism surrounding the introduction of SFAS 121
VARIABLES C Score Basu Model Earnings/P
SFAS121 0.020*** D 0.007
(3.528) (1.163)
Leverage 0.413*** RET 0.057***
(10.592) (7.923)
Log(Size) -0.010 D×RET 0.115***
(-1.368) (5.608)
B/M 0.427*** SFAS 0.001
(20.720) (0.291)
Log(1+analyst) 0.018** D × SFAS121 0.009*
(2.295) (1.686)
Bid-Ask Spread 0.002 RET × SFAS121 -0.017**
(0.791) (-2.409)
ROA 0.019 D×RET × SFAS121 0.054***
(0.436) (2.793)
∆Sale 0.018** M/Bt−1 0.004***
(2.197) (4.371)
Oper.Cycle 0.009 D ×M/Bt−1 -0.001
(0.800) (-1.146)
NOA -0.005 RET ×M/Bt−1 -0.002
(-0.208) (-1.574)






Observations 4,352 Observations 11,152
Adjusted R-squared 0.724 Adjusted R-squared 0.322
Firm FE Yes Firm FE Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of the SFAS-121 effect on the
level of conditional conservatism. The sample is restricted to 1992 - 1999 win-
dow. C score is the Ball and Shivakumar 2005 firm-year proxy of conditional
conservatism as estimated in Eq.(2.2). Earnings/P is income before extraor-
dinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. SFAS121 is equal to
one for fiscal years starting after December 15, 1995, zero otherwise. D is an
indicator variable equal to one if RET is negative, zero otherwise. RET is
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. All the variables are
as described in Table 2.6. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99%
and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level.
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Table 2.10: Effect of the exogenous increase in conditional conservatism on equity
overvaluation and short interest
(1) (2)
VARIABLES P/V SI





























Adjusted R-squared 0.697 0.620
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of
Eq.(2.11). All the variables are as described in Ta-
ble 2.6. Columns (1) and (2) present estimation of
Eq.(2.11) for actual realization date of SFAS - 121
(December 15, 1995). All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * de-
note statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
P-values are derived based on robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.11: The role of conditional conservatism in the reduction of equity
overvaluation and short selling activity during SHO Regulation and SFAS 131
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES P/V SI P/V SI
CO P -0.042*** -0.001*
(-2.849) (-1.665)
DURING CONS P -0.001 -0.001*
(-0.029) (-1.947)
DURING P -0.156 0.013***
(-1.297) (2.930)
CO NP -0.038*** -0.001**
(-2.877) (-2.151)
DURING CONS NP 0.009 0.001**
(0.657) (2.159)
DURING NP -0.192** -0.002
(-2.206) (-0.567)
SFAS 131 -0.611*** -0.001
(-5.485) (-0.688)
CONS 96 -0.140*** 0.001**
(-8.648) (2.488)
SFAS 131 ×CONS 96 0.075*** 0.000
(4.762) (0.233)
Leverage -0.315 0.037*** 0.251 0.010*
(-1.225) (2.811) (0.695) (1.944)
Log(Size) 0.089*** -0.011*** 0.344*** 0.002***
(3.102) (-9.071) (11.154) (5.985)
B/M -0.910*** -0.013*** -0.391*** 0.004**
(-8.863) (-3.000) (-5.235) (2.432)
Log(1+analyst) -0.042 0.010*** -0.154*** 0.002**
(-0.742) (4.217) (-2.689) (2.305)
NOA 0.164 -0.017** -0.349 0.008***
(0.923) (-2.133) (-1.347) (2.765)
Big-5 0.023 -0.010** 0.054 0.000









Dividend yield 0.084 -0.042
(0.721) (-0.839)
Return volatility 0.082*** 0.004*
(11.512) (1.664)
p− val. DURING P+DURING CONS P 0.13 0.00
p− val. SFAS 131 + SFAS 131× CONS 96 0.00 0.45
Observations 3,130 3,182 5,047 5,199
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.373 0.326 0.126
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(2.12), (2.13), (2.14), (2.15). The depen-
dent variable is a proxy of equity overvaluation (P/V) and short-selling activity. All the other
variables are as described in Table 2.6 and in Section 2.5.4. All continuous variables are winsorized
at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
P-values are derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.12: Stock returns during the burst of the Dot-Com bubble and conditional
conservatism
Panel A: Average P/V within quintiles of C score measure
Quintile - CSCORE 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 2.658 1.923 1.625 1.480 1.020
Difference 0.736 0.298 0.144 0.461
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.00
Panel B: Pre-crisis level of conservatism and stock returns
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
DOT COM -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115***
(-21.515) (-15.272) (-15.101)




LT Debt 0.020 0.021
(0.922) (0.992)














Constant 0.044*** 0.266*** 0.292***
(39.463) (15.186) (15.956)
Observations 48,638 36,210 36,210
Adjusted R-squared 0.017 0.048 0.050
Four-factor loadings No No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results for the estimation of the effect of conditional conservatism on high-tech firms’
stock performance during the Dot-Com bubble. Panel A presents univariate analysis of the means of P/V proxy
within quintile s of average conservatism over Dot-Com bubble period (1995-1999). Panel B presents the results
of the following regression:
Returni,t = β1DOT COMi,t + β2ACT 5i ×DOT COMi,t + β3Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where Return is monthly stock return. DOT COM is an indicator variable equal to one for months between
March 2000 and October 2002, zero otherwise. ACT 5 is a decile of five year average of C score (over 1995-
1999) estimated in the last fiscal year before the beginning of the Dot-Com bubble (1999). Controls is a set
of control variables that are updated on a quarterly basis and are lagged one quarter. The model is estimated
from August 1997 till October 2002. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***,
**, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.13: The role of conditional conservatism in the reduction of equity
overvaluation and short selling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES P/V SI P/V SI




Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,774 13,774 19,013 19,013
Adjusted R-squared 0.608 0.689 0.260 0.279
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
This table reports the results for the estimation of Eq.(2.5). The de-
pendent variable is a proxy of equity overvaluation (P/V). In Column
(1) and (2) ACT Banker is estimated as in Eq.(2.1) augmented with
cost stickiness measures as in Banker et al. (2016). The proxy is an an-
nual decile of Banker et al. (2016). Column (3) and (4) present average
estimates of Eq.(2.5) using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression slopes.
The standard errors are Newey-West-adjusted with one annual lag. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% levels. ***, **,
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are
derived based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.1: Means of selected characteristics of CSCORE deciles (ACT)
ACT CSCORE ROA M/B Log(Size) Leverage Bid-Ask Spread
1 0.01 0.09 5.43 7.84 0.05 0.57
2 0.05 0.07 3.95 7.24 0.07 0.69
3 0.08 0.06 3.43 7.12 0.09 0.77
4 0.10 0.06 3.14 7.03 0.12 0.82
5 0.13 0.05 2.93 7.05 0.15 0.87
6 0.15 0.04 2.79 7.05 0.19 0.93
7 0.18 0.04 2.53 7.04 0.23 0.96
8 0.21 0.03 2.24 6.91 0.26 1.05
9 0.26 0.02 2.20 6.65 0.30 1.21
10 0.36 0.00 1.96 6.03 0.39 1.59
Rank Correlation 0.65 -0.39 -0.46 -0.19 0.63 0.12
Predicted Sign (+) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+)
This table shows means of selected characteristics of CSCORE deciles (ACT). All the
variables are as described in Table 2.6. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 99%
and 1% levels. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Chapter 3
The Benefits of Balance Sheet
Conservatism: Evidence form the
Financial Crisis
3.1 Introduction
Firms’ balance sheet plays a crucial role in the dissemination of business cycle shocks
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997) and balance-sheet asset-
informativeness is beneficial for financial statement users (Chen et al. 2019). In times
of crisis, investors are more likely to spot weaknesses in accounting quality compared to
good times when there are more investment opportunities (Mitton 2002). This is espe-
cially relevant as market prices are affected by limited investors’ attention and processing
power (e.g. Daniel et al. 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Hirshleifer et al. 2004). As
such, investors with limited attention tend to overvalue firms with “bloated” balance
sheets (Hirshleifer et al. 2004). However, preserving positive firms’ performance through
biased earnings might be especially problematic when balance sheets are bloated (Bar-
ton and Simko 2002). Given this, reducing accounting bloat (i.e., having higher balance
sheet conservatism) might be beneficial during periods of increased demand for reliable
lower-bound estimates of net assets and increased investors’ attention. Thus, to study
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the importance of firms’ balance sheet conservatism (here and after, BSC), I analyze the
setting of the recent financial crisis. This period is particularly interesting as it character-
ized by a significant credit crunch (e.g.Duchin et al. (2010) and Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010)) and overall decline in trust (Tonkiss 2009; Sapienza and Zingales 2012) that trans-
lated into increased investors’ attention (Plantin et al. 2008; Goh et al. 2015). Overall,
this study aims to answer two questions. First, analyze what kind of BSC-properties
helped firms to benefit during the crisis. Second, study whether firms with higher pre-
crisis BSC experienced lower stock price declines and better real economic performance
during the crisis.
BSC represents a cumulative effect of past conservative accounting choices. In
particular, it results from both conditional and unconditional conservatism. Uncondi-
tional (conditional) conservatism refers to persistent (i.e., news independent) understate-
ment of net assets (timely recognition of negative information) that creates unrecognized
goodwill. Jointly, this results in net assets that proxy for liquidation values (Beaver and
Ryan 2005) and reduced amount of funds distributable to contracting parties. BSC has
been largely critiqued in light of its reporting properties, mainly arising from uconditional
conservatism. In particular, given its understatement of net assets, it is regarded as an
accumulation of hidden reserves (Penman and Zhang 2002) that fosters opportunistic
managerial endeavor (Basu 2005a), a bias of unknown magnitude in the financial state-
ment (Ball and Shivakumar 2005), and an income increasing mechanism (Ball et al. 2000;
Jackson and Liu 2010). Overall, balance sheet conservatism credibly signals lower bound
estimates in net asset values. This stays in contrast to the tendency of a delay in bad
news recognition that might lead to accumulation of overstated net assets, due to lack of
timely impairments and write-offs. Given the aforementioned properties of BSC, I pro-
pose two main roles of BSC - informational and cushioning, that helped firms to benefit
from BSC during the financial crisis.
The informational role of BSC refers to the relative importance of hard in-
formation to market participants. Given increased vulnerability of firms’ and investors’
attention on accounting quality during the crisis, market participants are more likely to
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require hard information. Provided that BSC-firms transmit reliable information on lower
bound estimates of net asset values (i.e., collateral value of the assets), BSC is expected
to serve as a bonding mechanism to lenders by providing contractual information (Sunder
et al. 2018). Thus, lenders would be less reluctant to provide favorable financing terms
(i.e., lower cost of debt) to BSC-firms (Sunder et al. 2018). This is in line with Duffie and
Lando (2001) who document that under periodic and imperfect accounting reports there
is higher uncertainty of debt issuers’ net asset values that increases transparency spread
and risk assessments of credit rating agencies. Therefore, maintaining more reliable lower
bound estimates through BSC resolves uncertainty and reduces net assets bloat. Overall,
BSC is expected to facilitate access to capital and debt renegotiation that helps firms
to overcome liquidity needs and prevents bankruptcy filings (Giammarino 1989). This
is especially important since the crisis was accompanied by a significant credit crunch
(Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010).
On the cushioning side,1 BSC promotes the accumulation of “reserves” during
good times that can be released in bad times (i.e., Jackson and Liu 2010). In particular,
BSC creates a buffer that limits subsequent recording of losses (Roychowdhury and Watts
2007). This feature might be especially beneficial in crisis times (that is characterized
by a significant fall in profits (e.g. Kim and Yi 2006), since it allows to use accumulated
buffer to smooth earnings shocks, avoid covenant violations and retain higher investors’
valuation. Additionally, by providing reliable lower bound estimates of accounting num-
bers, BSC-firms enter unfavorable economic periods with ex-ante impaired assets and
lower likelihood of equity overvaluation (Mashruwala and Mashruwala 2018b).2 This
is associated with lower probability of assets write-downs and subsequent stock price
declines.
Overall, given the informational and cushioning roles of BSC, I hypothesize
that BSC-firms experienced lower stock declines during the financial crisis. The main
1This is also refereed to as creation of ‘cookie jar’ reserves. These reserves provide opportunities
for earnings management that can be used to artificially increase earnings when past understatements
reverse (Ball et al. 2000; Jackson and Liu 2010).
2Penman and Zhang (2002) documents that investors undervalue firms with conservative accounting
(Q-score)
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mechanisms underpinning better performance are i) access to lower cost of debt financing,
ii) lower likelihood of significant assets write-downs, iii) lower earnings volatility, and iv)
lower likelihood of covenant violation.
I test these predictions on a large sample of U.S. firms. Overall, the results
suggest that BSC plays a crucial role in the transmission of negative consequences at-
tributable to credit supply shock and a decline in overall trust during financial crises. The
main model under consideration controls for firm fixed effects and captures the difference
in performance before, during and after the crisis where BSC and all the controls are
measured at the onset of the crisis. I estimate BSC by extracting accounting bloat from
book-to-market ratio and as a robustness provide additional proxies of BSC. First, I start
with the analyses of informational and cushioning roles of BSC. On the informational side,
I document that firms with higher pre-crisis BSC had lower cost of debt financing during
the crisis both from bank loans and from primary bond market. Additionally, these firms
issued more debt, but not equity. On the cushioning side, I document that BSC-firms had
lower probability of experiencing significant assets write-downs (i.e., taking a “bath”).
Additionally, I document that BSC-firms were able to reduce earnings volatility and had
lower probability of covenant violation. Second, I estimate whether firms benefited from
BSC during the crisis (i.e., experienced lower stock price drops and had better real eco-
nomic outcomes). Regression estimates indicate that BSC firms experienced lower stock
price drops. To get a better sense of the economic magnitude of pre-crisis BSC on firm
performance, firms in the fourth quartile of BSC outperformed firms in the lowest quar-
tile of BSC by 6.3 (14.1) percentage points in raw (abnormal) returns. This result is not
driven by time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. I proxy for firm-performance
using both market- and accounting-based performance measures. Given the divergence
in returns between high- and low-BSC firms, it may be concluded that the crisis was
largely unanticipated. Additionally, a hedge portfolio of going long on high BSC-firms
and shorting low BSC-firms earns excess returns of 112 basis points per month. Finally,
I study the setting of the Great Depression and document that firms with higher balance
sheet conservatism performed better within the first two years of the crisis.
104
Next, I explore the causes behind the outperformance of firms with high BSC.
Given that financial constraints impair firm’s ability to gain access to financing, firms are
faced with a trade-off - long-term optimization (cut on investment, restructuring of em-
ployment contracts, etc.) and short-term liquidity needs. As discussed above, high BSC
firms are expected to be less financially constrained and more able to raise debt during
the liquidity shock of the crisis. To test this, I analyze actions taken by firms related to
investment, labor practices and productivity. On the investment side, I document that
low BSC-firms cut more on investment during the crisis. Further, I analyze whether high
BSC-firms’ better performance is not driven by labor cost reductions. The results indi-
cate that high BSC-firms experienced higher employment. In addition, high BSC-firms
maintained higher productivity. Next, I test whether pre-crisis level of BSC translated
into lower riskiness during the crisis. I report that high BSC-firms had less volatile stock
returns, higher credit rating and lower distance to default. This is particularly important
in light of the financial crisis, where the issue of bankruptcy along supply chains and
industries was prevalent.
Finally, I ensure that the results hold for alternative proxies of BSC. First, I
follow Beaver and Ryan (2000, 2005). Second, I construct an index of firms’ conserva-
tive reporting of asset values, conditional and unconditional conservatism using principal
component analysis. The results stay in line with the main findings. Additionally, I
control for the pre-crisis level of financial reporting quality (FRQ). I document that FRQ
is also positively associated with firm performance during the crisis.
Overall, I assume that the financial crisis occurred exogenously (at least with
regards to any particular firm) (e.g. Almeida et al. 2012; Campello et al. 2010; Duchin
et al. 2010; Chodorow-Reich 2014) and use this setting to study corporate performance
given firms’ heterogeneity in pre-crisis balance sheet quality (i.e., BSC). The exogenous
shock is expected to alter the equilibrium in the market, while BSC is kept constant
over the period under consideration. Particularly, to overcome the inferences that BSC is
endogenous to unobserved variation in firm performance, I employ the following research
design. First, I measure BSC prior to the beginning of the crisis, while all the control
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variables are measured at the fourth quarter of 2006. This allows to treat BSC as an
instrumental variable with the assumption that pre-crisis BSC is not correlated with
unobservable firm performance measures during the financial crisis. Second, I use placebo
crisis periods to ensure that the results hold only during the crisis. Third, I use both
accounting- and market-based performance measures. Fourth, the main results continue
to hold when I measure BSC in 2005, 2004 and 2003. Fifth, I use propensity score
matching to ensure balanced distribution of covariates in treated and control groups.
Finally, I control for firms past productivity, investment and profitability to ensure that
the results are not driven by BSC-firms’ heterogeneity besides financial reporting quality.
Collectively, the results of the study make several contributions to the literature.
First, I add to the literature analyzing the real effect of the crisis on the corporate sector
(e.g. Tong and Wei 2008; Campello et al. 2010; Duchin et al. 2010; Almeida et al. 2012;
Chodorow-Reich 2014). I present a possible mechanism (i.e., BSC) that helped firms to
limit the negative consequences of the crisis. Second, I add to the literature studying
the role of financial reporting (FR) (particularly conservatism) during the financial crisis
(Francis et al. 2013; Balakrishnan et al. 2016) and its role in mitigating negative effects
of crises (Mitton 2002; Barton and Waymire 2004; Hilary 2008). I present a cumulative
effect of past conservative practices on balance sheet and its main mechanisms through
which firms benefited during the crisis. Third, I add to the literature that focuses on the
negative side of BSC (Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Basu 2005a; Jackson
and Liu 2010), by presenting unexplored benefits of BSC that help to ameliorate negative
consequences of the crisis. Fourth, I document an opposing view to the litature showing
that BSC is contracting neutral (Basu 2005b), is unrelated to debt market, has no role
in creditor protection (Ball et al. 2008) and can reduce contracting efficiency (Ball and
Shivakumar 2005; Guay and Verrecchia 2007; Gigler et al. 2009). I present that lenders
view BSC as contracting efficient (in line with Sunder et al. 2018) and that under the
credit crunch conditions, BSC benefits both debt- and shareholders. Finally, I propose an
additional proxy for measuring BSC (Beaver and Ryan 2000, 2005; Sunder et al. 2018).
Overall, BSC might be regarded as a useful accounting tool for both shareholders and
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debtholders under the times of a severe financial turmoil.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines literature
review. Section 3 presents research design and describes the data used. Sections 4 presents
main results. Sections 5 presents real economic performance of BSC firms. Finally, section
6 provides additional robustness tests and section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
3.2.1 Properties of Balance Sheet Conservatism
Balance sheet conservatism reflects the cumulative effect of two types of conservatism (i.e.,
conditional (CCONS) and unconditional (UCONS)) that results in the understatement
of net asset values. It captures the difference between market and book value of recorded
assets, where the later is expected to proxy for liquidation values. BSC can result from
conservative reporting of assets relative to market value of assets; faster expensing (i.e.,
UCONS) or assets write-downs due to bad news (that can not be reversed in case of good
news).3
By understating net assets, BSC creates accounting slack that reduces assets
write-downs in case of bad news. For instance, consider a firm with low book value of
assets compared to economic value (i.e., BSC-firm). Under the negative shock the firm
will not recognize bad news in earnings unless the shock causes the economic value of
assets to drop below book value of assets. The opposite is true for a firm with “accounting
bloat” (i.e., with book value of assets higher than economic value). This firm will need to
recognize assets write-downs that will cause declines in earnings. Moreover, even if BSC-
firms suffer a shock that triggers assets write-downs, the magnitude of the write-down
would be smaller than for a firm with low BSC (i.e., less accounting slack). An additional
property of BSC is that by understating net asset values it improves the quality of the
balance sheet by presenting reliable lower bound estimates of accounting numbers.
3As one of the examples consider expensing of R&D outlays independent of whether they represent
successful innovations or not. Another example is accounting for acquisitions following the pooling of
interest method.
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Given these reporting properties, a number of scholars critiqued BSC, especially
due to unconditional conservatism. Basu (2005b) states that UCONS largely exists to
circumvent taxes and regulation and relates it to opportunistic managerial endeavors.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) views UCONS as introducing a bias of unknown magnitude
into financial statements that garbles the earnings signal and increases information asym-
metry. Additionally, they view it at best as contracting neutral (if the bias is known)
and possibly inefficient (if the bias in unknown). Additionally, UCONS leads to potential
over-reporting of losses which may never be realized. Penman and Zhang (2002) argue
that UCONS leads to hidden reserves that can be released back into earnings in future
times that might create incentives for earnings management (Jackson and Liu 2010). I
claim that these features might be beneficial during the times of increased distress as
UCONS creates a buffer that can be used to increase earnings when past understate-
ments reverse (Ball et al. 2000; Jackson and Liu 2010) and reduces the likelihood of
assets write-downs.
3.2.2 The Role of Balance Sheet Conservatism during the Crisis
In good times investors are more likely to pay less attention to the accounting quality
of information since there are more investment opportunities (Mitton 2002). In times of
crisis investors are more likely to spot weaknesses in accounting quality that might result
in a “flight to quality” syndrome (Goh et al. 2015). In other words, investors might either
leave the stock market, or move their assets to high-quality firms. This, in turn, results in
excessive volatility that does not reflect the true value of underlying assets, which forces
investors to downward valuation of such assets (Plantin et al. 2008; Goh et al. 2015).
In contrast, firms that preserve balance sheet conservatism signal to investors that the
accounting information is reliable and of high quality. Thus, the quality of the balance
sheet is expected to be especially important during the crisis time. In a survey study,
Cascino et al. (2016) stress on the importance of the balance sheet during crisis times:
.... a lot of people don’t actually place that much emphasis on these types
of numbers, balance sheet numbers, because they are so concerned about profit
margins, EBITDA margins, is top line growth still there, and that is the focus.
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And then you will look at the cash flow numbers ... [It] is only at extreme
times of stress in the market where the balance sheets become
important. (Fund manager, UK)
The main theoretical underpinning of the paper is that BSC helps firms mitigate
the negative effect of the financial crisis given its property to reduce accounting bloat in
net asset values. Following Biddle et al. (2016), I define two main mechanisms of BSC:
informational (i.e., higher contracting efficiency) and cushioning (i.e., accounting slack).
The informational mechanism of BSC is attributable to contracting efficiency.
Traditionally, lenders view balance sheet as one of the main sources of financial informa-
tion. Benston (1969, 1973) state that early U.S. bondholders did not even require the data
on earnings or sales. Provided that lenders are more concerned with lower end distribution
of the borrower’s net assets and that they have asymmetric payoff function of firm value
(Townsend 1979; Watts 2003), BSC is expected to act as a bonding mechanism. Göx and
Wagenhofer (2009) motivate the use of conservatism under moral hazard problem that
arise due to financing needs and a given project’s incentives for hidden effort. Considered
that BSC signals a lower bound of the collateral value of assets, it results in more credible
book values and reduces lenders uncertainty regarding the liquidation value of assets (A.
Ahmed et al. 2002; Göx and Wagenhofer 2009). This is more pronounced in the pres-
ence of information asymmetry that helps to ameliorate shareholder-debtholder conflicts
of interest. This property of BSC serves as ex-ante screening mechanism of borrowers’
ability to pay during the life of the loan. Thus, BSC serves as a bonding mechanism to
lenders by providing more contractable hard information and by reducing the probability
of debtholders’ exploitation through paying excessive dividend to shareholders.4 More-
over, BSC results in timely reporting of bad news in earnings that is valued by lenders.
This notion is supported by bond prices quicker reaction to bad news in earnings rather
than stock prices (Defond and Zhang 2014). Additionally, BSC benefits debtholders even
in case of firm-default. In particular, creditors of firms with higher pre-default level of
conservatism have higher recovery rates (Donovan et al. 2015). Overall, consistent con-
4”the emergence of the conservatism principle and the preparation of audited financial statements can
be ascribed to managerial attempts to bond against exploiting their asymmetrically informed position
relative to other claimholders” (Basu 1997)
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servative balance sheet reporting might serve as a signal of credible hard information to
creditors. In turn, this is expected to reduce the need for costly monitoring that leads to
lower cost of debt, less strict covenants, higher covenant slack (Sunder et al. 2018) and
higher likelihood of obtaining financing (Göx and Wagenhofer 2009).
The cushioning mechanism is attributable to preservation of cash and other
assets through understatement of net income and net assets. In particular, by persistently
understating net assets, BSC reduces funds distributable to contracting parties that leads
to higher amount of cash retained in the firm. For example, firms that face higher
regulatory and political costs might keep their balance sheets more conservative for cost
reduction and subsequent cash preservation (Basu 2005b; Qiang 2007a). In this sense,
BSC might be considered as income smoothing mechanism that accumulates “reserves”
during good times and releases this cushion in bad times (e.g. Levitt 1998; Jackson and
Liu 2010).
Additionally, by providing reliable lower bound estimates of accounting num-
bers, BSC-firms enter unfavorable economic periods with ex-ante impaired assets that
minimizes the likelihood of assets write-downs that subsequently affect earnings (Roy-
chowdhury and Watts 2007). This is especially important during the crisis times as
unfavorable economic conditions lead to stricter impairment rule and are associated with
an increase in asset write-offs as the expected profits fall (Johnson et al. 2000, Kim and
Yi 2006). For instance, during the crisis both Level 2 and Level 3 fair value accounting
involves manipulation by managers that deviates from the true value of assets that results
in downward valuation of such assets by investors (Plantin et al. 2008; Goh et al. 2015).
Downward valuation of investors might be as a result of equity overvaluation. Given
that during the crisis firms are under pressure to report more precise information (Göx
and Wagenhofer 2009), mispricing is expected to be corrected causing a fall in price for
overvalued equities. BSC diminishes equity overvaluation (Mashruwala and Mashruwala
2018b) and is expected to reduce bad news hoarding that increases equity crash risk
(Hutton et al. 2009). Thus, BSC-firms are expected to have lower price drops during the
crisis. Overall, given BSC-firms’ ability to smooth earnings (i.e., through accumulation of
110
“buffer”) and have lower likelihood of forced asset-impairment, it might be expected that
BSC-firms experienced lower stock price drops during the crisis. Particularly, sharehold-
ers may place a valuation premium over firms with higher BSC when there is a decline
in overall trust in the economy (e.g. Guiso et al. 2008) as was the case during the crisis.
3.2.3 Main Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is based on the properties of BSC. In particular, I identify three main
mechanism through with BSC-firms might ameliorate negative consequences of the crisis.
First, given that creditors have an asymmetric payoff function of firm value and that they
focus on the lower end distribution of the borrower’s net assets (Townsend 1979; Watts
2003), BSC is expected to serve as a bonding mechanism providing access to financing
during the credit crunch. Second, by accumulating reserves in good times, BSC might let
firms to release this cushion in bad times resulting in lower earings volatility (Levitt 1998;
Jackson and Liu 2010). Third, the recent recession was accompanied by highly publicized
assets write-downs (Spear and Taylor 2011).5 Given that BSC understates net assets, it
creates accounting slack that reduces assets write-downs unless the economic value drops
below the book value of assets. In contrast, managers of firms with bloated balance sheets
might be forced to write-down assets affecting earnings (Barton and Simko 2002; Haggard
et al. 2015). Prakash (2010) documents that firms with bloated balance-sheets are twice
more likely to write down assets during recessions compared to expansions. Thus, I expect
that firms with less accounting bloat (i.e., higher BSC) are less likely to write-down assets
and avoid the associated negative investors’ reaction (Francis et al. 1996). Finally, by
reducing the probability of assets write-downs and by creation of accounting slack, firms
with higher BSC are expected to have lower likelihood of covenant violation. Thus, I test
the above mechanisms stated in one hypothesis:
H1: Firms with higher pre-crisis BSC had access to i) lower cost of debt-
financing, ii) were able to lower earnings volatility, iii) avoided significant
5In a survey of asset write downs conducted within 32 countries, Ernst&Young (Young 2010) reports
that asset write-down charges constituted 9% of net assets of a firm in 2008, compared to 2% in the
previous year.
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assets write-downs and, iv) were less likely to violate covenants during the
crisis
BSC improves the quality of the balance sheet by reliably reflecting lower bound
estimates and through the reduction of accounting bloat in net asset values. As was
stated above, by presenting lower bound estimates of net assets, BSC prevents wealth
transfer from debtholders to shareholders, helps in assessing value of collateral, restricts
managers’ ability to reduce net asset values and hoard bad news. Additionally, by creating
accounting slack BSC is expected to reduce the likelihood of covenant violation and
result in ex-ante higher covenant slack at the loan inception. This is especially important
during crisis times as Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017) document that borrowers of less
healthy banks who violated covenants during the crisis experienced a reduction of loan
supply by 11%. This was accompanied by a reduction in employment and investment.
Additionally, BSC is expected to decrease equity overvaluation reducing the noise in
fundamental values. Thus, BSC is expected to lessen the extent to which stock prices are
subject to large declines followed by a market crash. Given these, I expect that BSC-firms
experienced lower price drops. The main hypothesis of the study is as follows:
H2: Firms’ pre-crisis level of BSC is positively associated with better stock
return performance during the crisis.
3.3 Research Design and Sample Description
3.3.1 Balance sheet conservatism
To proxy the balance sheet conservatism I start with Sunder et al. (2018) as the main
measure.6 It is measured by the persistent downward bias in book value of equity. In
particular, BSC is proxied by the amount of book equity that is equivalent to the economic
value. Raw book-to-market (BTM) is a noisy measure of balance sheet conservatism
6As a robustness test, I propose two additional measures. First, I construct a proxy for firms’
conservative reporting of asset values, unconditional and conditional conservatism. Second, I follow
Beaver and Ryan 2000, 2005. The results stay in line with the main findings.
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since there are several factors that are likely to affect both book and market value of
equity. For instance, market value of equity also captures the value of economic rents
and the value of growth options. Hence, there is a need to extract other sources of
variation in BTM. In particular, I control for long-term growth forecast and sales growth
to account for the expected growth. Industry concentration is expected to capture higher
rents that are associated with industry concentration that, in turn, exhibit lower BTM.
Market sentiment may result in over- or under-investment of market capitalization in the
denominator of BTM. Thus, I control for consumer sentiment (Qui and Welch 2006) and
S&P index as a proxy for general level of market prices, given that investors’ sentiment
is tied to overall market conditions (Rosen 2006). Firm profitability, credit rating and
return volatility are used to control for distress. Given that even without conservatism
inflation can decrease BTM (Basu 1997), there is a control for the presence of high
inflation. Finally, to proxy for the extent of fair value accounting, accumulated other
comprehensive income is included.7 All the variables are estimated given firms’ fiscal
year end. The main model under consideration is as follows:
BTMi,t = α+ β2LT Growth Forecasti,t + β2Sales Growthi,t + β3Industry Concentrationi,t
+ β41/Consumer Sentiment Indexi,t + β51/S&P Indexi,t + β6Profitabilityi,t
+ β7Credit Ratingi,t + β8Return V olatilityi,t + β9High Inflationi,t + β10AOCIi,t
+ εi,t,
(3.1)
where BTM is the book value of assets divided by the market value of equity plus the
book value of debt. Long-term growth forecast and sales growth proxy for the expected
growth of a firm. Industry concentration controls for the effect of a high rent that results
in a lower BTM. 1/Consumer SentimentIndex is a proxy for market sentiment and
1/S&P accounts for general level of prices that is expected to affect investors’ sentiments.
Profitability, Credit Rating and Return V olatility are used to control for a distress.
HighInflation is an indicator variable that controls for inflation. AOCI is calculated as
accumulated other comprehensive income scaled by total assets to proxy for the extent
7For detailed explanation of variables construction and estimation procedure, please refer to Sunder
et al. (2018).
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of fair value accounting. Eq.(3.1) is estimated with year and industry fixed effects (2-
digit SIC). The residual term from Eq.(3.1) is the measure of balance sheet conservatism
(BSC). To assist in interpretation of results I multiply BSC by -1, so that the higher
BSC, the higher is the firm’s balance sheet conservatism. Regression results of Eq.(3.1)
are reported in Internet Appendix Table 3.1.
3.3.2 Research Design
To establish a link between balance sheet conservatism and firms’ performance during
the financial crisis I estimate variants of the following regression:
Yi,crisis = β1BSCi,pre−crisis + ψ′Xi,pre−crisis + ω′FEi + εi, (3.2)
where subscript i denotes firm. The dependent variable Yi,crisis is one of the variables
related to hypotheses testing. For theH2, Yi,crisis is bank-loans and primary bond issuance
spread (I include all banks loans and primary bonds issued within this period), average
earnings volatility, probability of covenant violation and experiencing a significant assets
write-down (both are dummy variables) during the crisis (July 2007 to March 2009). For
the H1, Yi,crisis is crisis-period buy and hold raw (RawReturn) and four-factor model
adjusted abnormal (AbnormalReturn) returns measured over the period July 2007 to
March 2009. BSCi,pre−crisis stands for the measure of balance sheet conservatism that
is measured in 2006. Xi,pre−crisis is a vector of firm-specific control variables that are
measured the last calendar quarter before the year of the beginning of the crisis (2006
Q4). In different model specifications I control for different set of control variables that
are discussed below.
3.3.3 Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The beginning of the crisis is defined as July 1, 2007 to March 31, 2009 (e.g. Duchin
et al. 2010, Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Similar to prior literature I exclude fi-
nancial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999). Accounting information
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comes from Compustat quarterly or annual (depending on the research setting). Data
on share returns comes from CRSP. Compustat and CRSP datasets are merged using
CRSP/Compustat linking table. Information related to private loan issuance is from the
Loan Pricing Corporation’s (DealScan) database. The data on primary market corporate
bonds is from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). I require that firms have
non-missing data for BSC and main control variables related to the stock performance
during the crisis. However, I do not impose this restriction on the remaining variables to
preserve sample size. This results in 1643 firms.
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of primary variables of interest. All the
accounting information is measured in the fourth quarter of 2006. The mean of BSC
is positive (0.003). Average raw (abnormal return) is -0.51 (0.029) and still strongly
negative (positive) for the top sample quartile (quite in line with Lins et al. 2013; Lins
et al. 2017). On average, this suggests the negative consequence of the financial crisis.
Firms entered a crisis being not highly levered with the mean of Long − Term Debt
(Short − Term Debt) equal to 16.4%(2.7%). The average cash-to-assets ratio is around
19% with average gross profitability is 10.2%. The average spread on bank-loans issued
during the crisis is around 2% with average total cost of borrowing (TCB) of 1.4%. The
average spread on primary bond issuance during the crisis is around 6%. Additionally,
more than half of the sample experienced a significant asset write-down (Bath Firm =
51.5%).
Table 3.2 presents the correlation matrix. It is important to note that BSC
is positively correlated with crisis-period raw returns (0.17) and abnormal returns (0.9).
Additionally, BSC-firms entered the crisis as firms with more cash, higher profitability,
lower short-term debt and retained earnings. Further, pre-crisis BSC is negatively corre-
lated with bank-loan spread and total cost of borrowing (AISD = -0.19, TCB = -0.15) and
primary bond issuance spread (Offering yield = -0.13). Moreover, the correlation between
having experienced a significant asset write-down (Bath firm) and covenant violation dur-
ing the crisis and pre-crisis BSC is negative and statistically significant, while positive
with earnings smoothing proxy. In Section 3.6.1 I perform propensity score matching to
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ensure balanced distribution of covariates.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Possible Mechanism
In this section, I present the results for the analysis of the main properties of balance
sheet conservatism - informational and cushioning.
Informational Role
First, I start with the test of informational side of BSC. In particular, I test whether
BSC has contracting and economic relevance in the corporate debt market. In particular,
I test whether debt pricing is negatively associated with BSC. I add to the findings
of Sunder et al. (2018) by analyzing the period of financial crisis and by studying the
relationship between BSC and primary bond issuance spreads.
First, I start with the universe of bank-loan initiations from the DealScan
database. Consistent with prior studies, I require dollar-denominated loans borrowed by
U.S. firms with the information on spread, maturity, covenant and loan amount. As a
measure for the cost of borrowing, I use two measures. First, AISD - all-in-drawn spread
that is a payment in basis points over LIBOR (e.g. Anantharaman et al. 2013; Sunder
et al. 2018).8 Second, I use the measure of Berg et al. (2016), total cost of borrowing
(TCB), that incorporates different loan-specific options (i.e., a variety of fees that are
embedded in loan-specific options) and the likelihood that these options are going to be
exercised.9
All the regression models include a set of loan and borrowing characteristics
8During the crisis period, 656 firms were granted a bank loan. 362 firms were granted only 1 bank
loan, while maximum amount of loans that was taken by a firm is 11. It is important to note, that the
number of observations in the regression sample is lower than the number of bank loans outstanding as
a result of missing observations in the control variables used in the model.
9During the crisis period, 150 firms were issued a loan in the primary bond market. 60 firms issued
only 1 loan, while maximum amount of loans issued by a firm is 10. It is important to note, that the
number of observations in the regression sample is lower than the number of primary loans issued as a
result of missing observations in the control variables used in the model.
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that are expected to affect cost of borrowing. Following the literature, the loan-level
controls include size, maturity, whether the loan has a collateral, has financial covenant,
prime base rate, or performance pricing and rating. Borrower-specific controls include
size, leverage, profitability, tangibility, current ratio, cash all measured one quarter before
the initiation of the loan. Additionally, a vector of fixed effects includes loan type, loan
purpose, industry and year dummies. Given that loans to the same borrower might be
correlated with each other, standard errors are clustered by firms. All the borrowing-
specific controls are lagged to ensure that all the accounting information is captured
prior to the loan origination. The regression model for the cost of loan is estimated at
facility level.
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
Table 3.3 presents the coefficient estimates for the cost of borrowing surrounding
the financial crisis for firms with high/low BSC. Column (1) and (2) reports regression
estimates with the dependent variable equal to AISD and TCB. In both columns the
coefficient of BSC is negative and statistically significant (-0.014, t-stat=-2.692 and -0.11,
t-stat=-2.513). Regarding the economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in
pre-crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with 0.27 (0.22) percentage points decrease in bank-
loan spread (total cost of borrowing) - AISD (TCB) during the crisis. Overall, the results
indicate that firms that entered the crisis with high BSC had lower cost of borrowing
from banks during the crisis period.
Next, I study a subset of primary market corporate bonds from Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD). Consistent with Chava et al. (2010), I consider bonds
that are corporate debenture with issuance, offering date, and covenant information and
that are issued during the crisis period. Additionally, I drop Yankee, Canadian, foreign
currency and privately placed bonds. As before, I include the same set of firm-specific
accounting information. Bond-specific characteristics include the face value of bond, time-
to-maturity, indicators for callable (Redeemable), interchangeable (Fungible), seniority
indicator (Security) and whether it has covenant or not (Log(1 + covenant)). credit
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rating10 and whether the bond includes covenants or not. Cost of debt is proxied as
bonds offering yield.
Table 3.3, Column (3) presents the results. The results are consistent with the
prediction and show that there is a strong negative relation between BSC and cost of
corporate primary market debt (-0.027, t-stat=-2.642). Regarding the economic signifi-
cance, a one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with 0.53
percentage points decrease in corporate debt spread during the crisis.
3.4.2 Cushioning Role
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
On the cushioning role of BSC, I examine whether firms had lower volatility of earn-
ings during the crisis; experienced lower probability of assets write-downs and had lower
probability of covenant violation.
In line with the idea that BSC accumulates reserves in bad times and releases
them in good times, it might be the case that BSC-firms experienced lower price drops
due to the use of pre-crisis accumulated buffer (Ball et al. 2000; Jackson and Liu 2010)
and subsequent release during the crisis. The main empirical challenge is to segregate
earnings smoothness into its fundamental and discretionary components. I follow Lang
and Maffett (2011) and Lang et al. (2012) in estimation of earnings smoothing proxy. In
particular, for each firm-quarter pair I estimate measures of overall earnings smoothness
(SMTH1 and SMTH2) over two-digit SIC industry. Second, SMTH1 (SMTH2) is
regressed on a set of determinants of earnings smoothness, where discretionary smoothing
is defined as the residual term equal to DSMTH1 (DSMTH2). Finally, firm-quarter
measure of earnings smoothing is defined as the average of percentile rank values of
DSMTH1 and DSMTH2 defined as DSMTH.11 Final measure of earnings smoothing
is average DSMTH over the crisis period. The set of control variables include Tobin’s Q,
firms’ size, long- and short-term leverage, cash, profitability and sales growth, indicator
10S&P rating is of the first choice. If it is missing I rely on Moody’s and then Fitch rating, subsequently.
11For detailed description of all variables under consideration, please refer to Lang and Maffett (2011)
and Lang et al. (2012).
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variable of whether a firm is audited by one of the Big-4 auditors and standard deviation
of pre-crisis returns.
Table 3.4, Panel A presents the results. The results are positive and statistically
significant. Column (1) includes only BSC (0.029, t-stat = 2.387). Column (2) includes a
set of control variables, BSC is positive and statistically significant (0.039, t-stat=3.006).
Column (3) includes past level of earnings smoothing (PreviousDIS SMTH - measured
as average over 7 quarters before the crisis). Results remain positive and statistically
significant (0.026, t-stat = 2.330). In terms of economic significance, a one standard
deviation increase in pre-crisis BSC (0.196)is associated with 0.005 increase in earnings
smoothing during the crisis.
Next, I examine whether BSC decreases the probability of a significant asset
write-down. I follow Elliott and Shaw (1988) and determine a significant asset write-off
(i.e., “bath”) as any quarter where Special Items (SPI) from Compustat is negative and
exceeds one percent of lagged firm total assets (during the crisis period).12 Following
Francis et al. 1996; Haggard et al. (2015) I control for factors preceding the bath such
as negative firm performance, negative stock returns, low/negative income, increasing
book-to-market and proxies for firm equity liquidity. Table 3.4, Panel B presents the
results. The dependent variable in Column (1) is equal to 1 if a firm experienced a bath
during the crisis, zero otherwise. A one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis level of
BSC (0.196) is associated with 7.8 percentage lower likelihood of experiencing a bath.
In Column (2) the dependent variable is a total number of “baths” experienced by firms
during the crisis period. Given that the dependent variable is count, I employ poisson
regression. A one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis level of BSC is associated with
a decrease is the amount of baths by 0.84.13 The discretion of firms with regards to taking
a bath or not is not uniform. Some managers will try to hoard bad news until the amount
of negative information is significant so that it is impossible to withheld it. In contrast,
other managers will release such information as early as possible. In line with Haggard




et al. (2015) I classify former as forced baths, while the later as voluntary baths. I follow
Barton and Simko (2002) who document that managers are limited in biasing earnings by
the amount of net operating assets overvaluation relative to neutral GAAP application.
This is the proxy for balance sheet constraint that limits managers flexibility in their
financial reporting. Baths in firms with more (less) constrained balance sheets are more
likely to represent forced baths. I set forced firms equal to 1 (0) if pre-crisis level of net
operating assets is in the top (bottom) tertile. Column (3) and (4) present the results.
The coefficient on BSC is negative and statistically significant only in forced-bath sample
(the difference between forced and voluntary BSC is significant - p-value = 0.02 ). These
results support the fact that BSC-firms were less likely to be forced to write-down an
asset.
Finally, I estimate actual covenant violation probability. Chodorow-Reich and
Falato (2017) document that borrowers of less healthy banks who violated covenants
during the crisis experienced lower investment intensity, decrease in employment and a
reduction of loan supply. Covenant violation might partially explain worse performance
during the crisis. I obtain the data for covenant violation from Nini et al. (2012) and
Roberts and Sufi (2009). There 111 firms that violated covenants within the crisis period.
Table 3.4, Panel C presents the results. In all the regression specifications firms with
higher pre-crisis level of BSC had lower probability to violate covenants. A one standard
deviation increase in BSC (0.196) decreases the probability of covenant violation by 1.7
percentage points, ceteris paribus (Column (3)).
Summarizing both informational and cushioning roles of BSC, the results indi-
cate that BSC-firms attracted lower cost of debt, smoothed earnings, had lower proba-
bility of experiencing a significant asset write-down and covenant violation.
3.4.3 Stock returns surrounding the financial crisis and BSC
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
To test the performance of firms during the financial crisis with different pre-crisis
levels of BSC, I estimate various regressions of stock returns (both raw and four-factor
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model adjusted) as a function of BSC and a set of control variables. The set of control
variables includes firm’s financial health before the crisis. I include cash holdings, both
short- and long-term debt and profitability. Firms that entered the crisis with healthier
balance sheets were less affected by the economic downturn (see Almeida et al. 2012;
Harford et al. 2014). Additionally, I control for momentum (the firm’s raw buy-and-hold
return measured over one year prior to the onset of the crisis), size and idiosyncratic risk
(Lins et al. 2017) and sales growth . Ball et al. (2020) decompose that book value of
equity into retained earnings and contributed capital. They document that only retained
earnings-to-market predicts the cross section of average returns. Thus, I include retained
earnings component. Additionally, Novy-Marx (2013) document that profitability, mea-
sured by gross profits-to-assets, has roughly the same power as book-to-market predicting
the cross section of average returns. I follow his recommendations and control for gross
profitability. All the variables are defined in Appendix 3.7. FE is industry dummies
that are set at two-digit SIC code. By design, Eq.(3.2) controls for firm-fixed effects.
Additionally, I control for Fama-French three-factor model plus the momentum loadings
that are estimated based on the previous 60 months data ending on June 2007. εi is
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by two-digit SIC industry.
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents results for the baseline estimations. The variable
under interest is BSC. All models include industry fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2)
present that firms with higher BSC earned higher returns during the crisis excluding con-
trol variables. The results are positive and statistically significant.14 To overcome a con-
cern associated with omitted variables, columns (3) and (4) include a set of firm-specific
characteristics. As before, high-BSC firms had better stock performance compared to
low-BSC firms. Overall, the results remain positive and economically significant. Hold-
ing everything else constant, one standard deviation increase in BSC (0.196) is associated
with 3.3 percentage points increase in raw returns and 6.5 percentage points increase in
four-factor model adjusted abnormal returns during the crisis. The effect of control vari-
14A one standard deviation increase in BSC (0.196) is associated with 4.6 percentage points increase
in raw returns and 9.5 percentage points increase in four-factor model adjusted abnormal returns during
the crisis.
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ables is as expected. For example, firms that entered the crisis with “healthier” balance
sheets (higher cash holdings and lower leverage) experienced higher returns during the
crisis. Additionally, firms that were bigger in size, lower sales growth and less risky
showed better stock performance during the crisis.
Panel B of Table 3.5 presents the re-estimation of all the previous models,
but instead of including a linear measure of BSC, I assign BSC into quartiles. The
first quartile is set as a benchmark. The results indicate that high BSC-firms (BSC4)
outperformed firms with the lowest BSC (BSC1). Column (3) and (4) present results
including full set of control variables. As before, the results stay in line with the previous
findings. High BSC-firms (BSC4) outperformed firms with the lowest BSC (BSC1) by
9.2 (14.1) percentage points in raw (abnormal) returns. Overall, the impact of BSC is
monotonic, but not entirely linear.
Panel C ensures that the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for
measures of corporate governance that led to better performance of firms during the cri-
sis (Nguyen et al. 2015). The results indicate that the impact of BSC is still positive
and statistically significant. Additionally, there is some evidence that better governed
firms performed better during the crisis. In particular, performance of firms with more
entrenched managers (independent compensation committee) was worse (better) during
the crisis. These results stay in line with Nguyen et al. (2015) who document the im-
portance of pre-crisis level corporate governance for the firms’ performance during the
crisis.
Finally, Panel D sheds light whether the positive relation between BSC and
stock performance during the crisis is unique to this period or is common to other periods
that might be due to omitted risk factors that are correlated with BSC. I estimate Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The data on stock returns is at monthly frequency,
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while BSC is measured in 2006 and all the control variables are updated quarterly:15
yi,t = β1BSC2006,i × Crisist + β2BSC2006,i × Post− Crisist
+ ψ′Xl,i,t−1 + ω′FEi,t + εi,t,
(3.3)
where y is either monthly raw return or four-factor model adjusted returns. BSC2006
stands for the measure of balance sheet conservatism at the end of 2006. Crisis is a
dummy variable set to one in the period July 2007 to March 2009, while Post − Crisis
stands for the period April 2009 to December 2013. Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific
control variables that are updated every quarter.
Table 3.5, Panel D presents the results for both raw and four-factor model-
adjusted returns. Columns (1) and (2) do not control for firm-specific characteristics.
In both specifications, high-BSC firms outperformed low-BSC firms during the crisis.16
Columns (3) and (4) include additional control variables. As before, the results are posi-
tive and statistically significant. Additionally, there is a reversal of returns in post-crisis
period, where the coefficient on BSC2006,i × Post − Crisist is negative and statistically
significant.
Overall, the results present evidence that pre-crisis balance sheet conservatism
is positively associated with firm performance during the crisis. In particular, high-BSC
firms outperformed low-BSC firms. This result is persistent only during the crisis time.
3.4.4 Robustness tests
In this section, I present additional analyses to ensure the robustness of baseline specifi-
cations. First, there is a possibility that the measure of BSC in 2006 may be correlated
with the anticipation of the crisis. Even though the regression models include controls
that might affect crisis period stock returns, the possibility that BSC in 2006 is correlated
with unobservable measure of crisis anticipation might confound main findings.
15The regression is run over 2007 to 2013 as BSC is measured in 2006 to reduce the likelihood that
BSC is jointly determined with the firm performance.
16In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation increase in BSC (0.196) in 2006 is associ-
ated with 0.1 (0.2) percentage points higher monthly raw (abnormal) returns during the crisis.
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To address this concern, I replicate the estimations of Table 3.5, Panel A and
test whether crisis-period returns are positively affected by BSC measured in 2005, 2004
and 2003. Table 3.6, Panel A presents the results of Eq.(3.2) substituting BSC measured
during different years. In all the models the coefficient on BSC is positive and statistically
significant. Overall, baseline findings are not sensitive to the time period when BSC
is measured. One of the explanations for these findings is overall persistence of firms
commitment to conservative balance sheet reporting. BSC reflects an accumulation of
past accounting choices of the firm. Under U.S. GAAP past conservative write-offs of
assets can not be easily reversed. Thus, BSC is considered as a sticky measure.17
Next, to address the issue that base line results maybe biased by time varying
heterogeneity not explained by the control variables I use placebo (i.e., non-existent) years
of financial crisis. In particular, I set crisis in July 2004, in July 2003 and in July 2002
(columns (1) to (4) Table 3.6, Panel B). The crisis period lasts 21 months. Table 3.6, Panel
B presents the results. For none of the placebo crisis years the effect of BSC on returns is
positive and statistically significant. Importantly, the results are negative. This stays in
line with Penman and Zhang (2002), who document that investors undervalue firms with
conservative accounting (Q-score. Additionally, Figure 3.1 presents alpha (i.e., abnormal
return) of calendar-time regression of a zero-investment (equal-weighted) hedge portfolio
that goes long firms with high (4th quartile) and short firms with low (1st quartile) levels
of pre-crisis BSC. Placebo crisis years are set from 1991 till 2016. Firms are sorted into
quartiles based on pre-crisis level of BSC. Each crisis period starts in July and lasts
for 21 months. The only period when hedge portfolio obtains positive and statistically
significant alpha is during the crisis time (112 b.p.; p-value=0.049). In alternative periods
alphas are statistically insignificant. Moreover, in 1995 alpha is negative and statistically
significant.
Finally, I examine whether better performance of high BSC-firms was present
during other crisis times that were not accompanied by the credit crunch. I study the
dot.com bubble burst (2000 Q1 to 2002 Q3), September 11 terrorist attack (2001 Q3-Q4)
17In particular, the correlation between BSC measure in 2006 and 2005 is 78%; 2006 and 2004 is 66%;
2006 and 2003 is 52%.
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and Russian debt crisis separately. After the burst of the bubble there was a slowdown of
the US economy accompanied by a decline in investments. Additionally, after the terrorist
attack there was an overall decline in investors’ sentiment causing a demand rather than
a supply shock (Tong and Wei 2008). The Russian debt crisis; led to a collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund. To bail out major creditors of LTCM
that had to write-off losses on their investment, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
organized a $3.5 billion support. It is important to note, that these crises periods are not
comparable to the recent financial crisis and do not have the characteristics (i.e., credit
crunch, significant decline in trust, etc.). Panel C of Table 3.6 presents the results. The
coefficient of BSC for both raw and four-factor model adjusted returns is statistically
insignificant.
The results presented thus far indicate that firms with higher BSC performed
better just during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 the main feature of which was a sig-
nificant credit crunch.
3.4.5 Stock returns surrounding Great Depression and BSC
To shed more evidence on the positive side of BSC during the crisis times that are
accompanied by the credit crunch, decline in trust and increased investors’ attention,
I perform an out-of-sample analysis of firms’ performance during the Great Depression.
This crisis is the closest one in terms of its’ magnitude and features to the recent financial
crisis. As before, I study firm performance given the level of BSC at the beginning of the
crisis.
Great Depression resulted in a significant financial turmoil that led to a decline
(increase) in Gross National Product (unemployment) from $190.9 billion (4.2%) in 1928
to $131.5 billion (25%) in 1933. This was accompanied by a significant decline in the
stock market through out 1929 to 1932, with an average decline in value of common stock
on the NYSE from $60 billion in December 1928 to $20 billion in December 1932. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average (Moody’s Commodity Index) declined from 300 (223.5)
in December 1928 to 59.93 (79.8) in December 1932. As in the case of financial crisis
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(2008-9) there was a significant negative impact on corporate sector. Both equity and
debt issuance fell dramatically from 1929 to 1933. Additionally, there was a decline in
manufacturing production and financial distress that was accompanied by a decline in
percentage of firms with positive net income from 61% in 1928 to 18% in 1932 (Graham
et al. 2011).
I replicate estimation similar to Table 3.5, Panel A. The firm-specific accounting
information is collected from Moody’s Investment Manual for Industrial Securities, while
stock returns are from CRSP. Due to data limitations I can not proceed with the (Sunder
et al. 2018) proxy for BSC, thus I follow Beaver and Ryan (2000) and estimate a proxy of
unconditional conservatism and use it as a proxy for BSC.18 I require that there is stock
return information both in period t and t − 1.19 All the control variables and BSC are
measured in 1928.20 As before, I exclude financial and utility firms.
[Insert Table 3.7]
Table 3.7 presents the results on the association between BSC and firm-performance
during the Great Depression. The results indicate that firms that entered Great Depres-
sion with higher pre-crisis level of BSC had better stock performance during the crisis
over first two years (columns (1) to (4)). The results for the raw and abnormal return
that are estimated over October 1929 to December 1932 are positive, but statistically
insignificant. In terms of economic significance, one standard deviation (0.131) increase
in pre-depression BSC results in 7.9 (5.9) percentage points increase in raw (abnormal)
returns estimated over October 1929 to December 1930 (1931) (holding all other control
variables fixed). Overall, the results above provide additional support to the previous
findings that firms with higher pre-crisis BSC performed better during the crisis that was
18In robustness check I replicate Table 3.5, Panel A for the main sample using Beaver and Ryan
(2000), see Section 3.6.2.
19This is done to preserve the sample size as CRSP coverage starts in December 1925, while Fama-
French factors are available from July 1926.
20A vector of control variables includes size (natural logarithm of market value of assets (average of
monthly stock price times average shares outstanding, both variables are from CRSP and estimated over
the fiscal year), leverage (total debt to total assets), cash holdings (cash to total assets), profitability (ebit
to total assets), momentum (12 months buy-and-hold stock return measured at the end of September
1929), idiosyncratic volatility (the residual variance of the market model estimated over 39 months
(minimum 18 months) prior to the beginning of the Depression (October 1929)).
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accompanied by a credit crunch.
3.5 Real economic performance of firms surrounding
financial crisis and BSC
Thus far, I present evidence that firms, which entered the crisis with higher BSC had
better stock performance. In this section, I study operating performance of firms sur-
rounding the crisis period as a function of BSC in 2006 and a set of control variables. The
main empirical setup is a differences-in-differences setting that compares the difference
in real economic performance between firms with high versus low pre-crisis level of BSC,
after (2009) versus before (2006) the financial crisis. This setup is similar to the one
used in Giroud and Mueller (2016) and Duval et al. (2017). All the control variables are
measured in 2006. Additionally, I include two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and cluster
standard errors at the two-digit SIC industry. Finally, to account for the trend I include
change in the dependent variable over 2004 to 2006.
[Insert Table 3.8 about here]
First, I analyze accounting-based performance measures. Accounting measures
reflect both past and short-term financial performance, while market-based measures
reflect future and long-term financial performance (e.g. Hoskisson et al. 1994). I use three
measures of accounting performance: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE)
and return on sales (ROS) that are measured as cumulative returns over 2007 to 2009.
To account for the fact that high-BSC firms performed better before the crisis I estimate
cumulative ROA, ROE and ROS over pre-crisis years - 2004 to 2006. Table 3.8, Panel A
presents the results. The main coefficient under interest is BSC, which is both positive and
statistically significant for all profitability measures. A one standard deviation increase
in pre-crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with 2.9, 6.4 and 4.1 percentage points increase in
ROA, ROE and ROS, respectively.
Second, consistent with the idea that during periods of high liquidity constraints
incremental investments have high payoffs, I study the effect on investment during the
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crisis. Recent studies demonstrate that firms experienced underinvestment that was dic-
tated by drying-up liquidity (e.g. Campello et al. 2010; Duchin et al. 2010). Additionally,
firms which cut more investments during the financial crisis experienced lower stock per-
formance (Lins et al. 2013). Given that BSC-firms had better borrowing capacity, I study
whether this translated into higher value-creation through investment. I define invest-
ment intensity as capital expenditures over total sales.21 Table 3.8, Panel B presents
the results. Specifically, in Column (1) coefficient on BSC is positive and statistically
significant. In terms of economic significance: one standard deviation increase in pre-
crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with 6.1 percentage points higher increase in investment
output change during the crisis. Next, I test whether firms with BSC were able to shield
their employees from unemployment risk. In particular, better stock performance might
be explained by higher labor cost reductions. Thus, I study whether firms maintained
implicit contracts with their employees. Panel B, Column (2) demonstrates the results.
The coefficient on BSC is positive and statistically significant. In terms of economic sig-
nificance: one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with the
6.3 percentage points higher increase in crisis employment change. Additionally, I study
how firms’ productivity changed depending on pre-crisis BSC. Duval et al. (2017) docu-
ment that firms with weaker pre-crisis balance sheets experienced a decline in post-crisis
total factor productivity (TFP) growth relative to their less vulnerable counterparts. I
estimate TFP semiparametric method initiated by Olley and Pakes (1996). Panel B,
Column (3) presents the results. The coefficient on BSC is positive and statistically sig-
nificant. In terms of economic significance: one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis
BSC (0.196) is associated with 4.5 percentage points higher increase in crisis TFP change.
Third, I test whether firms with higher BSC were less risky during the crisis.
Given that BSC-firms had better access to debt-financing and had an ability to reduce the
volatility of earnings, this should lead to lower riskiness of a firm. Specifically, firms with
sufficient cash or access to external funding and less volatile earnings are able to meet
debt service obligations. These, in turn, should result in lower bankruptcy risk (Uhrig-
21I use sales instead of assets in the denominator to avoid introducing a mechanical association: a
high level of BSC results in lower assets
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Homburg 2005). I test whether BSC-firms had lower monthly volatility of stock returns,
better credit rating (the higher the score, the lower is the rating) and lower distance to
default (Bharath and Shumway 2008). All the variables are estimated as an average over
the crisis-period. Table 3.8, Panel C presents the results. In all model specifications high-
BSC firms were less risky during the crisis: exhibited lower stock return volatility, higher
ratings and lower distance to default (-0.115, t-stat=-4.098; -0.207, t-stat=-4.422; -2.282,
t-stat=-2.929). In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in
pre-crisis BSC (0.196) is associated with -0.022 lower standard deviation of stock returns,
4.1% lower probability of default and -0.45 higher rating (the lower the score the higher
is the rating).
Finally, I estimate whether BSC-firms were able to raise more capital during
the crisis. Debt issuance is defined as long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt
reduction plus current debt changes scaled by total sales. The equity issuance is de-
fined as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred
stock scaled by total sales. The dependent variables is the cumulative change in debt
and equity issuance over the crisis period. Table 3.8, Panel D presents the results. As
illustrated in column (1) firms with higher BSC raised more debt during the crisis (0.046,
t-stat=3.040). In contrast, there is no effect on equity issuance that is represented in col-
umn (2) (0.005, t-stat=0.226). These results support the evidence that BSC is especially
valued by debtholders since it reduces lenders’ uncertainty regarding the liquidation value
of assets. Thus, BSC-firms were more kin to issue debt during the crisis.
3.6 Additional Robustness Tests
So far the results document a strong evidence that BSC is positively related to firm
performance during the crisis. In this section, I introduce further tests to ensure the
robustness of my main results. First, I use propensity score matching to ensure similarity
of covariates distribution between treated and control groups. Second, I introduce alter-
native proxies for BSC. Finally, I analyze whether the results do hold once I control for
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pre-crisis level of financial reporting quality.
3.6.1 Propensity Score Matching
[Insert Table 3.9 about here]
Having a set of observational (i.e., nonrandomized) data requires the assumption
of balanced distribution of covariates in treated and control groups for drawing causal
effects. One possible way to replicate randomized experiment is to obtain treated and
control groups with similar covariate distributions (Stuart 2010). Given that I do not
have exogenous variation to assign treated and control samples, I make an inference on
these two groups based on quintiles of pre-crisis BSC. I assign treated (control) sample
as those firms that are in the fifth (first) quintile of the pre-crisis BSC. I use logistic
model and 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with caliper of 5% and no replacement that
produces the balanced sample after the matching procedure. I match on all covariates as
in Table 3.5, Panel A.
Table 3.9, Panel A provides comparison of treated and control groups before
and after the matching. Before the matching, there are 328 control and 328 treated firms.
Treatment group is bigger in size, with smaller short-term debt and book-to-market ratio,
higher cash, profitability and momentum. After the matching there are 144 one-to-one
matched firms. Notably, there are no statistically significant differences in the mean
values of the covariates across treated and control samples. Panel B presents regression
results of Eq.(3.2) over the matched sample. As before, the results are positive and
statistically significant, both for raw (0.232, t-stat=2.663) and abnormal returns (0.460,
t-stat=2.342).
3.6.2 Alternative proxies for BSC
[Insert Table 3.10 about here]
As an alternative proxy for BSC I propose two measures. First is an index of BSC
constructed using principal component analysis. Second proxy follows Beaver and Ryan
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(2000, 2005). I discuss them below.
First, I construct a proxy for BSC based on measures that proxy for firms’ con-
servative reporting of asset values, unconditional and conditional conservatism. Specifi-
cally, I control for depreciation (whether firms use accelerated depreciation or not), hidden
reserves accumulated through advertising and R&D (measures the extent of “hidden” re-
serves that are not on the balance sheet due to conservatism (Penman and Zhang 2002)),
goodwill (the presence of goodwill reflects recording of assets on the books at nonconser-
vative values), acquisition (whether the acquisition is accounted following pooling of in-
terest method), cumulative total accruals (asymmetric treatment of gains and losses (i.e.,
conservatism) produces an asymmetry in accruals that will result in cumulative negative
accruals over time (Givoly and Hayn 2000)). Combining these BSC-related measures
(within the sample spanning from 1990 to 2015) using first component from principal
component analysis I construct BSC-index (measured in 2006). Internet Appendix, Ta-
ble 3.2 presents the correlation of BSC-index with BSC characteristics. The correlation
between BSC characteristics and BSC-index are of expected direction, suggesting that
these factors capture a common underlying economic construct.
Table 3.10, Panel A provides the results from the estimation of Eq.(3.1) replac-
ing BSC with the BSC-index. The results confirm the previous finding - pre-crisis level
of BSC is positively associated (0.037, t-stat = 1.927; 0.106, t-stat = 2.546) with firms’
stock performance during the crisis.
Second, I estimate BSC using alternative proxy following Beaver and Ryan
(2000, 2005) as in Section3.4.5, but with six time period lags of the independent variables
(as the data availability allows me to expand the time span). This proxy captures net
effect of unconditional conservatism. However, given that balance sheet conservatism
mostly arises from unconditional conservatism (correlation between Sunder et al. (2018)
and Beaver and Ryan (2000, 2005) is 84%), I add this as an alternative measure. The
proxy for the incorporation of information in book value is the coefficient of lagged returns
on equity. By introducing the Basu (1997) framework, allows to avoid the bias in the
firm-specific intercept that captures both unconditional and conditional bias and permits
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isolating the level of unconditional conservatism.
Table 3.10, Panel B provides the results from the estimation of Eq.(3.1) re-
placing BSC with the BSCBeaver. As before, the results are positive and statistically
significant (0.229, t-stat = 4.816; 0.323, t-stat = 3.867).
3.6.3 Financial Reporting Quality
Effective financial reporting quality results in lower information asymmetry (Graham
et al. 2005). As a consequence, it leads to lower political and regulatory costs, higher
managerial efforts, lower cost of debt and lower (higher) information risk (stock returns)
(Farraghe et al. 1994; Francis et al. Francis et al. 2005; Agarwal et al. 2008; G. Biddle
et al. 2009; Bushee and Miller 2012).
It is documented that financial reporting quality mitigates negative effects of
financial crises followed by a market crash (Mitton 2002; Barton and Waymire 2004; Hi-
lary 2008). For exmaple, Mitton (2002) documents a positive relation between accounting
quality and firms’ returns during the East Asia crisis. In addition, Barton and Waymire
(2004) documents that the Great Depression firms had lower stock declines given higher
quality of financial reporting. In this regard, I control for financial reporting quality to
make sure that the effect of BSC is not subsumed. I proxy for financial reporting quality
(FRQ) based on discretionary accruals model following (e.g. Dechow and Dichev 2002;
Francis et al. 2005; Biddle et al. 2009). The main premise of the measure is that the
prediction of earnings is more precise when there is a lower error embedded in accruals.
The discretionary accruals model is estimated following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and
additionally augmented by the fundamental variables from Jones (1991), namely PPE
and change in revenues as suggested by McNichols 2002.22
Table 3.10, Panel C provides the results from the estimation of Eq.(3.1) adding
22The main model is a regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash
flows adding the change in revenue and PPE. Following Francis et al. (2005); the model is estimated
cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama
and French (1997) 48-industry classification. AQ is defined as the standard deviation of the firm-level
residuals calculated over the years t-4 to t. Higher values of standard deviations of residuals indicate
poorer accruals quality. This signifies that accruals lack predictability and should be a reason for priced
uncertainty. I multiply the obtained measure for FRQ by negative one so that it is increasing in financial
reporting quality and measure the proxy in 2006.
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FRQ as an additional control variable. Controlling for pre-crisis level of financial report-
ing quality does not subsumes the positive effect of BSC. The results remain positive and
statistically significant (0.170, t-stat = 4.216; 0.329, t-stat = 3.812). Additionally, firms
that entered the crisis with better financial reporting quality had better stock performance
(0.412, t-stat = 2.278; 1.259, t-stat = 3.124).
3.7 Summary and Conclusion
Using financial crisis as a natural experiment, I test to what extent the quality of pre-crisis
balance sheet (proxied by balance sheet conservatism) affected share- and debtholders’
value during the recent financial crisis. This paper provides evidence that BSC is value-
enhancing mechanism to share- and debtholders when the level of liquidity problem in
the economy increases.
First, I find that firms with higher BSC outperformed firms with lower BSC
during the crisis by around 6.8 percentage points in raw stock returns. Second, I document
that BSC-firms invested more during the crisis, were more productive and maintained
higher employment rates. Third, I find that BSC-firms were less risky during the crisis
that is represented by lower stock return volatility, distance to default and higher credit
ratings. Fourth, I find that BSC-firms raised more debt with lower cost of debt and lower
probability of covenant violation. Finally, I present an evidence that the positive effect
of BSC is more pronounced for firms that entered the crisis as financially constrained or
informationally opaque. These findings play in favor of causality rather then association
of the main findings.
The study presents an evidence on the positive side of BSC to share- and
debtholders during the crisis times. Financial constraints impair firms’ ability to engage
in long-term efficiency increasing investments. That is, firms with higher balance sheet
conservatism are more protected against financial frictions. Collectively, these results
present the importance of BSC predominately in periods of high vulnerability and low
market liquidity. During the normal times the level of firms’ BSC is already embedded in
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the stock price. Given the rare frequency and predictability of such an event as financial
crisis, I stay away from suggesting the optimal level of balance sheet conservatism that
managers should target.
The results of the paper should be considered within certain limitations. First,
measurement error of balance sheet conservatism. Although, I tried to incorporate dif-
ferent proxies, I can not rule out the measurement problem. Second, there are several
mechanisms through which BSC is supposed to ameliorate negative consequences of the
crisis. Although, there is no explicit findings on the factors that drive the results, I find
an evidence in support of informational and cushioning roles of BSC. Third, a lack of
proper evidence for the first stage (i.e., the choice of having BSC) limits the aforemen-
tioned conclusion to be causal. Fourth, the results might be biased to the extent that
the setting is missing correlated omitted variables. Finally, all the main conclusions are




Variable Definition of main variables
Panel A: Variables used in construction of BSC following Sunder et al. (2018)
BTM The book-to-market ration, computed as the ratio of the book value of total
assets (at) to the market value of equity (prcc f × csho) plus the book value
of debt (at-ceq)
LT Growth Forecast The median of long-term growth estimates by analysts (I/B/E/S data).
Missing values of firms that have at least one non-missing observation within
the sample period are replaced by the closest non-missing value to preserve
the sample size.
Sales Ratio of sales (sale) to lagged sales
Industry Concentration Herfindahl index.
Consumer Sentiment
Index
Published by the University of Michigan, available at
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/tables.html
S&P Level of the S&P’s Composite Index from CRSP
Profitability The ration of cash flow from operations (oancf) lagged total assets (at)
Credit Rating The numerical equivalent of S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating
(splticrm) from COMPUSTAT. For firms not rated by S&P, I first regress
debt rating on a set of financial variables, including log of assets (at), ROA
(ib/at), leverage, dividend (dvc) indicator, subordinated debt (ds) indicator
and a loss indicator, with industry and year fixed effects for rated firms.
Then, I use the estimated coefficients from the first regression and the firm’s
financial information to compute a credit rating for each firm in each year.
The computed rating values are winsorized at 2 and 27 to be consistent with
the range of ratings reported in COMPUSTAT. The value of Credit Rating
decreases in credit quality
High Inflation An indicator variable equal to one if the inflation over the past five years is
higher than the median level during the sample period, and zero otherwise.
Inflation is from Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
AOCI Accumulated other comprehensive income (acominc) scaled by total assets
(at)
Panel B: Main Variables
BSC A measure of balance sheet conservatism following Sunder et al. (2018)
Raw Raturn Raw return computed over the period July 2007 to March 2009, winsorized
within the range of -1 and 1
Abnormal Return 4-factor Market model-adjusted return over the period July 2007 to March
2009. Market model parameters are estimated over the five-year period
ending in June 2007 using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market
proxy, winsorized within the range of -1 and 1
Market Cap. Market value of assets estimated as share price (prccq) times the number
of shares outstanding (cshoq)
Long-Term Debt Long-term debt (dlttq) divided by total assets (atq)
Short-Term Debt Short-term debt (dlcq) divided by total assets (atq)
Sales Growth Growth of sales (saleq) from the last quarter
RE Retained Earnings (req) - accumulated other comprehensive income (acom-
incq) scaled by market value of equity (prccq*cshoq)
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Table 3.7 continued
Variable Definition of main variables
Gross Profitability Revenues (revtq) - cost of goods sold (cogsq) scaled by total assets (atq)
Cash Cash and short-term investments (cheq) divided by total assets (atq).
Idiosyncratic Risk The residual variance of the 4-factor market model estimated over five-year
period ending in June 2007 (monthly CRSP data)
Momentum One year buy-and-hold return preceding the crisis
Panel C: Additional Control Variables
E-Index The sum of six dummies reflecting antitakeover provisions (Bebchuk et
al. 2009) http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml




Percentage of independent directors in the compensation committee
ROA Net income (ib) over the total assets (at)
ROE Net income (ib) over the shareholders’ equity (ceq)
ROS Net income (ib) over the net sale(at)
Investment Capital expenditure (capxy) scaled by total assets (sale)
Employment The number of people employed by the company (emp)
TFP Total Factor Productivity following Olley and Pakes (1996)
Standard Dev. Monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns (ret)
Rating The numerical equivalent of S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating
(splticrm) that decreases in credit quality
Default Prob. Monthly monthly distances to default following Bhattacharya et al. (2003)
Debt Issuance Ratio of long-term debt (dltis) minus the reduction in long-term debt (dltr)
plus current debt changes (dlcch) scaled by total sales (sale)
Equity Issuance Ratio of sale of common and preferred stock (sstk) minus purchase of com-
mon and preferred stock (prstkc) scaled by total sales (sale)
AISD All − in− drawn spread, expressed in decimals
TCB totalcostofdebt as in Berg et al. (2016)
Offering yield Yield to maturity at the time of issuance, based on the coupon and any
discount or premium to par value at the time of sale, expressed in decimals
Amount Facility amount (Dealscan)
Maturity Facility maturity in months (Dealscan)
Collateral Number of covenants (Dealscan)
Covenant Is the number of covenants that are included in a loan (Dealscan)
Covenant dummy Dummy variable equal to one if a loan has covenant and zero otherwise
(Mergent FISD)
Prime Base Rate Dummy variable equal to one if the base rate is prime and zero otherwise
(Dealscan)
Fungible Dummy variable equal to one if bonds are by virtue of their terms, equiva-
lent, interchangeable, or substitutable, and zero otherwise (Mergent FISD)
Security Rank variable that takes the value of one to four for unsecured, subordi-
nated, senior, and senior secured bonds, respectively (Mergent FISD)
Redeemable Dummy variable equal to one if a bond can be redeemed under certain
conditions, and zero otherwise(Mergent FISD)
Performance Pricing Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing and zero
otherwise (Dealscan)
Total Assets Total assets (atq)
Tangibility Ratio of property, plant, and equipment (ppentq) to total assets (atq)
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Table 3.7 continued
Variable Definition of main variables
Current Ratio Ratio of current assets (acoq) to current liabilities (lcoq)
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt (dlttq) and short-term debt (dlcq) to total assets
(atq)
Tangibility Property plant and equipment (ppentq) to total assets (atq)
Big-4 Dummy variable equal to to one if a firm is audited by one of the Big-4
auditors, and zero otherwise
Std. Returns Standard deviation of returns estimated over 36 months (minimum 12
months)
Info. Asymmetry Relative Bid-ask spread = 100 × (Ask - Bid)/(0.5× (Ask + Bid)) estimated
over 36 months (minimum 12 months)
DSMTH Earnings smoothing proxy following Lang and Maffett (2011) and Lang et
al. (2012)
FRQ Discretionary accruals model following Dechow and Dichev (2002) aug-
mented by the fundamental variables (PPE and change in revenues) fol-
lowing McNichols 2002
BSC˙Beaver Beaver and Ryan (2000) measure of balance sheet conservatism
137
Figure 3.1: Calendar-Time Regressions of Hedge Portfolios
This figure presents calendar-time regression of a zero-investment (equal-weighted) hedge port-
folio that goes long firms with high (4th quartile) and short firms with low (1st quartile) levels
of pre-crisis BSC. Placebo crisis years are set from 1991 till 2016. Firms are sorted into quar-
tiles based on pre-crisis level of BSC. Each crisis period starts in July and lasts for 21 months.
Numbers in green are p-values of alpha from the 2-factor Fama and French model.







































Long ’high’ and short ’low’ BSC−firms within 21 month
Hedge Portfolio
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of Main Variables
N Mean Std.dev Q1 Median Q3
BSC 1643 0.003 0.196 -0.125 0.015 0.142
Raw Return 1643 -0.507 0.295 -0.741 -0.533 -0.317
Abnormal Return 1643 0.029 0.747 -0.498 -0.088 0.337
Market Cap. 1643 7637.001 19704.539 479.588 1353.867 4531.230
Long-Term Debt 1643 0.164 0.174 0.000 0.126 0.261
Short-Term Debt 1643 0.027 0.052 0.000 0.004 0.030
Cash 1643 0.187 0.193 0.035 0.109 0.285
Sales Growth 1643 0.070 0.215 -0.032 0.038 0.127
RE 1643 0.022 0.624 -0.007 0.151 0.300
Gross Profitability 1643 0.102 0.064 0.058 0.089 0.129
Idiosyncratic Risk 1643 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.009 0.016
Momentum 1643 0.214 0.364 -0.019 0.176 0.386
AISD 1040 0.019 0.015 0.007 0.018 0.027
TCB 690 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.009 0.018
Offering yield 317 0.064 0.015 0.055 0.062 0.069
DSMTH 1382 0.590 0.079 0.541 0.601 0.647
Bath Firm 1636 0.515 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
Covenant Violation 1643 0.068 0.251 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table presents descriptive statistics of primary variables of interest. All of the variables































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: The informational role of BSC
Bank Loans Bond Market
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES AISD TCB Offering yield
BSC -0.014*** -0.011** -0.027***
(-2.692) (-2.513) (-2.642)
Log(Amount) -0.001** -0.000 0.006***
(-2.058) (-0.428) (3.020)






Prime Base Rate -0.003 -0.007**
(-1.097) (-2.104)










Log(Total Assets) -0.000 -0.001 -0.006***
(-0.496) (-1.568) (-3.774)
Profitability -0.010 -0.006 -0.003
(-0.950) (-0.721) (-0.139)
Cash 0.014 (0.016) -0.005
(1.41) (2.33) (-0.349)
Tangibility 0.005 -0.001 0.005
(0.967) (-0.379) (0.695)
Current Ratio 0.001 0.000 -0.004***
(0.633) (0.138) (-2.973)
Leverage 0.001 0.011** 0.005
(0.227) (2.418) (0.473)
Log(Rating) 0.008** -0.001 0.006*
(2.12) (-0.24 ) (1.723)
Observations 334 266 316
Adjusted R-squared 0.673 0.761 0.436
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Loan Type FE Yes Yes No
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of Eq.(3.2) for the estimation of the
informational role of BSC. The dependent variable is all-in-drawn
spread (AISD), total cost of borrowing (TCB) developed by Berg
et al. 2016 and the spread of primary corporate bonds (Offering
yield), all are expressed in decimals. The set of bank loans and
primary corporate debt issuance covers the period of the crisis
(2007 July - 2009 March). I include all the debt contracts within
the crisis period with non-missing observations. All of the other
variables are as described in Table 3.7. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.4: The Cushioning role of BSC
Panel A: Earnings Smoothing
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Model-1 Model-2 Model-3
BSC 0.029** 0.039*** 0.026**
(2.387) (3.006) (2.330)
Log(Total Assets) -0.008*** -0.004***
(-4.698) (-3.067)
Long-Term Debt -0.012 -0.007
(-0.611) (-0.739)










Std. Returns -0.451*** -0.152***
(-6.309) (-3.224)
Previous DIS SMTH 0.652***
(25.404)
Constant 0.590*** 0.699*** 0.247***
(19,062.975) (31.250) (11.579)
Observations 1,379 1,379 1,277
Adjusted R-squared -0.006 0.044 0.522
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of Eq.(3.2) for the estimation of the
cushioning role of BSC. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
a proxy for earnings smoothing (DSMTH) (following Lang and
Maffett (2011) and Lang et al. (2012)) that is estimated as an av-
erage DSMTH over the crisis period. In Panel B, the dependent
variable equal to one for firms taking ‘baths’ (Column (1,3,4))
and total number of ’baths’ (following Elliott and Shaw (1988))
during the crisis period (Column (2)). In Panel C, the depen-
dent variable is equal to 1 if a firm violated a covenant during
the crisis period and zero otherwise. All of the other variables
are as described in Table 3.7. ***, **, * denote statistical sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.4 - Continued
Panel B: Assets write-downs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Whole Sample Whole Sample Forced Sample Voluntary Sample
BSC -0.399*** -0.889*** -0.398*** -0.026
(-4.942) (-4.473) (-3.230) (-0.156)
Log(Total Assets) 0.017 0.040 -0.017 0.042***
(1.620) (1.323) (-0.823) (3.106)
B/M -0.003 0.026 -0.049 0.385**
(-0.077) (0.333) (-1.149) (2.343)
Profitability -0.802** -1.809 -1.327** -0.522
(-2.286) (-1.599) (-2.439) (-0.752)
ROA -1.759*** -5.579*** -1.288 -1.226
(-2.902) (-5.845) (-1.575) (-1.066)
Turnover 0.006 0.028 0.009 0.009
(0.663) (1.174) (0.612) (0.888)
Volatility 0.714*** 1.428*** 0.533 0.592**
(4.435) (4.076) (1.648) (2.547)
Info. asymmetry -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-0.449) (-0.803) (-0.661) (0.026)
Momentum -0.075** -0.239*** -0.097 -0.109**
(-2.225) (-4.176) (-1.502) (-2.064)
Constant 0.213* -0.891*** 0.562*** -0.091
(1.972) (-2.841) (2.731) (-0.700)
Observations 1,629 1,629 667 667
p− value BSC 0.06
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.129 0.113
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.10
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Table 3.4 - Continued
Panel C: Covenant Violation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Violation Violation Violation
















Constant 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.218***
(8.613) (532.193) (6.278)
Observations 1,640 1,640 1,640
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.044 0.077
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes
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Table 3.5: Crisis period returns and BSC
Panel A: Pre-Crisis BSC and stock returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
BSC 0.236*** 0.483*** 0.170*** 0.331***
(6.738) (6.454) (5.291) (4.036)
Ln(Market Cap.) 0.022*** 0.035**
(3.687) (2.564)
Long-Term Debt -0.141** -0.162
(-2.425) (-1.079)








Gross Profitability 0.054 0.341
(0.343) (0.727)




Constant -0.407*** -0.430*** -0.579*** -0.749***
(-26.125) (-12.201) (-9.828) (-5.936)
Observations 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.345 0.208 0.361
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of the relationship between crisis returns and BSC estimating
Eq.(3.2). Crisis-period returns are measured over the period from July 2007 to March 2009.
In Panel B, BSC is segregated into quartiles, where each variable is set as a dummy variable
that corresponds to a specific quartile (the intercept captures the effect of quartile 1). For
example, BSC2 is set to one if a firm is in the second quartile of BSC measured in 2006
and zero otherwise. Panel C, uses linear measure of BSC and includes additional controls
for corporate governance. When the measure of the governance metrics is missing, I set it
equal to zero and introduce a dummy variable set to one if there is a missing value of the
governance metrics. All models include these dummies, but the coefficients are not reported
in the table. Panel D presents Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of Eq.(3.3) with four-
factor loadings that are updated on a monthly level. All the variables are as described in
Table 3.7. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are
derived based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by firm.
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Table 3.5 - Continued
Panel B: Quintile Dummies of BSC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
BSC2 0.057*** 0.121*** 0.036** 0.078**
(3.497) (3.265) (2.562) (2.302)
BSC3 0.111*** 0.200*** 0.077*** 0.124***
(5.882) (4.522) (4.388) (2.792)
BSC4 0.125*** 0.226*** 0.092*** 0.141***
(7.296) (6.112) (5.188) (3.361)
Constant -0.479*** -0.565*** -0.629*** -0.867***
(-22.666) (-12.036) (-10.837) (-7.103)
Firm Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640
Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.342 0.209 0.359
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Control for Corporate Governance Proxies
BSC 0.226*** 0.467*** 0.166*** 0.324***
(6.462) (6.028) (5.208) (3.931)
E-Index -0.016** -0.038** -0.011 -0.028*
(-2.042) (-2.419) (-1.311) (-1.773)
Compensation Committee Independence 0.062* -0.008 0.056 -0.012
(1.735) (-0.085) (1.536) (-0.117)
Board Independence -0.041 -0.037 -0.067 -0.088
(-0.642) (-0.260) (-1.120) (-0.654)
Constant -0.356*** -0.247* -0.515*** -0.542**
(-7.338) (-1.754) (-6.257) (-2.438)
Firm Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640
Adjusted R-squared 0.184 0.352 0.214 0.365
Firm Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Stock returns surrounding the crisis and BSC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
BSC ×Crisis 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.004**
(3.060) (3.212) (2.349) (2.595)
BSC × Post− Crisis -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005**
(-2.122) (-2.223) (-2.465) (-2.515)
Constant 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.002
(1.452) (1.091) (0.888) (0.384)
Firm Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Observations 126,610 126,610 118,353 118,353
Average R-square 0.039 0.103 0.074 0.137
Number of groups 84 84 84 84
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: Stock returns surrounding the Crisis and BSC: Robustness Test
Panel A: Persistence of BSC proxy
BSC2005 BSC2004 BSC2003
Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BSC 0.089** 0.195*** 0.094** 0.183*** 0.119*** 0.188***
(2.095) (3.230) (2.544) (3.174) (3.735) (3.083)
Constant -0.560*** -0.622*** -0.538*** -0.580*** -0.503*** -0.524***
(-12.572) (-7.934) (-10.293) (-6.416) (-9.706) (-5.569)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,979 1,979 1,905 1,905 1,831 1,831
Adjusted R-squared 0.164 0.378 0.168 0.362 0.169 0.351
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Placebo years
2004 2003 2002
Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BSC -0.249** -0.181** -0.365*** -0.259*** -0.796*** -0.551***
(-2.282) (-2.355) (-2.830) (-2.806) (-5.260) (-4.894)
Constant 0.347** 0.303** 1.194*** 0.835*** 1.487*** 1.175***
(2.261) (2.266) (8.542) (7.071) (8.664) (8.440)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,201 1,201 1,126 1,126 1,207 1,207
Adjusted R-squared 0.178 0.276 0.190 0.303 0.293 0.292
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Alternative Crisis Periods
Dot.com 9/11 Demand LTCM
Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BSC -0.076 -0.519 -0.013 -0.006 -0.011 0.016
(-0.521) (-1.643) (-0.345) (-0.141) (-0.075) (0.104)
Constant 1.368*** 2.483*** 0.100 0.073 -0.335*** -0.330***
(6.161) (5.311) (1.590) (0.989) (-4.265) (-2.933)
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 935 935 1,031 1,031 753 753
Adjusted R-squared 0.352 0.430 0.103 0.077 0.148 0.130
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of the relationship between BSC and stock returns estimating Eq.(3.2). In Panel A, BSC is
measured in 2005, 2004 and 2003. In Panel B, I introduce placebo crisis years and estimate Eq.(3.2). As before, placebo crisis
period return is estimated over 21 month starting from July of the placebo year. Panel C, estimates Eq.(3.2) over alternative
crisis periods - Dot.com bubble (2000 Q1 to 2002 Q3), September 11 terrorist attack (2001 Q3-Q4) and Russian debt crisis
that led to a collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fun. All the variables are as described in Table 3.7.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors clustered by two-digit SIC industry.
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Table 3.7: Crisis period returns and BSC
October 1929 to December 1930 October 1929 to December 1931 October 1929 to December 1932
VARIABLES Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return Raw return Abnormal return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BSCBeaver 0.608*** 1.064*** 0.449** 2.032*** 0.230 0.558
(4.502) (3.826) (2.609) (4.351) (1.118) (0.836)
Constant -0.352*** -0.300** -0.623*** -0.674** -0.788*** -0.649
(-4.721) (-2.095) (-9.372) (-2.366) (-7.962) (-1.258)
Observations 104 104 97 97 92 92
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 0.338 0.049 0.539 0.228 0.402
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of the relationship between Great Depression (1929-1932) returns and BSC. The beginning of the
crisis is set as of October 1929. Crisis-period returns are measured over three periods: (1) from October 1929 to December 1930;
(2) from October 1929 to December 1931; (3) from October 1929 to December 1932. The regression model under consideration is
as in Table 3.5. To measure BSC I follow the modified model of Beaver and Ryan (2000) (I reduce number of lagged observation
to one time period to preserve the sample size). The model is as follows:
BTMi,t = αi + αt +
1∑
j=0
[β1Di,t−j + β2Ri,t−j + β3Di,t−jRi,t−j ] + εi,t,
where BTM is the book-to-market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal period. αt is a time intercept and αi is
firm-specific measure of unconditional conservatism. This measure is referred as BSCBeaver. Factor loadings and idiosyncratic
risk are estimated each month based on the previous 39 months’ data (min 18 months). ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on clustered standard errors at the industry level.
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Table 3.8: Operating performance surrounding the Crisis and BSC
Panel A: Alternative profitability measures
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ROA ROE ROS
BSC 0.148*** 0.326*** 0.209***
(8.557) (5.569) (3.365)
Observations 1,550 1,550 1,549
Adjusted R-squared 0.471 0.281 0.369
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Investment, Employment, TFP
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CAPEX EMPL TFP
BSC 0.312** 0.322*** 0.228***
(2.437) (5.476) (3.745)
Observations 1,547 1,532 1,198
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.232 0.135
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes
This table presents results of the relationship between op-
erating performance surrounding the crisis and BSC. Main
regression under consideration is as follows:
Yi,2009−2007 = β0 + β1BSCi,2006 + ψ′Xi,2006 + Yi,2006−2004
+ ω′FEi + εi,
where subscript i denotes firm. For Panel A, C and D
the dependent variable Yi,2009−2007 is cumulative crisis-period
firm performance, firm risk and capital raising. In Panel B,
Yi,2009−2007 is the log difference of investment, employment
and TFP. BSC stands for the measure of balance sheet con-
servatism that is measured in 2006. Xi,2006 is a vector of firm-
specific control variables that are measured in 2006. Specifi-
cally, I control for firm’s financial health before the crisis. I
include cash holdings, both short- and long-term debt, prof-
itability, Tobin’s Q and change in y within 2004 to 2006. FE
is two-digit fixed effects. All the variables are as described
in Table 3.7. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on clustered
standard errors at the two-digit SIC industry level.
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Table 3.8 - Continued
Panel C: Firm risk
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES STD Default Prob. Rating
BSC -0.115*** -0.207*** -2.282***
(-4.098) (-4.422) (-2.929)
Observations 1,633 1,155 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.331 0.334 0.747
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Capital raising
(1) (2)




Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.231
Industry F.E. Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes
Table 3.9: Stock returns surrounding the Crisis and BSC: PSM
Panel C: Firm risk
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES STD Default Prob. Rating
BSC -0.115*** -0.207*** -2.282***
(-4.098) (-4.422) (-2.929)
Observations 1,633 1,155 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.331 0.334 0.747
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Clustered St. Errors Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.10: Stock returns surrounding the Crisis and BSC: PSM
Panel A: Index of BSC characteristics






Firm Characteristics Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.367
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes Yes






Adjusted R-squared 0.239 0.351
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes








Adjusted R-squared 0.215 0.360
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes
Four-factor loadings Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
This table presents results of the relationship between BSC
and stock returns using robustness test. Panel A replaces
BSC in Eq.(3.2) with alternative proxy constructed as an
index of firms’ conservative reporting of asset values, condi-
tional and unconditional conservatism using principal com-
ponent analysis. Panel B replaces BSC in Eq.(3.2) with
alternative proxy following Beaver and Ryan (2000, 2005).
Panel C add FRQ following Dechow and Dichev 2002 aug-
mented by the fundamental variables (PPE and change in
revenues) following McNichols 2002. All the variables are
as described in Table 3.7. ***, **, * denote statistical sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clus-
tered by two-digit SIC industry.
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Internet Appendix
Table 3.1: Measuring balance sheet conservatism
This table presents the OLS regression results of BTM on a set of variables for estimation of BSC
following Eq.(3.1). The results replicate findings of Sunder et al. (2018), Appendix 1. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. P-values are derived based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm-level.
(1)
VARIABLES Dep. Variable = BTM

























Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix
This table presents correlation matrix between BSC-index constructed using first component
from principal component analysis and BSC characteristics. Depreciation is an indicator vari-
able equal to one if the compustat footnote (dpact fn) shows that the firm uses accelerated
depreciation, and zero otherwise. R&D and Advertising reserves are “hidden” reserves follow-
ing Penman and Zhang (2002). Advertising reserve (xad) (R&D reserve) (xrd) is amortized
using a sum-of-the-years-digits method over two (five) years. Goodwill is an indicator variable
equal to one if there is no goodwill balance (gdwl), and zero otherwise. Acquisition is an indi-
cator variable equal to one if the compustat footnote (aqs fn) shows that the firm uses pooling
of interest method (“AI”), and zero otherwise. Accruals the average of nonoperating accruals
(ni + dp - oancf + recch + invch + apalch + txach) scaled by assets (at) over a period with a
maximum of three years and a minimum of two years. ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.




R&D reserve 0.80∗∗∗ 0.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.41)
Advertising reserve 0.00 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.76) (0.00) (0.00)
Goodwill 0.35∗∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
Acquisition 0.01∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.07) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Accruals -0.75∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BSC 0.18∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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